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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
TRAJECTORY PRIVACY PRESERVATION AND LIGHTWEIGHT
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNIQUES FOR MOBILITY-CENTRIC IOT
by
Abdur Rahman Bin Shahid
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Niki Pissinou, Major Professor
Various research efforts have been undertaken to solve the problem of trajectory pri-
vacy preservation in the Internet of Things (IoT) of resource-constrained mobile de-
vices. Most attempts at resolving the problem have focused on the centralized model
of IoT, which either impose high delay or fail against a privacy-invading attack with
long-term trajectory observation. These proposed solutions also fail to guarantee lo-
cation privacy for trajectories with both geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged data, since
they are designed for geo-tagged trajectories only. While a few blockchain-based
techniques have been suggested for preserving trajectory privacy in decentralized
model of IoT, they require large storage capacity on resource-constrained devices
and can only provide conditional privacy when a set of authorities governs the
blockchain. This dissertation addresses these challenges to develop efficient trajec-
tory privacy-preservation and lightweight blockchain techniques for mobility-centric
IoT.
We develop a pruning-based technique by quantifying the relationship between
trajectory privacy and delay for real-time geo-tagged queries. This technique yields
higher trajectory privacy with a reduced delay than contemporary techniques while
preventing a long-term observation attack. We extend our study with the consider-
ation of the presence of non-geo-tagged data in a trajectory. We design an attack
vii
model to show the spatiotemporal correlation between the geo-tagged and non-geo-
tagged data which undermines the privacy guarantee of existing techniques. In
response, we propose a methodology that considers the spatial distribution of the
data in trajectory privacy-preservation and improves existing solutions, in privacy
and usability.
With respect to blockchain, we design and implement one of the first blockchain
storage management techniques utilizing the mobility of the devices. This technique
reduces the required storage space of a blockchain and makes it lightweight for
resource-constrained mobile devices. To address the trajectory privacy challenges
in an authority-based blockchain under the short-range communication constraints
of the devices, we introduce a silence-based one of the first technique to establish a
balance between trajectory privacy and blockchain utility.
The designed trajectory privacy- preservation techniques we established are light-
weight and do not require an intermediary to guarantee trajectory privacy, thereby
providing practical and efficient solution for different mobility-centric IoT, such as
mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Vehicles.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Over the past few years, with the advancement of sensing technologies, wireless com-
munication, and embedded systems, we have observed a dramatic increase in the
research effort to turn physical objects into smart devices and enable them to talk to
each other through the internet; the network formed by these different smart devices
is termed as the Internet of Things (IoT) [AIM10]. From predictive maintenance in
industries, improving environment monitoring systems, reducing road fatalities by
enabling the vehicles to communicate with each other, minimizing errors in decision
making in military systems to better monitoring of health, IoT has a bevy of ap-
plications in nearly every industry. A variation of IoT is the mobility-centric IoT,
which unifies the sensing ability with mobility of the devices. The core component
of such mobility-centric IoT systems is the location information of the IoT devices:
users share their location information through their devices with a system to get a
variety of location-based services (LBSs). Formally, location-based services are “ser-
vices accessible with mobile devices through the mobile network and utilizing the
ability to make use of the location of the terminals”[VMG+01]. The location infor-
mation of the users, for example, has made location-based recommendation systems
a standard part of our daily life. Real-time navigation systems, intelligent vehicle
systems, crowdsensing, indoor navigation for blind people, and health monitoring
are just a very few examples of location-based services which are benefited from
the mobility aspect of IoT. From an economic perspective, mobility-centric IoT has
a tremendous impact on the overall GDP. It was predicted that the revenue from
location-based service would be as high as $39.43 billion in 2020 [IoT15]. Under-
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Figure 1.1: Real cases on trajectory privacy issues.
standing the enormous potential of such systems, efforts have been made to connect
an increasingly larger number of device to IoT system; according to statistics from
Statista, the number of smartphone devices would hit 2.87 billion by the year of
2020[Sta19].
Despite having enormous technological and economic benefits, embracing mobility-
centric IoT for location-based services (LBSs) is challenging. One problem is regard-
ing the privacy of the location information of LBS users. IoT systems usually rely
on centralized architecture (i.e., cloud server), with a main server responsible for
storing, processing, and analyzing all the data sent by the various IoT devices. By
gathering all the information from a user and by combining them with other in-
formation from a large number of sources, it is possible to reveal sensitive, private
information. This type of information is highly valuable, and a malicious system
authority may choose to profit by selling the information to third parties, but even
in cases where the central authority can be trusted, the sensitive data cannot be
assumed secured as centralized architectures are highly susceptible to a single point
of failure or external cyber-attacks. Security loopholes in the design of the system or
lack of understanding about a variety of threats can make the whole system vulner-
able. By exploiting these loopholes, malicious entities can compromise the system
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[MF17] or harvest users’ sensitive data [Gra18]. Another risk of revealing sensi-
tive spatiotemporal location information is that malicious entities (e.g., robbers)
can utilize that information to target potential victims (Figure 1.1). For example,
an interview of ex-buglers revealed that burglars use location-based social networks
to discover empty houses to burgle. In summary, an IoT system never be wholly
trusted and it is necessary to ensure the privacy of an IoT user’s data in such a
system by design.
1.2 Motivation
This dissertation is motivated by the trajectory privacy issues in IoT systems which
are built to provide different kinds of location-based services (LBSs). The research of
this dissertation focuses on three different types of LBSs: location query, heteroge-
neous data sharing platform (e.g. location-based social networks), and aggregation-
oriented mobile crowdsensing applications. We first consider an LBS where users
send their location information and request to a service provider from their IoT
devices (e.g., smartwatch, smartphones, and the on-board unit of vehicles) to get
location-centric information(e.g., nearby urgent care, and restaurants having at least
4-star reviews). We can formulate this request or query as follows.
Q = {U , lt, I} (1.1)
Here U is the identifier of a user, lt is the user’s location in terms of latitude and
longitude at time t, and I is the requested information. The service provider in-
telligently generates the best relevant results for U based on the previously shared
location data and other relevant contextual data. A service provider usually stores
all the contents from all of its users and generates a predictive model to find out the
best results for a particular request; the problem here is that, asides from providing
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“honest” results, the models can also be (mis)used to extract sensitive information
regarding the user’s health status, religious and political views, home and work
addresses, their frequently visited locations, and so on.
In addition to sending a request to the service provider, LBS users can also
share the location information through check-ins and different types of geo-tagged
content. One such example is the location-based social network (LBSN), where
users share their location-based experience with other users through location-tagged
media content, such as photos, videos, and texts. Formally, “Social Network Sites
that include location information into shared contents are called Location Based
Social Networks (LBSN).”[RH13]. Both check-ins and geo-tagged contents can be
considered as similar to an LBS query as both of them explicitly contain location
information of a user and carry the similar location privacy threats. The high
temporal correlation between geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged data can also be used
to infer a user’s location information.
Given the severity of the privacy issues that arise from the shared location in-
formation, we have recently observed a surge of research on location privacy 1.The
majority of this research has paid particular attention to solving the problem for in-
dependent location’s privacy preservation, but this focus is shifting towards devising
mechanisms to protect the privacy of spatiotemporally correlated locations. In this
dissertation, we focus on the problems with (1) ensuring the privacy of frequently
visited sensitive locations under spatiotemporal correlation against long-term ob-
servation-based attacks, and (2) preserving privacy against an attack based on a
combination of geo-tagged and non geo-tagged contents in spatiotemporal domain.
We define the notion of “long-term privacy” as follows. Let, T1, . . . Tn are n number
of different trajectories of a user. Each of these trajectories are made up with a set
1We use “Trajectory Privacy” and “Location Privacy” interchangeably.
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of sensitive (both frequent and infrequent) locations such that tilast < t
i+1
last. Here,
tilast and t
i+1
first are the times of last and first locations in Ti and Ti+1, respectively.
Then, the long-term privacy preservation refers to preserving privacy of Ti+1 in such
a way that it will not leak the privacy of any of the sensitive locations in T0, . . . Ti.
We observe that when it comes to the issue of preserving privacy against long-term
observation, existing approaches either leak privacy to maintain quality of services
(QoS) or impose high reduction in QoS, in terms of query drop or delay, to en-
sure the location privacy [GDSB16, LLL+17]. As such, finding the right balance
between the long-term privacy preservation and real-time quality of services is the
core problem that motivates the first aspect of this dissertation.
The second problem is mainly associated with LBS scenarios where users share
both geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged content. We confine our study to LBSN with
two kinds of content: checkins and photos. The location privacy issues with checkins
and photos have been studied independently for many years: devising machine
learning techniques for identifying a user’s location from both indoor and outdoor
photos is an active area of computer vision [LCTZ13, TPFF+15, WKP16]. The
opposite is also true: preserving visual location privacy against such identifying
techniques has also attracted significant attention [MDFFF17, OFS17]. Nonetheless,
the synergy between the privacy-invading techniques for check-ins and photos is not
addressed well in the literature. In particular, we study the location privacy issues
in a scenario, where a trajectory contains spatiotemporally correlated check-ins, geo-
tagged, and non-geo-tagged photos, and a malicious entity is unwilling to analyze
the contents of the photos of location inference. Formation of such a successful
attack model and its defense mechanism is another aspect of this dissertation.
One way of concealing the user is by forming a distributed peer-to-peer (P2P)
network without relying on a centralized entity. This idea has been studied at
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some extent, and several approaches have been proposed for location privacy pro-
tection [STP+14, NLZ+15, GPI16]. However, these approaches utilized the P2P
network in an off-the-shelf manner. In reality, tapping into distributed P2P net-
work is not straightforward as it comes up with a bevy of security, trust, and
data management issues. We argue that we first need to identify which distributed
IoT system can provide security, trust, auditability, and immutability by design.
Blockchain technology has emerged as a distributed P2P way of recording digital
interactions in a secure, transparent, and auditable way without relying on central-
ized authority[Nak08, Fra14]. Blockchain is essentially a public ledger of a sequence
of blocks that continually grows as newly created blocks are added to record the
up-to-date transactions. The meaning of transactions varies with the context of its
application. For instance, with cryptocurrencies, it is mainly the amount of currency
transacted by two entities in the network. In environment monitoring crowdsensing
applications, this could be the value of shared sensor reading. As distributed P2P
network is used, each node in the network holds a copy of the blockchain which
provides built-in integrity of information, and security of immutability by design,
making it very useful for P2P trustless networks composed of a massive number
of devices. By design, blockchain provides anonymity, as the nodes can join the
network with private and public keys. With these unique set of benefits, blockchain
has already gained significant attention from the IoT community to achieve privacy
through decentralization. From a broader perspective, integrating blockchain to IoT
systems is being considered. Today’s centralized architecture is incapable of han-
dling the fast-paced growth of IoT; the frequent change in the mobility-centric IoT
network due to node mobility, node failure, damage, energy depletion, or channel
fading only further exacerbate the problems of a centralized model. However, the
integration of blockchain with IoT is also not straightforward. Since the chain con-
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tinues to grow, IoT devices require more and more resources to manage it on their
local spaces. Similarly, scalability with constrained computing power and battery
also poses a challenge. To be precise, with the integration of blockchain, each node
needs to perform a large number of tasks at different stages of the blockchain with
their constrained computing power and battery life, and as the network grows this
problem becomes increasingly more challenging to address. Hence, we emphasize
that, before attempting to preserve privacy with a distributed P2P network using
blockchain, we must address its scalability problem for resource-constrained IoT
devices, which is another focus of this dissertation.
The majority of the works on blockchain-IoT integration is motivated by bit-
coin, the first successful application of blockchain. It is a public blockchain, where
the nodes join and leave the network with random public keys and there exists no
authority for tracking the nodes. Blockchain has since evolved from public to a per-
missioned version. The idea of a permissioned blockchain stemmed from the evidence
of misuse of freedom in public blockchains for illegal activities. For instance, almost
half of the bitcoin transactions are estimated to be related to illegal drug sales, ran-
somware, and other malicious activities[FKP19]. Organizations are more interested
in permissioned blockchain, which would assist them with the power of blockchain
as well as having better control over the entities that they interact with. In a such
blockchain, there exists an authority which controls who can join the network and
do what kind of operations. Hence, unlike public blockchains, trajectory privacy
preservation in a permissioned-blockchain is a more robust problem as the author-
ity retains the capability of tracking the nodes. The current privacy-preserving
solutions, proposed for the context of permissioned blockchain, can guarantee only
conditional privacy[LLC+18]. The problem of preserving trajectory privacy in a
permissioned blockchain is the final motivation of this dissertation.
7
1.3 Research Problems
The overall goal of this dissertation is to devise efficient trajectory privacy preserva-
tion mechanisms for mobility-centric IoT systems. To achieve this goal, we aim to
understand the different attack models that can be utilized to compromise trajectory
privacy, the limitations of existing works against those attacks, and the approaches
to improve the existing works to mitigate the identified privacy leakages.
We first study the problem of personalizing trajectory privacy preservation with
reduced quality of services (QoS) loss against a long-term observation-based attack.
This problem involves modeling of a long-term observation attack and quantification
of its privacy leakage, and nullifying the attack with reduced loss of QoS. We extend
our study with the problem of understanding how a combination of spatiotem-
porally correlated geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged contents can affect the existing
trajectory privacy-preserving mechanisms (TPPMs) and how can we improve the
existing TPPMs to neutralize the effect. This problem involves the design of an
inference attack model from the two kinds of contents: quantification of the effect
of that inference model on existing TPPMs, and devising appropriate TPPM to
mitigate the effect.
The two above problems mainly focus on preserving trajectory privacy in a
centralized IoT system. Another drastic way of preserving privacy is the formation of
a P2P network of the IoT nodes such that the necessity of an intervening centralized
authority can be demolished. Recently, blockchain is being studied as a promising
way to decentralize IoT systems. In this dissertation, we explore the problem of
making blockchain lightweight for P2P networks of IoT nodes without relying on
powerful or expensive edge devices.
We then study the trajectory privacy preservation problem in the context of
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permissioned-blockchain, where a malicious authority is capable of tracking the IoT
nodes and the P2P interaction between the nodes constitute proofs regarding their
location information. The problem includes modeling of a different attacks that can
be exploited by the authority and measuring their impact on location privacy of the
IoT nodes.
1.4 Research Objectives
To answer the above mentioned research questions, this dissertation aims to achieve
the following four objectives: 1. measure the effect of long-term observation attack
on trajectory privacy preservation and determine the factors that can mitigate such
an attack in a personalized manner while maintaining the loss of quality of services
(QoS) within a constraint, 2. assess the impact of a combination of spatiotemporally
correlated geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged contents on trajectory privacy without
analyzing the contents of the non-geo-tagged contents and formulate and evaluate
a mechanism to mitigate the impact, 3. evaluate the relationship of spatiotemporal
mobility of the IoT nodes and spatial sharding with the size of blockchain to design a
lightweight blockchain framework, and 4. identify and measure the trajectory privacy
risks in a permissioned-blockchain and evaluate the influence of a privacy-preserving
mechanism on QoS while alleviating those risks.
1. Long-Term Privacy Preservation for Frequently Visited Locations
In a location-based service(LBS), a user queries a service provider by providing
his/her precise location information (Equation 1.1) to get a variety of services. As
the shared location information may reveal a user’s sensitive information, trajectory
privacy preservation mechanisms (TPPM) come into play to preserve privacy. A
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.2: Architectures for Trajectory Privacy Preserving Mechanism (TTPM):
(a) Trusted Third Party (TTP)-based architecture and (b) User-centric architecture.
TPPM works between the user and the service provider. It takes the query Q and
scrambles it in such a way that it would not leak privacy (at some degree) of the
user against a set of testable attacks. There are two types of TPPM architectures:
Trusted Third Party (TTP)-based and user-centric. In a TTP-based architecture,
the TPPM could be a cloud server or any other external entity. On the user-centric
architecture, the TPPM resides on the user’s device and does not depend on a TTP
in the runtime (Figure 1.2 depicts these two architectures).
At this time, a variety of TPPMs have been proposed, which can be classified into
the broad categories of pseudonym, cryptography, and obfuscation. The pseudonym
and cryptographic techniques have any of the following limitations: it relies on a
TTP-based architecture, its implementation is challenging for resource-constrained
IoT devices, and it requires changes in the already up and running LBS system to
facilitate privacy requirements. On the other hand, obfuscation techniques can be
built upon a user-centric architecture in a lightweight way, and they do not require
changes in an existing architecture of an LBS. These advantages make obfuscation
techniques highly practical for trajectory privacy preservation in LBS for resource-
constrained IoT devices. As such, this dissertation is focused on obfuscation tech-
niques, wherein a user’s original location is replaced by a set of locations which look
similar to a user’s real location based on some predefined privacy measures. Thus,
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using an obfuscation-based mechanism, the original query Q becomes,
Q′ = {ID,< l1, . . . lm >, I} (1.2)
Here, < l1, . . . lm > is the set of the locations which represents a user’s original
location. An objective of this dissertation is to design an obfuscation mechanism
to achieve the following properties: 1. personalization, 2. privacy preservation of
sensitive locations against long-term observation attacks, and 3. a quantifiable rela-
tionship between long-term privacy and quality of services (QoSs).
2. Location Inference Attack Based on Spatiotemporally Correlated Geo-
tagged and Non Geo-tagged Contents and Its Defense Mechanism
While our first objective is to study privacy issues with homogeneous data-centric
interaction between the users and LBS, i.e., check-ins or queries, we extend the work
with heterogeneous data-centric interaction. As mentioned earlier in motivation,
a heterogeneous data-centric interaction refers to a trajectory, shared by a user
with the LBS, which contains both of geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged contents. We
confine our study with two kinds of contents: query and photo. In our study, a
checkin in an LBS is similar to query as we do not consider the privacy issues with
the requested information (I in Equation 1.1). While queries are always geo-tagged,
a photo can either be geo-tagged or non-geo-tagged. In the case of non-geo-tagged
photos, the inference attack models are usually constructed based on a machine
learning model which analyzes the contents of photos to localize a user. However,
we study the problem from a different perspective. Let us consider a trajectory T
which contains queries, geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged photos as follows.
T =< (Q, t1), (Pgeo, t2), (Pnon−geo, t3), (Q, t4), (Pnon−geo, t5), . . . > (1.3)
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Here, the terms Q,Pnon−geo,Pgeo refer to a query, non-geo tagged photo, and geo-
tagged photo, respectively.
Our objective is to investigate the case of inferring location information without
analyzing the content of a photo using a machine learning model where there is a
high temporal correlation between two shared contents. The objective also includes
the construction of an efficient obfuscation approach to negate the inference in a
lightweight and practical way.
3. Spatiotemporal Blockchain Management for Resource-Constrained
IoT devices to Achieve Decentralized Privacy
Replacing a centralized LBS architecture with a decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P)
network of the IoT devices is a significant step towards achieving privacy preser-
vation in IoT. Questions of efficiency and practicality aside, blockchain is being
considered to design a fully decentralized IoT system with (some degree of) built-in
privacy. Inspired by the massive popularity of bitcoin, the first successful applica-
tion of blockchain, a large number of works in the intersection of blockchain and
IoT focused on how to implement “bitcoin”-like blockchain in the IoT. To preserve
trajectory privacy, the IoT nodes change their private-public key pairs frequently.
However, their assumption of having enough computation and storage capacity on
the IoT devices to manage a blockchain is mostly impractical. To make blockchain
computationally lightweight, some works focused on simplification of the mining
process so that power consumption is reduced. To deal with the constrained re-
source issue, the solution of managing blockchain using fixed infrastructures based
on high-end computing devices (i.e., gateways) has been explored significantly. How-
ever, for mobility-centric IoT, where the network is spread through a vast region
and the topology changes frequently, having a fixed infrastructure is uneconomic.
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In a nutshell, all these works either considered that the IoT devices are capable
enough to store the blockchain and to perform blockchain operations, or they em-
ploy high-end computing devices to manage the blockchain. While privacy can be
preserved, these works are impractical for mobility-centric IoT. What sets this work
apart is that our objective is to make blockchain lightweight so that the IoT devices
are able to store it without relying on external edge computing devices, with a focus
on the mobile crowdsensing applications. We study and measure the relationship of
spatiotemporal mobility of the users and spatial division of a blockchain into shards
with the storage capacity of the IoT devices to hold blockchain on their space.
4. Quantifying Location Privacy in Permissioned Blockchain-based de-
centralized IoT
We have now come to the point of studying trajectory privacy issues in a blockchain.
In a public blockchain, this is “easy”: there is no centralized authority of the
blockchain and the certificate authority (CA) is independent of the blockchain sys-
tem, and as a result the devices can change their public and private key pairs
frequently to achieve untraceability in the network, but this high level of privacy
comes at a price. In a public blockchain, it is difficult to track or find out malicious
entities, which creates a major challenge to law enforcement and government agen-
cies. While several tools have been developed for tracing transactions or entities,
organizations are more interested in having control over the identities of the enti-
ties in the blockchain, leading to the development of permissioned blockchain. In
such a blockchain, there exists at least one authority who controls who can join and
perform blockchain operations in the network, and that authority provides the IoT
users public and private key pairs in exchange for their real identity, which helps
them maintain their privacy from their peers in the network. However, it can only
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provide conditional privacy as the authority itself can trace the devices. Preserving
trajectory privacy against such the blockchain authority is quite challenging. We
study the trajectory privacy in a permissioned-blockchain where the IoT devices
form a P2P network using short-range communication technology (e.g., Bluetooth).
With such a short-range communication, a transaction between two devices gener-
ates proof-of-location (PoL) about each other in the spatiotemporal domain which
certifies the presence of the devices at a precise location at a particular time in the
network. In such a context, we show that there is an essential trade-off between tra-
jectory privacy and utilization of the system. The final objective of this dissertation
is to model the trajectory privacy leakages in the considered case of permissioned-
blockchain for IoT, devise a lightweight mechanism to mitigate the leakages, and
quantify the trade-off between privacy and QoS.
1.5 Research Contributions
To achieve the goals as mentioned above, we first design a delay aware long-term
trajectory privacy-preserving obfuscation technique for frequently visited locations
under spatiotemporal constraint for location-based services, then we devise a loca-
tion inference attack from a combination of spatiotemporally correlated checkins,
geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged photos and an obfuscation mechanism as its coun-
termeasure, and we introduce a lightweight, scalable blockchain framework based on
region division and mobility of the users for crowdsensing applications. Finally, we
propose a silence-based privacy-preserving obfuscation mechanism to achieve tra-
jectory privacy in a permissioned blockchain-based IoT. The critical points of our
contributions are as follows:
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1. Delay Aware Long Term Trajectory Privacy Preservation for Fre-
quently Visited Locations under Spatiotemporal Constraint for Location-
Based Services [SPI+18, SPI+19]
We start our research by studying the different location inference attacks based on
probability distribution of historical location data, travel time information between
locations using knowledge of a map, and short and long-term observation of privacy-
preserving queries.
We propose a trajectory privacy-preserving obfuscation approach, coined as
“KLAP”, to achieve personalization in the process of long-term privacy preservation
against the map and historical knowledge, and short and long-term observation-
based attacks. KLAP models a user’s preference for different locations based on the
historical data and can personalize privacy-preservation by utilizing such a model
for sporadic, frequent, and continuous LBS use cases. Specifically, KLAP generates
a secure Concealing Region (CR) to obfuscate the user’s original location and di-
rects that CR to the service provider. It selects a set of locations, similar to the
original location in terms of preference and certain spatiotemporal conditions, such
that a malicious service provider cannot distinguish the original location from the
set. The CR is computed as the convex hull of the set of locations, and the vertices
of the CR replaces the user’s location in an original query (Equation 1.2). While
it can protect privacy against a variety of spatiotemporal correlation-based attacks,
the key contribution of our work lies in the introduction of a CR pruning technique
that makes it possible to improve the delay between successive CR submissions with
a slight compromise of privacy for infrequent locations while maintaining long-term
privacy of frequently visited sensitive locations. We evaluate the proposed approach
with two real-world datasets, and the experimental results show that it can achieve
better efficiency and efficacy compared to existing state-of-the-art methods for the
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different cases considered in this work. Part of this work is published in [SPI+18],
and the extended version of the work is under submission in [SPI+19].
2. Location Inference Attack From A Trajectory of Spatiotemporally
Correlated Geo-Tagged and Non Geo-Tagged Contents and Its Counter-
measure [SPIM18]
Inferring location information from a variety of data has long been studied indepen-
dently: inferring location from geo-tagged contents and inferring location from non-
geo-tagged contents. Without loss of generality, we limit our discussion to queries
(which are always geo-tagged), and photos (geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged). Un-
like many other works, in this dissertation, we intend to create the link between
geo-tagged queries and photos and non-geo-tagged photos for location inference at-
tack without relying on machine learning model for the case when the contents have
a spatiotemporal correlation. Our work is based on the following hypothesis: the
probability of sharing different contents at different locations based on historical
data and the high temporal correlation between a set of geo-tagged contents (gener-
ated using an existing obfuscation approach) and non-geo-tagged contents allows to
infer a user’s location at a finer level without analyzing the non-geo-tagged photos.
Let us consider a trajectory T similar to Equation 1.3. To preserve the privacy of
the trajectory, let the user uses an obfuscation approach O which generates k − 1
number of fake locations and tags them with the real locations. The obfuscated
version of T is as follows,
T ′ =< (O(Q), t1), (O(Pgeo), t2), (Pnon−geo, t3), (O(Q), t4), (Pnon−geo, t5), . . . > (1.4)
We show that, if there is a high temporal correlation among the shared of content,
a traditional obfuscation approach can leak privacy of a user. We formulate and
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implement such an inference attack model on dummy based obfuscation approach
using two different factual datasets to validate the hypothesis. To nullify such infer-
ence, we also propose a randomized obfuscation approach which generates dummy
locations by considering the both of query and photo sharing probabilities for differ-
ent locations. Our contribution also includes a technique to visually represent the
privacy-preserving queries and photos in the case of location-based social network
(LBSN). The work is published in [SPIM18].
3. Spatiotemporal Blockchain Management for Resource-Constrained
IoT devices to Achieve Decentralized Privacy [SPSK19, SPN+19a]
Making blockchain lightweight for resource-constrained IoT devices has recently
garnered some attention, but the influence of the mobility of the devices in designing
blockchain is not explored yet. In this research, we focus on specific mobility-
related scenarios where a mobile node is not really required to have a “global” view
of a blockchain. Let us consider an environment monitoring mobile crowdsensing
application where aggregated data (e.g., temperature, humidity, and air quality)
from a small region at a particular time is more critical than an individual’s data.
The mobile nodes at a location may contact each other in a P2P way to collect each
other’s environmental sensor’s value for some time, then one node is selected to
send the aggregated information in a particular form (e.g. max, mean, average, and
median.). Since the nodes are mobile, the trust value computed for some nodes may
not be significant at a different location and time for an individual node, and the
environmental data varies from one region to another; thus, instead of having a single
network, region-based multiple smaller networks, as well as blockchains, are more
feasible. Furthermore, it is not practical to deploy powerful, expensive edge devices
over a large region to carry out the blockchain operations. This research aims to
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address the blockchain management problem by designing a lightweight blockchain
framework, coined as “Sensor-Chain”, for mobility-centric IoT without relying on
a fixed infrastructure of edge devices. We show that breaking down a traditional
global blockchain into smaller “local” blockchains in the spatial domain and limiting
their size through a temporal constraint will allow us to design scalable blockchain
for mobile IoT systems. Furthermore, the Sensor-Chain allows the mobile devices
to control their storage space on the run. The highlights of our contribution are as
follows: 1. The Sensor-Chain blockchain framework consumes little storage space on
the IoT sensor devices and is scalable with the increase in network size. We compare
the performance of sensor-chain with three (3) other schemes and the results on the
relationship of spatial and temporal constraints with the size of blockchain justify its
advantage for aggregation-based mobile crowdsensing applications. 2. The proposed
framework does not involve any fixed positioned powerful edge devices, which makes
it more flexible with a variety of mobility-based IoT applications. 3. Sensor-Chain
is independent of any particular ledger platform. Thus, it can be implemented with
any platform (e.g. Ethereum, hyperledger, and so on) for IoT. The work is accepted
for publication in [SPSK19]. A demonstration on the development of the framework
is accepted in [SPN+19a].
4. Quantifying Location Privacy in A Permissioned Blockchain [SPN+19b]
Unlike many other works on preserving trajectory privacy for mobility-centric IoT
using a public blockchain, we study the problem in the context of private or permis-
sioned blockchain for mobility-centric IoT. We consider a permissioned blockchain
which is governed by at least one authority: the authority provides the user with pri-
vate and public key pairs to achieve privacy from the peers in the network. However,
as the authority knows the real identity of each user, it is possible to map the users
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in the spatiotemporal domain, which leads to potential trajectory privacy invasion.
We study this problem in the context of two properties: there exists a spatiotem-
poral correlation between consecutive blockchain transactions, and there presents
a (either explicit or implicit) Proof-of-Location (PoL) protocol in the system such
that a node cannot fake its location in the network. In this work, a transaction is
considered as the atomic blockchain operation in the network. To understand the
time reachability based correlation, let the variable Otu represent the actual location
lu of a mobile IoT user u at time t. Given the user’s locations (li−1, li+1) at times
(ti−1, ti+1), the user’s probability to be at a location li at a discrete time ti is Pr
i
u(li).
This probability, Priu(li), can be computed using the time reachability correlation
as follows:
Priu(li) = Pr(Oiu = li|Oi−1u = li−1, Oi+1u = li+1) (1.5)
Note that Priu(li) = 1 if li is reachable to and from li−1 and li+1 in time (ti+1− ti−1).
Otherwise, Priu(li) = 0. A PoL is a digital certificate which confirms the presence
of a user at a certain time and location. The Spatiotemporal correlation between
two blockchain operations is defined based on the time reachability relationship
between the locations exposed by the two transitions. We first show that existing
obfuscation approaches, designed to protect trajectory privacy in centralized IoT
systems, cannot be implemented in a plug and play way in permissioned-blockchain
under the presence of a PoL. This leads us to the realization that it is not possible to
achieve privacy while maintaining the utility of the system. In other words, there is
an important trade-off between location privacy and utilization of the system under
a PoL. We develop our solution based on the hypothesis that to protect the privacy
of a sensitive location, a mobile user must keep silent in the network. However,
remaining silent infinitely results in location privacy of 100% but a system utilization
of 0%. On the other hand, if the user uses the system at a nearby insensitive location
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for a short time, then using the time reachability based spatiotemporal correlation,
defined by Equation1.5, a malicious authority can reduce the number of potential
locations as a mobile user’s real location. Thus, we formulate our problem as a two-
objective optimization problem: one objective is to remain silent to minimize the
number of locations with Priu(li) = 1, and the other is to maximize the utility of the
system. To solve the problem, we propose BlockPriv, a silence based obfuscation
approach, which quantifies the relationship between privacy and utility to protect
sensitive locations’ privacy dynamically. We analyzed different security, privacy,
and utility aspects of BlockPriv, both theoretically and experimentally, with its
implementation. The work is accepted for publication in [SPN+19b].
1.6 Dissertation Outline
The outline of the rest of the dissertation is as follows: The review of the related
works is presented in chapter 2. The detail of our proposed delay-aware obfuscation
mechanism to preserve trajectory privacy against long-term observation-based at-
tacks is detailed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents our designed inference attack model
from a combination of spatiotemporally correlated geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged
contents and its countermeasure. Chapter 5 discusses the proposed lightweight
blockchain framework for mobile IoT devices. Chapter 6 covers our work on trajec-
tory privacy preservation in permissioned-blockchain. Finally, chapter 7 concludes
the dissertation with a discussion on the limitations of the proposed works and
different directions for our future works.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we delineate an overview of the contemporary works related to
this dissertation. We start with a presentation on the related works of trajectory
privacy preservation in location-based services (LBS) from the perspective of ho-
mogeneous interaction between a user and LBS. The discussion includes different
location inference models proposed in contemporary works and different classifica-
tions of the existing trajectory privacy preservation mechanisms (TPPM) according
to their characteristics. We then review the TPPMs on preserving trajectory pri-
vacy against inferences based on heterogeneous data. The review covers inferences
for checkins and (geo-tagged and non geo-tagged) photos, two of the most com-
mon means of interaction in LBS, more precisely in location-based social network
(LBSN). Another innovative and bold way of improving location privacy is the de-
centralization of the system through blockchain. This chapter covers a review of
the research on blockchain-based IoT systems, their achievements and limitations.
The review is largely focused on the management of blockchain in a lightweight
manner for resource-constrained devices; as such it portrays a classification of the
blockchain based on their reliance of the type of architecture. Finally, the chapter
reviews the research on preserving location privacy in blockchain, with a concentra-
tion on permissioned-version of it.
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2.1 Location Privacy Preservation in Location-Based Ser-
vice (LBS)
We first discuss the related works on location inference models which underline the
different threats associated with location information sharing. Then, we go trough
the different approaches that have proposed so far to preserve the location privacy
against adversarial inferences.
2.1.1 Location Inference Models
Identification and Understanding of the different threats that can damage the pri-
vacy of location information is an active research area for quite a while. These
threats include figuring out home and work places, sensitive information, and de-
anonymization of database. Majority of these works focus on the explicit location
information of the users (e.g. checkin, gps data). Krumm et al.[Kru07] analyzed
two-week GPS tracks from 172 known individuals to infer users’ home address.
Cheng et al. [CCLS11] analyzed 22 million checkins of 220,000 users from differ-
ent location-based social network, including Foursquare, UberTwitter, Gowalla, and
Gravitiy. The authors studied spatial and temporal aspects of the checkins, mobility
patterns, different factors (e.g. social status, geographic and economic constraints)
motivating the mobility, and frequently visited locations. Recently, an interesting
inference model based on visual technique is proposed by Liccardi et al. [LARC16].
Their results show that it is possible to infer workplace and home addresses at
high accuracy without using a complex algorithm. A machine-learning method for
determining the motivation behind check-ins has been developed by huguenin et
al.[HBM+18]. They analyzed a large dataset from Foursquare and results show
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that their proposed model can achieve accuracy as high as 63%. Drakonakis et
al.[DIIP19] improved the location inference models further by designing a heuristics
based on social and behavioral norms of users in twitter checkins. Their approach
achieved 92.5% and 55.6% accuracy in identifying user’s home and workplace ad-
dresses. Olteanu et al.[OHS+17] showed that even if individual’s location data is
protected, the co-location data with other users can be used to leak user’s privacy.
The study of location privacy leakage from non-geo-tagged data has gained wide
attention recently. To solve the problem of identifying locations from a non-geo-
tagged photo, the models are usually trained a machine learning model with a large
dataset of tagged photos[LBTC+15a, LBTC+15b, WKP16]. Using such a model,
given a photo, it is possible to detect the place where the photo is taken. For
instance, Google supports search by photo [goo], where a photo, without any geo-
tagged is given as an input, the search engine gives the name of the place where the
photo was taken. Similarly, location privacy leakage through linguistic analysis of
textual data (e.g. hashtags in tweets in twitter) has also gained significant attention
very recently [Zha19, RKH+19]. As an example, Rusert et al. [RKH+19] devel-
oped a spatiotemporal Naive Bayes classifier to find out location-related hashtags
in Twitter.
While all these inference models underline the location privacy issues in different
domains, a major problem is that, they are studied independently. The impact of
joining all these models to develop a more comprehensive inference model and its
impact is not studied yet.
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2.1.2 Location Privacy-Preserving Approaches
Privacy-preserving approaches for geo-tagged data or simply location information,
can be categorized into two major classes: 1) trusted-third party(TTP) based cen-
tralized approaches, and 2) user-centric or decentralized approaches. In centralized
approaches, a TTP collects all the users’ data to provide privacy. In contrast, user-
centric approaches do not require middleware. Instead, it operates and stores the
required data on the user’s devices. In this dissertation, we focus on the following
categorization of the existing techniques: 1) pseudonym, 2) k-anonymity, and 3)
obfuscation.
Pseudonym is one of the earliest privacy-preserving approaches which replaces
the user’s real id with another one from a pool of ids[GPI15, YMH15, WYGG18,
WY19]. This pool of ids is managed either by a TTP [BSM16] or by the collaboration
of the users of the system. In a TTP based approach, a user (e.g., smart vehicle)
registers itself with the system by providing its real identification and gets a set
of pseudonyms in return [PSFK14]. Another variant is the mix-zone where certain
spatial regions are designated for pseudonym change (e.g., gas stations) [LLL+11,
BSM16]. For instance, in [BSM16], the vehicles are required to follow a certain
driving pattern and change their pseudonym in the mix-zone. These approaches
reduce the flexibility of the privacy-preservation approach as they are constrained
by the underlying infrastructure (e.g., structure of the road network). Also, an
attacker can perform statistical linkage attack by exploiting the knowledge on the
infrastructure to undermine the pseudonym changing approaches. In distributed
approach for pseudonym changing, the users collaborate with each other for sharing
their pseudonyms [GMS+13, PL15, YKH+16, ZLS+16, PLMW17, GMG18]. Such an
approach causes high computational and communication overhead in the devices.
Besides, the success of collaboration depends on the non-adversarial behavior of
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the collaborating users. Another limitation of pseudonym schemes is their limited
applicability. Many systems require the users the reveal their real identity to the
system. In such a case only conditional privacy is attainable.
Another popular approach is the k-anonymity in which user’s real location is
made indistinguishable with other k − 1 users’ real locations [GL08]. Several varia-
tions of k-anonymity have been proposed in literature, including l-diversity[MKGV07]
and personalized k-anonymity[GL08]. However, similar to pseudonym approach,
the success of these approaches either depends on an TTP or honest collaboration
of the users. The TTP, also known as anonymizer, can be an untrusted entity
who can undermine the privacy of its users. The TTP can also collude with other
malicious entities to achieve financial gain. In case of collaborative k-anonymity,
some users can be unconcerned about their privacy and can conduct location in-
jection attacks by faking their location to the service provider. To address these
problems, several solutions have been proposed in literature, including providing in-
centive [YFX13, ZTZ16, WLYD17] and cluster selection based on mobility pattern
similarity[ZLZ+18].
A major improvement of vanilla k-anonymity is the dummy approach in which
k − 1 number of dummy locations are directed with the real one to a service
provider without relaying on a TTP. However, majority of the existing methods gen-
erate the dummies at random [LJY08]. V-circle, V-grid [NZLL14], DLS, enhanced-
DLS [NLZ+14] methods improve this limitation by considering probability of submit-
ting queries from locations. These approaches further improved by MaxMinDistDS
[CS16] and k-DLCA [LHA+16] with the introduction of l-diversity over the set of se-
lected dummies. However, most of the existing methods consider only single queries;
thus, cannot protect privacy for frequent and continuous queries. Recently, Liu et
al. [LLL+17] propose a dummy generation algorithm based on spatiotemporal cor-
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relation of the locations. Specifically, they consider time reachability, direction sim-
ilarity, and in and out degree. However, this approach is computationally expensive
and it cannot protect privacy for frequently visited places.
Another alternative is the Spatial Obfuscation which replaces user’s real loca-
tion with a larger concealing region, CR [ACdVS11, LJY08, SJZ+17, GDSB16,
AHHH16]. Earlier methods concentrate only on minimum privacy area requirement
for a CR, [LJY08, ACdVS11] without considering any information related to users
and therefore, are highly vulnerable to attacks based on such information. A promis-
ing approach is the PROB framework [DBS10] which translates the locations into
features and allows users to assign sensitivity levels for each feature. It enlarges the
user’s region until sensitivity is reduced to a certain threshold. This framework eval-
uates the privacy level in terms of region area and thus some locations can be sorted
out using information of map or historical data. Another interesting method is the
n-CD framework [LSTL13], in which the user’s circular region of interest (ROI) is
divided into n equal sectors and each sector is covered with a concealing disk (CD).
It measures the privacy only using the area of the intersecting regions of all CDs.
Although a variation of n-CD method is proposed [LHA+16], none of them take
into account user’s individual information to evaluate the achievable privacy from
that region. Recently, Ghinita et al. [GDSB16] extended the PROBE framework for
continuous queries by considering user’s maximum velocity in free space to generate
CRs. In the case of successive queries, if it is not possible to submit a CR in current
time, they propose either to delay CR submission or submit a CR without contain-
ing the user’s current location but closer to the previous CR. However, both meth-
ods reduce the quality of services(QoS) with high delay or failure to satisfy user’s
query. A promising obfuscation method is proposed by Ağir et al.[AHHH16], which
uses Markov chain to generate the obfuscated region. However, with the reduction
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in the location precision, obfuscation mechanisms lower the quality of services as
well. In recent years, differential privacy[Dwo11] has gained ground in trajectory
privacy-preserving obfuscation approach design. Andreś et al.[ABCP13] proposed
Geo-Indistinguishability where statistical noise from Laplace distribution is added
to the actual location to obfuscate it and ensures that an noisy location has the
same probability to be generated from geographically close any two locations. Most
important difference between differential private mechanism and other approaches
is that it is an property of the mechanism not of the output. Differential privacy for
location privacy is further improved by taking into consideration the temporal cor-
relation between locations [XX15, CYXX17], and geographic and semantic features
of real location traces [BS16]. Yu et al.[YLP17] proposed an personalized differen-
tial privacy preserving mechanism by combining both geo-indistinguishability and
adversary’s expected location inference error.
If we look into the location privacy issues with non-geo-tagged data, there have
been proposed some solutions to deal with such privacy issues. Li et al.[LSL+19]
proposed HideMe plugin to intelligently hide a person’s photo before it is uploaded
to the social network. In the process, the authors considered temporal, spatial,
interpersonal and attributes of photo sharing and combine it with face matching
algorithm. The hiding or Perturbing portion of the image [HLB+15] is in fact one of
the most studied solution in privacy-preserving photo sharing. Moving forward, in
case of privacy leakage from textual data, some solutions have also been proposed to
patch the privacy leakage. Tagvisor[ZHR+18] proposed three obfuscation approaches
for protecting location privacy in case of hashtags: deletion or not publishing the
hashtags, replacement of the original hashtag with another one, and replacing the
location information with semantically broader category.
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2.2 Blockchain for Internet of Things (IoT)
Understanding the limitations of the centralized model of IoT, recent research has
shifted to develop decentralized architecture based on blockchain. The existing re-
search efforts can be categorized into devising approaches to integrate blockchain
into IoT using existing robust storage and computing resources [XZN+17, PWH+18,
XFW+18, WvB14]. The research approaches have focused on node authentication
and access control [NXN+07, ZN+15, Axo15, NXN+18, XCBC18, Nov18, OBS18,
XNC+19, XCBC19], scalable data provenance methods[SRK+17, TSL+19a, ASN+19],
trust management [MDB17, DGP17, YWN+18, AKKH18], information sharing frame-
work for network systems [ARNK19], different security vulnerabilities in blockchains
and their countermeasures [CPNX19, SSN+19, TSL+19b, SNKM19], and providing
decentralized privacy in IoT systems [RNKK18, AMM+18, CVPC19, DKJG17]. The
majority of these works have one thing in common: they either simply considered
that IoT devices are equipped with enough storage and computing resources to hold
and process blockchains, or utilized high end edge computing devices to manage the
blockchain. The assumptions of having enough resources is hard to get on with IoT
devices, making the applicability of the research works based on such assumptions
questionable. For instance, trust and authentication management for wireless sen-
sor networks using blockchain was proposed in [MDB17] without hinting how the
sensors will manage the blockchain on their own local space. Likewise, the Block-
VN architecture for distributed transport management system [SMP17], based on
a permissioned blockchain, considered that at least some portion of the vehicles
are capable of storing and processing an ever-growing blockchain. Another exam-
ple is the IoT-based Machine-to-Machine payment system, known as IOTA [Fou18].
IOTA uses proof-of-work consensus protocol, which makes the new block creation
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task both computationally expensive and time consuming. Thus, in IOTA the hard-
ware requirement is too high and it is hard to meet such requirement for IoT sensor
nodes.
Realizing the resource issues of the IoT devices, many research works proposed
to offload the blockchain onto edge computing devices. The SpeedyChain[KXN+18]
data sharing framework for intelligent vehicles suggested to use roadside infrastruc-
ture units (RSIs) to maintain blockchain. The RSIs are responsible for trust and
authentication management, and trusted vehicles, verified by the RSIs, can append
block to the blockchain. In a similar way, a Roadside Units (RSU) based blockchain
trust management for vehicular network was proposed in [YYL+18]. In this work,
each vehicle generates a rating for its neighboring vehicles and share the rating with
nearby RSU. With all the most recently received ratings, RSUs calculate the trust
value offsets of involved vehicles and gather these data into a block. In order to insert
the new block into the blockchain, the authors proposed a combination of proof-of-
work and proof-of-stake, improving each other. In contemporary works, Xiong et
al.[XZN+17, XFN+17] proposed to deploy multiple access mobile edge computing de-
vices to carryout the computationally expensive proof-of-work and introduced game
theoretic approach for edge computing resource management. In these works, the
sensors are considered as ordinary nodes, and the edge devices are responsible for the
blockchain operations. The “EdgeChain” framework [PWH+18] extended this idea
by introducing credit-based resource management system to control the edge server
resource consumption by an individual IoT device. In [Nov18], a smart contract-
based access mechanism was put forward with the aim of simplifying the process
of blockchain management and reducing the communication overhead between the
nodes. In this mechanism, the IoT devices are kept out of the blockchain as they
cannot hold a large blockchain. Rather, a special node called management hub is
29
proposed to put as a link between IoT devices and blockchain. A blockchain frame-
work was proposed for smart homes[LMNZ18], where the information produced by
smart home devices are stored in the blockchain. In this architecture, the blockchain
is maintained in the gateways and is isolated from the devices. Similar to the other
works on blockchain based Internet of Vehicles, kang et al. [KXN+18] also con-
sidered RSUs as edge computing infrastructures for blockchain management. This
approach utilized a modified Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) consensus scheme
where instead of stake-based voting, reputation is used for miner selection.
It is evident that all these approaches tried to solve the storing and processing
heavyweight blockchain problems by employing more powerful computing devices
in the architecture. However, such structured deployment is hardly achievable, as
the network topology is prone to changes very frequently in many IoT scenarios.
One viable solution to make blockchain “manageable” for sensors without using
any edge or other devices is limiting the size of the blockchain. The “temporal
blockchain” [DOA16] proposed a solution based on such concept. It was proposed
to delete all the blocks older than a preset period (e.g. 30 days old). While this
approach can reduce the size of the blockchain, it still lacks in guaranteeing limited
storage capacity with the growth of the network in the long-run in IoT scenario.
Moreover, how to deal with the loss of information due to the deletion of blocks was
not addressed.
This study highlights that existing blockchain frameworks lack a clear under-
standing of the resource management issues for blockchain in IoT scenario. Lack of
such understanding makes the frameworks highly impractical for IoT. The research
on blockchain and IoT has a long way to go, and we emphasize that before taking
further steps, we must have an efficient approach to make blockchain lightweight
and scalable for IoT sensors.
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2.3 Location Privacy Preservation in Blockchain
The goal of the existing trajectory privacy-preserving mechanisms (TPPMs) is to
apply them to a node’s current location before revealing it to the central authority.
As an example, In case of pseudonym, before revealing the location, the mechanism
changes the id of a node to make it untraceable [YMH15]. These approaches de-
pend a trusted third party (TTP) to carry out the pseudonym changing steps. This
is similar to the mixing approach[BNM+14] used in blockchain to improve privacy
by changing the public key of a mobile node with a random public key such that
the probability of linking multiple transactions will be reduced. However, in a per-
missioned version blockchain where short-range communication between the mobile
devices form PoL for their whereabouts in spatiotemporal domain, such approach
will not work.
Perturbation mechanisms, such as geo- indistinguishability [ABCP13], add sta-
tistical noise to a node’s real location. Obviously, under a PoL, such mechanisms
have limited impact [MDS+18]. On the other hand, spatial obfuscation reduces the
precision of the actual location before releasing it to the authority. This is either
done by infusing more locations or replacing the actual location with a realistic larger
region. Similar to location perturbation, location obfuscation works only at a lim-
ited scale under the PoL. In a nutshell, the existing privacy preserving mechanisms,
designed for centralized IoT systems, cannot be applied directly in the problem that
we are trying to solve here.
In the scope of blockchain, the frequent change of public keys is the most ex-
plored solution to preserve the privacy[ZN+15, DSKJ17, SK17]. As an illustration,
Dorri et al. [DSKJ17] proposed Lightweight Scalable Blockchain (LSB) architec-
ture for smart-vehicle ecosystems. Here, each node uses a fresh unique public key
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while communicating with other nodes to prevent linking attacks. In blockchain
based centralized proof-of-location (PoL) generation, Brambilla et al.[BAZ16] also
proposed to change the public keys frequently to preserve node’s sensitive location
privacy while generating proof of locations. Michelin et al. [MDL+18] proposed
permissioned blockchain based SpeedyChain framework for vehicular network sce-
nario. Similar to most of the other works in this context, SpeedyChain considers
the fixed positioned roadside infrastructure units (RSIs) as the key to maintain the
blockchain. Different from bitcoin or ethereum like blockchains, here, for each ve-
hicle there exist exactly one block in the blockchain. In order to maintain privacy,
this framework proposes the timely changing the public key of each vehicle. How-
ever, these frameworks do not fit completely into the scenario, considered in this
paper, where the authority of the blockchain controls the private and public key
distributions to the mobile nodes in the system.
From the perspective of efficacy, it is found that changing the public keys is not
quite as bulletproof as expected[KKM14, BKP14]. The deanonymization of bitcoin
users have gained significant attention from both law enforcement and security and
privacy communities. As an unregulated market, it is estimated that almost half
of the bitcoin transactions are related to illegal activities (e.g. illegal drug sales,
ransomware)[FKP19]. Research efforts show that it is possible to map the public
keys of bitcoin users to their unique identities (e.g. Ip addresses) [KKM14, RDJK18].
Such as, Roulin et al. [RDJK18] proposed an deanonymizing algorithm by exploiting
only the input and output transactions of mixing services and identified a relation-
ship between the input and output addresses at a very high accuracy. Recently,
Dorri et al. [RDJK18] applied decision tree algorithms on smart home devices’ data
(e.g. smart things, nest smoke alarm) by utilizing off-chain information to classify
IoT devices for understanding user’s activity pattern. While the work is done in
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smart home scenarios, similar to inference and and deanonymization can be done
in the context of the mobility of the IoT devices. All these deanonymization works
highlight that simply changing the public keys frequently is not the ultimately so-
lution to provide privacy in the blockchain, even in the public version it.
Moving forward, our work is focused on a authority-based permissioned blockchain
where privacy is tougher to acheive by default. It is closely related to the work
proposed by Li et al.[LLC+18] for the context of vehicular network. Using their pro-
posed framework, it is possible to achieve only conditional privacy as the trace man-
ager can track anyone at anytime, if necessary. Similar to this, Yang et al.[YYL+18]
presented a blockchain-based decentralized trust management framework for vehi-
cles where each vehicle is registered with the system using its VIN number. Thus, it
is only possible to achieve conditional privacy in this framework. Likewise, Sharma
et al. [SC18] proposed a permissioned blockchain by incorporating traceability fea-
ture while maintaining privacy in Internet of Vehicle (IoV). However, they used a
server for vehicle registration which would store all vehicle id in encrypted scheme
and central authority can track any vehicle when needed.
To achieve complete location privacy, Yang et al. [YZL+19] proposed an obfus-
cation approach to protect location privacy in private blockchain for crowdsensing
applications. In this work, a worker submits an obfuscated region to the system
to protect exact location’s privacy. However, in case of P2P communication of the
nodes, such approach cannot be applied without the collaboration of the nodes. Jia
et al. [YYL+18] designed a blockchain-based incentive mechanism for crowdsensing
applications with a focus on preserving location privacy of the users. In their frame-
work, a confusion layer was proposed in which a user’s location is encoded in such a
way that it can be confused with k− 1 other users’ locations. While this could be a
solution to protect location privacy, it requires honest collaboration of other users.
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CHAPTER 3
PRIVACY PRESERVING MECHANISM FOR CONTINUOUS
LOCATION SHARING IN CENTRALIZED INTERNET OF THINGS
(IOT) SYSTEMS
The ubiquitous use of Location-Based Services (LBS) through smart devices pro-
duces massive amounts of location data. An attacker, with access to such data, can
reveal sensitive information about users. In this chapter, we study different location
inference attacks based on the probability distribution of historical location data,
travel time information between locations using knowledge of a map, and short and
long-term observation of privacy-preserving queries. We show that existing privacy-
preserving approaches are vulnerable to such attacks. In this context, we propose
a novel location privacy-preserving approach, called KLAP, based on three fun-
damental obfuscation requirements: minimum k-locations, l-diversity, and privacy
area preservation. KLAP models a user’s preference for different locations based
on the historical data available on the LBS and can attain personalized privacy-
preservation by utilizing such a model for sporadic, frequent, and continuous LBS
use cases. Specifically, KLAP generates a secure Concealing Region (CR) to obfus-
cate user’s location and directs that CR to the service provider. For the first time,
we propose a CR pruning technique to improve the delay between successive CR
submissions significantly. We evaluate KLAP with two real-world datasets, and ex-
perimental results show that it can achieve better privacy, reduced delay, lower com-
munication, and storage cost compared to existing state-of-the-art methods. The
highlights of our contribution are as follows: 1. An obfuscation approach, named as
KLAP, is proposed to protect location privacy against attacks based on the prob-
ability distribution, personal context, real-time traffic information, and short and
long-term observation of obfuscated trajectories. 2. A concealing region (CR) prun-
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ing technique is proposed which presents a significant improvement over delay-based
approaches with a negligible reduction in privacy. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first technique to deal with the delay in privacy-preserving Location-Based
Services. 3. We carry out a rigorous experiment with two real-world datasets pro-
vided by Foursquare for two cities (NYC and Tokyo). Experimental results show
that KLAP can achieve better privacy, communication, and storage efficiency for
sporadic, frequent, and continuous queries compared to existing approaches.
This chapter is organized as follows. section 3.1 presents the background of
the problem that we are trying to solve in this chapter and section 3.2 discuss
the detail of the problem. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the detail of the proposed
privacy-preserving mechanism and its security analysis, respectively. The experi-
mental analysis is covered in section 3.6. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section
3.7.
3.1 Introduction
Location-Based Services (LBS) have become an integral part of our smart life. Ac-
cording to Statista, the number of LBS users in the U.S. is approximately 197
million, with expected growth to 242 million by 2018 [Sta17]. A typical example of
LBS use is point of interest (POI) search to obtain locations of restaurants, gas sta-
tions, movies, location-based coupons, and other consumer information. The query
process poses severe threats to user’s privacy which could lead to flooding users
with personalized innocent location-based advertisements to more severe exposure
such as revealing a user’s interests, home address, relationships and more. For ex-
ample, Liccardi et al. [LARC16] used a visual technique on Twitter data to show
that people’s most frequent and private locations, such as work and home, can be
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deduced using only a small sample of location points (1-day worth). This highlights
the vulnerability of location privacy in LBS, making this a highly critical issue.
Many approaches have been proposed in the literature to preserve users’ privacy
in LBS, including the class of user-centric approaches, which work on user’s devices
(e.g., smartphones, on-board unit (OBU) of smart vehicles, and smartwatches). One
popular user-centric privacy-preserving approach is the position dummy which di-
rects k−1 fake locations along with the original location to the LBS [HSI+16, LJY08].
Therefore, the maximum achievable privacy is 1
k
. However, the majority of the pro-
posed dummy based approaches focus on single queries and do not consider the his-
torical information related to users. Consequently, these approaches are vulnerable
to a variety of attacks derived from historical and spatiotemporal information. Re-
cently, a good number of works to generate dummy location using the notion of dif-
ferential privacy have been proposed, which aim to make the dummy generation pro-
cess ‘independent’ from the attacker’s knowledge[ABCP13, BCP14]. However, they
are still vulnerable to inferences based on historical data and spatiotemporal correla-
tion. Another category of user-centric approaches is the disclosure of locations with
reduced precision, called location obfuscation [LSTL13, XX15, SJZ+17, GDSB16].
The idea is to replace a user’s precise location information with a larger region, called
the concealing region (CR), with a compromise of Quality-of-Service (QoS). Unlike
many other approaches, obfuscation approaches can be implemented in a variety of
applications, including real-time navigation, POI search, and social network check-
ins[LARC16]. However, similar to other approaches, existing obfuscation techniques
also cannot guarantee strong privacy. In this chapter, we study the limitations of
existing obfuscation-based location-privacy preserving approaches and proposed an
obfuscation technique which is comparable with existing approaches regarding pri-
vacy preservation, delay management, and communication.
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Figure 3.1: Location inference attacks considered In this chapter: (a) Map, probability
distribution, and personal context linking attacks on single query, (b) region intersection
attack on multiple short-term queries, (c) Real-Time Traffic Information (RTTI) based
time-reachability, or maximum movement-boundary based attack, and (d) long-term ob-
fuscated location tracking attack.
3.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
In this chapter, we assume an adversary has access to the following information.
Information 1: user’s historical queries to a Location-Based Service. Information 2:
Knowledge of the map and Real-Time Traffic Information (RTTI) of the road net-
work. Using this information, we study the following problems of existing obfusca-
tion methods against such an adversary. First, many of the existing obfuscation
techniques generate CRs at random, without considering any prior related to the
user[LSTL13, SJZ+17]. Thus, from a given random CR0, an adversary with Infor-
mation 1 can exclude some locations (the dark regions in Figure 3.1(a)) for having
very low probability to be the user’s location and finds a smaller region, CR′0. Sec-
ond, majority of the methods focus on single query, and thus fail to provide privacy
for multiple queries. Let us consider again, a user submitted multiple queries with
different CRs in a short-period of time (Figure 3.1(b)). The time difference be-
tween the queries are small enough such that an adversary can guess with high
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confidence that the user’s location did not change significantly between T0 and T2.
Thus, it can compute the intersection of those CRs and find a smaller region(the
shaded region in the figure) containing user’s real location. Third, the assump-
tion of maximum velocity based free space movement[GDSB16] is unrealistic, as
user’s mobility is bounded by road networks and its condition in spatiotemporal
domain. In figure 3.1(c) a user issued two CRs, CR0 and CR1, at time T0 and
T1, using a maximum velocity based movement method [GDSB16]. However, using
information 2, an adversary can exclude some locations in CR0 from which it is not
possible to reach any location in CR1 in (T1 − T0) time interval. It can also ex-
clude some locations from CR1 to which it is not possible to reach from any location
in CR0. Fourth, they cannot guarantee privacy for frequently visited locations in
the long run. Let us consider four different obfuscated trajectories were published
in 〈T0,T1〉, 〈T10,T11〉, 〈T52,T53〉, and 〈T60,T61〉 timestamp (Figure 3.1(d)).Through
careful observation, the adversary can find that the CRs at T1,T11,T53, and T60
were generated for a single location. Thus, it can compute the intersection of those
CRs to get finer detail of that location. Motivated by these four limitations, in this
dissertation, we seek answer to the following question,
How can the personalized historical mobility information, information on the
privacy-sensitive locations, and a visit frequency of the locations will help to de-
sign an obfuscation mechanism to prevent against long-term observation attack with
improved quality-of-service (QoS)?
We hypothesize that, modeling of a user’s preference to different locations based
on his/her historical data, a classification of the locations based on his/her visit
frequencies, and a controlled relaxation of privacy requirements for infrequent lo-
cations will allow an obfuscation mechanism to mitigate in the process of privacy-
preservation against long-term observation attack with reduced QoS loss.
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Table 3.1: Table of Symbols
Symbol Description Symbol Description
OA User’s location at time TA Pi Location i’s popularity
Bui User u’s bias towards loca-
tion i
Sui user u’s preference for i
R radius of privacy generating
region(PGR)
α privacy area factor
δt Delay tolerance threshold λ privacy level deviation con-
trol factor
CR Concealing region W List of related locations to
construct CR
ECR privacy level of a CR type(i) type of location i
r radius of Region of Inter-
est(ROI)
C A CR’s vertices
3.3 Background
In this section, we first discuss some necessary concepts related to the work presented
In this chapter. Then, we present the proposed system model, including the attack
strategies of an attacker to undermine trajectory privacy. The important symbols
used in this chapter are listed in table 6.1.
3.3.1 Fundamental Concepts
1. User’s Preference, Sui : A user u’s preference Sui for a location i depends on
two factors: popularity of the location [NLZ+14], and user’s bias in favour of the
type of location i. We define preference Sui as follows,
Sui = Popularity, Pi × Bias, Bui (3.1)
Where, Pi =
#of queries from i
#of queries in the LBS
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Bui =
#of u’s queries from all the locations of type(i)
#of queries in the LBS
2. Accessible, Related, and Reachable Locations: A location i is acces-
sible if Pi > 0; otherwise it is inaccessible . An accessible location i, is related to
a user u, if, in terms of preference, it is considered to be close to the user’s locations
and is used to present user’s location in the CR. A location B is reachable from
location A if it is possible to reach B from A in (TB − TA + δt) time using a real
road network. Where, TA and TB are the timestamp of publishing locations A and
B, respectively. δt is a delay tolerant threshold which either could be set by the
user or the system. For example, δt = 1 minute means there could be maximum 1
minute delay between query generation and query submission.
3. Privacy Settings: In our approach, we use minimum required area, A,
of a concealing region, CR, as the primary parameter to generate a CR. How-
ever, this approach requires detail information of map, incurring high space and
computational complexity [GDSB16], and cannot always guarantee desired privacy
[LSTL13]. Thus, besides area, we incorporate two other privacy requirements: k
and l, to define minimum number of related locations and minimum diversity of the
selected related locations in the CR, respectively. We also realize that in the case of
continuous queries, it may not always possible to meet a hard privacy requirements.
Regarding this, we define two privacy settings:
Expected privacy, privE = 〈AE, kE, lE〉 and
minimum privacy, privmin = 〈Amin, kmin, lmin〉. Where, privE > privmin. The pro-
posed approach first selects privE to generate a CR. If it fails then it selects privmin.
4. Secure Concealing Region CR: A CR is a convex hull of a set of selected
related locations, W, such that it covers user’s real location. Given privacy settings,
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privE and privmin, a CR is said to be secured if
{Area(CR) ≥ AE ∧ |W| ≥ kE ∧ |type(W)| ≥ lE} or
{Area(CR) ≥ Amin ∧ |W| ≥ kmin ∧ |type(W)| ≥ lmin}
(3.2)
5. Privacy Generating Region(PGR), Settings of Privacy Parameters,
and Frequently Visited Places: To have a bound to generate a CR, a disk with
radius R, centered at user’s location O, is considered as Privacy Generating Region
(PGR) such that, the generated CR falls entirely inside of PGR. Here, the value ofR
is defined by KLAP and can be changed by the user. To set the minimum required
area A of CR, a user uses α as a factor of R such that, A = π(R
α
)2(1 ≤ α ≤ R). We
also assume that the users will identify their frequently visited places, e.g. home,
work, favorite coffee shop, and so on.
6. Delay in CR Submission: Let us consider a user moved to a new location
in (TB − TA) time and the minimum required time to submit a secure CR to the
LBS is T′B. If T
′
B > (TB − TA) + δt, then we call it delaying the CR submission.
3.3.2 Privacy Evaluation
We measure the privacy as the uncertainty in identifying real location for an adver-
sary [NLZ+14]. From a given CR with the list W of all the related locations, the
privacy level, ECR, is computed as follows,
ECR = −
∑
i
S i log2 S i; where, S i =
Sui∑
i Sui
;∀i ∈W (3.3)
3.3.3 Problem Formulation
Based on privacy level and delay, we formulate the problem of generating a secure
concealing region CR as follows according to the fact that, on the one hand, we
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Figure 3.2: Proposed system model
want to generate a CR with maximum privacy level, on the other hand, we want to
select the one with minimum delay to reach from previous CR.
maximize{privacy level ECR,
1
edelay
}
s.t. ECR ≥ λEBase; {λ ∈ R>0|λ ≤ 1}
delay ≤ δt; {δt ∈ R>0|δt > 0}
{α, k, l ∈ Z+|(1 ≤ α ≤ R) ∧ (k ≥ 2) ∧ (1 ≤ l < k)}
(3.4)
Here, EBase is the privacy level of a baseline CRBase and λ is a privacy level deviation
control factor. Certainly, we want to make the value of λ as close as 1. From the
experiment, it is observed that λ can be as large as 0.9. Note that, both λ and δt
are system controlled parameters. On the other hand, α, k, and l are related to the
user.
3.3.4 System Model
1. System Model
The general framework of a LBS system comprises a service provider and many
mobile users. We assume that the users are registered to the system with a unique
id, u. Our proposed framework, KLAP, resides in user’s device (Figure 3.2). To
find information about POIs of specific type ρ within a ROI with radius r, a user
submits a query as follows, Query0 = 〈u, 〈(x, y), r〉, ρ〉. Where, O = (x, y) denotes
the user’s original location in terms of latitude and longitude. Using the parameters
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for A, k, and l; the user generates a CR using KLAP algorithm. Then, the original
query Query0 is replaced by, Query
′ = 〈uid,CR, r, ρ〉. Instead of Query0, Query′ is
submitted to the LBS. Then, the LBS performs range query on the CR to find the
POIs of type ρ, and sends them to the user.
2. Adversary Model
We consider an adversary knows information on users’ historical queries. We also
assume that the adversary knows how KLAP works but does not know the privacy
parameters. Based on the available information, it can perform the following attacks
to infer the user’s location at a finer level.
a) Context linking attacks using knowledge of the map, popularity, and user’s
preference.
b) Region intersection attack on short-term multiple queries.
c) Real-Time Traffic Information (RTTI) based maximum movement boundary
attack.
d) Long-term obfuscated location tracking attack.
3.4 Proposed Delay-Aware Privacy Preserving Approach
In this section, we describe the computational details of concealing region (CR)
generation algorithm in KLAP. Based on the input, consists of privacy settings
privE and privmin, previously published CRA for a location OA at time TA, set
(
⋃
x CRx) of all CRs for frequently visited places, user’s current location OB at
current time TB, the process of CR generation in KLAP comprises the following
steps:
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Algorithm 1: KLAP algorithm
Data: Previous CRA at time TA, current time TB, user’s current location
OB, privE, privmin, R, set (
⋃
x CRx) of all CRs for frequently
visited places, δt, λ, user’s preference for all the locations S, m
Result: Final concealing region CR
1 if OB ∈ CRA then
2 Return CRA
3 if OB ∈ CRB //CRB ∈ (
⋃
xCRx) then
4 delayi ←delay between CRA and CRB using Equation 3.7
5 if (delayi > δt) ∧ CRA is not for frequent place then
6 CR−A ← Prune CRA by excluding the related locations with
delay(a ∈ CRA,CRB) > δt
7 delayi ←delay between CR−A, and CRB using Equation 3.7
8 wait delayi amount of time and Return CRB
9 Select all the locations with Sui > 0 from the region
(PGR \ {CRA ∪ (
⋃
x CRx)}) in a list, Loc
10 if (|Loc| ≥ mk) ∧ (|type(Loc)| ≥ ml) then
11 A, k, l← AE, kE, lE
12 else
13 A, k, l← Amin, kmin, lmin
14 Compute the absolute difference of the locations with OB in terms of
preference and sort them.
15 Seed← {k random contiguous locations from sorted list which includes
OB}
16 〈CRBase,EBase〉 ← Generate-CR(OB)
17 List-of-CR ← ∅
18 for (i = 1; i < k; i++) do
19 〈CRi,ECRi , delayi〉 ← Generate-CR(seeds(i))
20 if ECRi ≥ λEBase then
21 Put CRi into List-of-CR
22 CRf, delayf ←Select the CR with minimum delay
23 wait delayf amount of time and Return CRf
1
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Algorithm 2: Generate-CR
Data: seed, r,A, k, l,m,S,OB,CRA
Result: CR, ECR, delay.
1 Select all the locations with Sui > 0 from the region
(PGRseed \ {CRA ∪ (
⋃
x CRx)}) in a list, Loc
2 Compute the absolute difference of the locations with seed in terms of
preference and sort them.
3 LCL← {first l-type locations from the sorted list} ∪{first mk locations
from the sorted list, including OB}.
4 SLCL← Sorted LCL based on the locations’ geographical distance with
OB, in ascending order.
5 W← first k-locations from SLCL including OB; then delete them from
SLCL.
6 while |type(W)| < l or Area(Convex Hull of W)< A do
7 W←W ∪ SLCL(1)
8 delete SLCL(1) from SLCL
9 CR← Convex Hull of W
10 delay ←delay between CRA, and CR using Equation 3.7
11 if (delay > δt) then
12 CR− ←Prune CR by excluding all the related locations with
delay(CRA, b ∈ CR) > δt
13 delay ←delay between CRA, and CR− using Equation 3.7
14 if (delay > δt) then
15 CR−A ← Prune CRA
16 delayi ←delay between CR−A, and CR
− using Equation 3.7
17 CR← CR−
18 ECR ← compute privacy level of W according to Equation 3.3
19 return 〈CR, ECR, delay〉
2
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In CR Test: If user’s new location OB remains within CRA then use it as the new
CR (lines 1-2 of Algorithm 1).
Frequently Visited Place Check: If OB is in CRB, a previously published CR
for a frequently visited place, then use it as the final CR and skip steps 3, 4, 5, and
pruning of it in step 7. Moreover, if OA is a frequently visited place, then also skip
pruning CRA in step 7 (lines 3-9 of Algorithm 1).
Seed Selection: First select all the locations with Sui > 0 from the region (PGR \
{CRA ∪ (
⋃
x CRx)}). Recall that, PGR is actually a circle with radius R, centered
at OB. Then, for each location, compute the absolute difference with OB, in terms
of preference; and sort them based on that difference. From the sorted locations,
select a list of locations as seeds as follows: seeds = {k random contiguous locations
from the sorted list which includes OB} (lines 9-15 of Algorithm 1).
One can argue that, we can consider OB as the only seed to generate the CR.
However, it can leak user’s privacy in two ways. First, locations are static and
probabilities and preference do not change significantly over a long period of time.
Thus, an adversary can apply reverse engineering process on a CR to map for which
original location the vertices of that CR were generated and if there is only one such
location is found, it is the user’s original location. Second, as the CR was generated
based on a fixed PGR, the adversary can perform geometric operations to shrink
the CR.
Candidate Location Selection: For each seed, seedi, consider a PGRi, and select
all the locations from the region (PGRi \{CRA∪ (
⋃
x CRx)}). Again, compute their
difference in preference with OB; and sort them. From the sorted locations, select
a list of candidate locations with {first mk locations} ∪ { first ml type locations}.
Where, m ≥ 2. Afterwards, calculate the physical distance of candidate locations
from OB, sort them, and store in a list LS (lines 1-4 of Algorithm 2).
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CR Generation: From LS, select first k locations in a list W. Check if,{(|type(W)| ≥
l) ∧ (Area(convex hull of W) ≥ A)} (lines 5-9 of Algorithm 2). If not, select more
locations from LS in similar way in W. For consecutive queries, it may not always
possible to generate a CR with privE. Thus, first check if it is possible to generate
a CR with prevE; if not, select privmin (lines 10-13 in Algorithm 1).
Time Reachability based Delay Calculation: For the generated CRi, compute
the (possible) delay from Real-Time Traffic Information(RTTI) based time to reach
from CRA to CRi as follows:
RTTI(a ∈ CRA, b ∈ CRi) = minimum required time to move from a to b (3.5)
delay(a ∈ CRA,CRi) =

0, if(TB − TA) ≥ min(RTTI(a,∀b ∈ CRi))
(TB − TA)−min(RTTI(a,∀b ∈ CRi)), otherwise
(3.6)
X(m,n) = max
 min(delay(∀a ∈ CRA,CRi)),min(delay(CRA,∀b ∈ CRi))
 (3.7)
Delay Management using CR Pruning: If delay > δt, one straightforward
solution could be postponing the CR submission for at least delay amount of time
or generate a CRi closer to CRA without containing OA[GDSB16]. However, this
approach incurs reduction in quality-of-service. Thus, to deal with delay, we propose
a CR pruning approach. To prune a CR, first identify the related locations causing
the delay and then exclude them from it’s list of related locations. If the new CR,
reduces the delay then use that as new CR. Figure 3.3 depicts an example for
CR pruning where WA and Wi are the lists of related locations of CRA and CRi,
respectively. In detail,
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Figure 3.3: CR pruning example with δt = 1 minute: Each entry refers to the
delay(in min.) to reach from WA(m) to Wi(n). To reach from WA(2) to any
location in Wi minimum (TB − TA) + 2.3 minutes are required. On the other side,
to reach Wi(2) from any location in WA minimum (TB − TA) + 2.6 minutes are
required. Thus, we exclude both locations from Wi and WA, respectively, to get
pruned CRs.
a) First prune CRi and compute the delay. If it reduces the delay, then use the
pruned version as CR.
b) If the pruned CRi’s delay regarding CRA is still greater than δt, then, also
prune CRA. Afterwards, for each seed, store the following information: {CR−i ,
ECR−i , delay}, where CR
−
i is the pruned version of CRi.
Note that, one can argue to compute the delay to reach all the locations in
(PGR \ {CRA ∪ (
⋃
x CRx)}) from CRA in advance, and select locations based on
minimization of delay. However, if the number of locations inside of (PGR\{CRA∪
(
⋃
x CRx)}) is large, it is not feasible to send large volume of requests in a short-
period of time to a map service in a user-centric approach.
Final CR selection: To solve the Multi-Objective Optimization problem of se-
lecting the final CR( equation 6.4), first select all the CRs based on the following
relation, ECRi ≥ λEOB , where EOB is the privacy level achieved from the CR with
OB as the seed. Then return the CR with minimum delay.
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3.5 Scheme Analysis
In this section we analyze the security aspects of our proposed mechanism KLAP.
In particular, we discuss the impact of real-time traffic information based maxi-
mum movement boundary, long-term obfuscated location tracking, and probability
distribution and personal context linking attacks.
Definition 3.5.1 Given two CRs, CRA and CRB, submitted at TA and TB times-
tamps, with WA and WB as their corresponding set of related locations; a RTTI
based maximum movement boundary attack on continuous queries is successful if
W∗A ∪W∗B 6= ∅ (3.8)
W∗A = {∃i ∈WA|RTTI(i, ∀j ∈WB) > (TB − TA)}
W∗B = {∃j ∈WB|RTTI(∀i ∈WA, j) > (TB − TA)}
Theorem 3.5.2 RTTI based maximum movement boundary attack does not reveal
user information in KLAP.
Proof. In KLAP, using pruning and delay, CRB is submitted only when all of its
locations are reachable from CRA. Hence, W
∗
B = ∅. On the contrary, if CRA
is not for a frequently visited place and W∗A 6= ∅, then these locations must be
excluded in the CR pruning step. That is, W∗A does not leak any significant location
information for CRA and CRB, and therefore, W
∗
A = ∅. However, if CRA is for a
frequently visited place then certainly W∗A = ∅ through delay. Thus, RTTI based
attacks on consecutive CRs does not reveal any location information in KLAP.
Definition 3.5.3 Given multiple CRs, 〈CR0, . . .CRn〉, submitted from a frequently
visited location O on different days, a long-term obfuscated location tracking attack
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is defined as,
CRx = CR0 ∩ . . . ∩ CRn (3.9)
such that, CRx = {∃CR ∈ {CR0, . . .CRn}|(CR 6= CRx) ∧ (O ∈ CRx)}.
Theorem 3.5.4 KLAP is resilient against long-term obfuscated location tracking
attack.
Proof. KLAP learns the frequently visited locations from user’s input and once a
CR is generated for such a location, it stores that CR for future queries and skip
the pruning step for it. Thus, CRx = CR0 = · · · = CRn
Definition 3.5.5 For a submitted CR with a list of related locations W, an approach
is resilient against probability distribution and personal context linking attacks if
Pr(wi ∈ W|O ∈ W) = Pr(wj ∈ W|O ∈ W) =
1
|W|
;∀i 6= j (3.10)
Theorem 3.5.6 An attacker cannot infer user’s location using probability distribu-
tion and personal context linking attacks.
Proof. KLAP first defines user’s preference to a location based on popularity and
user’s bias to that location. Then, its seed and candidate locations selection algo-
rithm steps ensure that only the closely related locations, in terms of preference,
defines the CR. Thus, every location in W has the equal probability( 1|W|) to be O.
3.6 Experimentation and Analysis
We evaluate the proposed KLAP framework with two real-world datasets provided
by Foursquare for NYC and Tokyo cities[YZZY15]. The important statistics of the
datasets are provided in table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Dataset Statistics
Dataset #Check-ins #Locations #Types #Users
NYC 227428 38333 400 1083
Tokyo 573703 61858 385 2293
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4: Locations in (a) NYC and (b) Tokyo datasets.
For each check-in we consider five information types: user id, location id, location
using GPS coordinates, location type, and time of check-ins. Figure 3.4 presents
the locations used in the two datasets. The parameters and their different values
used in the experiment are as follows: r = 1000 meter, k = {9, 17, 25, 50}, α =
{4, 10, 12}, l = {3, 5, 7},R = 1000 meter, δt = 1 minute, δ = 0.9,m = 2
In this chapter, we use the following baseline approaches for comparison:
1. Rand-CR: It Generates a random CR based on area A requirement.
2. k-DLCA: It covers user’s ROI with n-number of circles with equal radii such
that the intersection region of those circles construct a CR[LHA+16].
3. Cont-Dummy: Based on spatiotemporal correlation, this approach generates
dummies considering real-time traffic information[LLL+17].
4. NoCor-CR: This is a variation of our proposed obfuscation approach KLAP
without considering spatiotemporal correlation between the CRs.
51
(a) NYC (b) Tokyo
Figure 3.5: Relationship between privacy area requirement A and k; and their
impact on privacy level ECR.
5. NoPrune-CR: This is another variation of KLAP without the pruning step.
That is, when a CR cannot be submitted in current time, it delays the process.
This approach generates a CR with privacy setting privE. This approach is
similar to PROBE under spatiotemporal constraints[GDSB16].
With different combinations of the parameters, we ran these approaches on 40
trajectories of different users from both datasets, each having ≈ 15 check-ins on
average, to generate different statistics. Without loss of generality, we use home
address of each user as the frequently visited place.
3.6.1 Privacy Level
We first evaluate the privacy level, ECR, achievable from a given CR; and the CR
depends on the three privacy parameters k, l, and A (by means of α). Obviously,
with the increase of k, ECR increases. While the parameter l ensures the required
level of diversity, we observe its little impact on the overall privacy level. Thus, we
are more interested in checking how the area requirement affects privacy in KLAP.
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(a) NYC (b) Tokyo
Figure 3.6: Comparison in terms of privacy level, ECR among different approaches. KLAP
settings: k = 9, l = 5, α = 10
In figure 3.5 we depicts the relationship between A(in terms of α), k, and ECR. Ev-
idently, with the privacy area requirement, KLAP can achieve higher privacy than
ideal privacy level with just k locations (− log2( 1k )). Thus, to achieve a high degree
of privacy, a user can set a higher value for A, leaving the values of k and l with
some default small numbers.
Comparison
The comparison among the mentioned approaches in terms of privacy level, ECR,
is shown in figure 3.6. k-DLCA shows the lowest value for ECR because it neither
considers user’s preference nor any privacy requirement and also, the generated CR
cannot guarantee a certain area of it. With Random-CR, it is possible to achieve
better privacy than k-DLCA and Cont-Dummy because it generates the CR ensur-
ing privacy area A. However, it does not consider the relationship between user and
locations. Although NoCor-CR improves this limitation, it cannot guarantee privacy
in continuous check-in cases. With the consideration of Spatio-temporal correlation
between successive check-ins, CR pruning approach, and (expected, minimum) pri-
vacy requirements, KLAP achieves the highest degree of privacy. More precisely, we
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(a) NYC (b) Tokyo
Figure 3.7: Impact of CR Pruning on delay management for (a) NYC and (b) Tokyo.
found only 4% and 7% check-ins in NYC and Tokyo, respectively, for which privacy
level of KLAP is less than NoCor-CR. This can also be improved by defining multi-
ple privacy settings between privE and privmin, and select the one closest to privE,
with an increase in computation cost. The oscillating nature of KLAP’s result is
effected either by regions’ location density or the CR pruning step. At regions,
where the density of locations is high, a generated CR may cover a large number of
related locations; yielding a high degree of privacy, even if k is small.
3.6.2 Impact of Pruning
Delay Management
We compare the amount of delay imposed by NoPrune-CR and KLAP in figure 3.7
to show the improvement achieved by KLAP with the pruning technique. In the
experiment we found that the delay in KLAP is always less than 1 minute. This
large improvement in KLAP is achieved with the concept of pruning and minimum
privacy, privmin settings.
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(a)NYC (b) Tokyo
Figure 3.8: (∆/ECR) based comparison among different methods for (a) NYC &
(b) Tokyo. Original-Q refers to the original query without any privacy-preservation.
For comparison purpose we use ECR = 1 for Original-Q.
Impact of Pruning on Privacy Level
In case of pruning previously published CRA, we observe a small reduction in privacy
level for CRA which is always ≤ 10% in both datasets.
3.6.3 Communication Cost
The communication cost, ∆, is computed using both of upstream, and downstream
cost[LSTL13] as ∆ = |C| + N . Where, |C| is the total number of vertices of the
CR and N is the number of POIs returned by the LBS. To measure ∆, we consider
one type of location to query. In figure 3.8, we present ∆/ECR to show the cost per
privacy level in different approaches. It is evident that to achieve 1 unit of privacy
level in KLAP; the cost is the lowest. On the other hand, Cont-Dummy yield the
highest amount of cost, indicating the advantage of obfuscation approaches over
dummy based approaches in terms of both privacy and communication efficiency.
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3.6.4 Storage Cost
In KLAP, storage cost is mainly influenced by 1) number of locations in the dataset,
2) CRs of frequently visited locations, and 3) previously published CR. Recall that,
our approach is a user-centric one. On each user’s device, for each location we
need to store {id, latitude, longitude, type, preference}. If we use flat-file to store
this information we would need no more than 200byte for each location. Thus,
it is required 8MB and 13MB for NYC and Tokyo, respectively, to store all the
locations’ information. Each CR comprises two information: its vertex list and the
ids of related locations inside of it. Even if a CR contains all the locations in city,
then it would take 1MB space for a simple file to store their ids. Therefore, if a
city has 1 million locations, then KLAP requires less than 250MB space to store
necessary information.
3.7 Discussion and Summary
In this chapter, we introduced an obfuscation mechanism for LBS, called KLAP.
Based on a user’s privacy settings, KLAP defines a concealing region (CR) to ob-
fuscate the user’s real location. Here, we made three significant contributions: first,
through the usages of location’s popularity and user’s preference, KLAP can achieve
strong privacy against personal context linking and probability distribution based
attacks; second, the utilization of real-time traffic information allows KLAP to be
practical in real-world scenarios and protect against maximum movement boundary-
based attack; and finally, with the proposed CR pruning technique, KLAP reduces
delay to a great extent compared to delay-based mechanism. Evaluation results of
privacy, communication, and storage costs, based on two real datasets, mark the
advantage of the proposed mechanism over existing approaches.
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CHAPTER 4
LOCATION INFERENCE ATTACKS ON GEO-TAGGED AND NON
GEO-TAGGED DATA AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURES
In this chapter, we study the privacy issues associated with the trajectories con-
taining both geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged data. Without loss of generality, we
limit our study to checkins and geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged photos. We propose
a probabilistic inference model by considering both checkin and photo probabili-
ties for each location. With Foursquare’s New York City and Tokyo datasets, we
first implement the inference model on three variations of dummy-based obfusca-
tion mechanisms, and show that a straightforward application of existing dummy
approaches can leak location privacy for trajectories containing both geo-tagged and
non geo-tagged data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to inves-
tigate the impact of historical shared photos on location privacy. After observing
the negative impact of the inference attack, we also propose an improved version of
[NLZ+14] to negate such an inference. Our contribution also includes a visualization
technique to visual represent trajectory privacy-preserving checkins and photos in
location-based social networks (LBSN), another form of LBS.
The chapter is organized as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 provide a formal in-
troduction to the problems. The necessary background information, fundamental
concepts, the proposed system and attack models are discussed in section 4.3. Fi-
nally, the proposed privacy-preserving mechanism is detailed in section 4.4. The
chapter is concluded in section 4.6.
4.1 Introduction
The advancement of location technology and smart devices is fading the gap be-
tween the physical world and online social network; making Location-Based Social
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Network (LBSN) a popular platform to enjoy different location-dependent services,
e.g., friend finder, point-of-interest(POI) search, check-in, and geo-tagged photo
sharing. There exist many LBSNs offering different services, such as Facebook,
Foursquare, and Google place. In Foursquare, more than 160 million check-ins and
5 million photos were recorded for New York City alone [fou]. While it prompts
technological and societal advantages, the vast collection of location information of
both check-ins and geo-tagged photos poses serious privacy concerns. Studies show
that it is possible to reveal a user’s home, workplace, lifestyle, health condition,
and political views. from the location information [DMHVB13, LARC16, TPI17].
For instance, Liccardi et al. [LARC16] proposed a visual technique based location
inference model, using twitter check-in data, to show that people’s most frequent
and private locations, such as work and home, can be deduced using only a small
sample of location points (1-day worth). To counter such an inference attack, several
Trajectory Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (TPPMs) have been proposed, including
dummies-based obfuscation[LLL+17].
We identify that existing inference models, as well as TPPMs, mostly consider
only the location information. These TPPMs can guarantee strong privacy, only if
we limit inference to check-ins. However, besides check-in, photo sharing is another
prevalent form of interaction in LBSN and the impact of historical shared photos
on location privacy, specifically their distributions over locations, is not studied yet.
In this paper, we aim to show that, it is possible to design inference model to de-
duce location information in the spatiotemporal domain based on the distribution
of historical check-ins and photos. The novelty of our work is that we designed
an inference model which is oblivious to contents of the photo. We experimen-
tally show that, under specific spatiotemporal constraint, such an inference model
can be a useful tool to infer a user’s location at a higher resolution, even if its lo-
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Figure 4.1: Location inference motivation:(a) a user generates a set of locations
using an existing location-privacy preserving mechanism (TPPM) on a mobile device
(e.g., smartphone, smartwatch, and so on)to conceal her original location in a geo-
tagged photo and (b) submits them to an LBSN. (c) With access to the LBSN, an
adversary’s goal is to find a user’s original location from the location set without
processing the content of the photo.
cation information is “well” protected using an obfuscation approach. While our
analysis is concentrated on dummy-based obfuscation, it can be extended for differ-
ential privacy-based obfuscation, such as geo-indistinguishability[ABCP13], which
we intend to explore in our future work. The generic framework of the inference is
depicted in Figure 4.1. With our experimental results signifies our argument that,
for LBSs, where users interaction covers heterogeneous contents, TPPM should be
designed by considering the impact of all the type of data, not only the geo-tagged
content.
4.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
For a better understanding of how spatiotemporal analysis of the distribution of
historical photos influences location privacy, we illustrate a couple of examples in
Figure 4.2. We first discuss a more straightforward form of inference, so-called “0/1-
probability-based inference”, where an adversary checks whether a location has any
probability from where a photo can be shared. Let’s consider a user decided to
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share a check-in with a photo in LBSN. To protect privacy of current location O,
she shared O with k − 1 dummy locations using any of the dummy based methods
in [NLZ+14, NLZ+15, LLL+17, YLX+17](Figure 4.2(a)). An attacker knows that
the user is at any of the k locations, and a photo is also shared from that location.
Without considering the content of the photo, the attacker can look into the his-
torical data and can eliminate the dummies with zero (0) photo sharing probability
to infer more precise user’s location information. The definitions of check-in and
photo sharing probabilities are discussed in section 4.2. Using data, collected from
Foursquare through their public API, we apply this inference model on three differ-
ent algorithms, which generate dummies based on historical check-in distribution.
The details of the experiment are discussed in section 4.5. Figure 4.2(b) presents
results of the inference model for Random[NLZ+14] and Baseline [NLZ+15] Algo-
rithms. It is evident that overlooking the impact of photos makes these algorithms
highly vulnerable against the proposed inference model. Definitely, this inference
model can be further improved with the consideration of spatiotemporal correlation
between successive events (we use ‘event’ as the generic term for check-ins and pho-
tos). Let us consider two events, E0 (a photo without any geo information) and E1
(a check-in), generated at time T0 and T1, respectively. As both of the events are
independent of each other, one straightforward solution to protect location privacy
of E1, is to generate a set of dummies using check-in probability (Figure 4.2(c)).
However, (T1 − T0) might be small, indicating that a user’s position did not change
significantly between E0 and E1. In other words, if (T1 − T0) ≤ δ, then an adver-
sary can guess with high confidence that the user’s location remained the same and
thus can apply the discussed inference attack. Motivated by this example, we seek
the answer to the following problem: How can the incorporation of heterogeneous
contents’ information in the process of obfuscation allows a user to protect his/her
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Figure 4.2: (a) 0/1-probability based inference: User hides his location of geo-tagged
photo with 3 different dummy locations using a check-in probability-based(Pc) ex-
isting TPPM. Two of those locations have zero photo-sharing probability(Pρ)(x
marked), thus excluded by an adversary. (b) Example on real dataset: adversary’s
success rate σ(%) on Random[NLZ+14] and Baseline[NLZ+15] algorithms(using k
= 20) with 0/1-probability based inference, performed using a real dataset. (c) and
(d) Inference based on spatiotemporal correlation: Although dummy locations set
and photo are submitted in different time, as (T1 − T0) is small, an adversary can
guess with high confidence that both events were generated from the same location.
Thus, can exclude some dummies in a similar way.
trajectory privacy in the spatiotemporal domain?
We hypothesized that by considering the probabilities of content sharing at dif-
ferent locations based on their historical data and by utilizing delay and drop in the
process of obfuscation allow a user to protect his/her trajectory privacy.
That is, we argue that it is also required to consider photo-sharing probability
while generating the dummies (from our previous paragraph, it is E1) to protect
trajectory privacy. However, it is not always possible to find enough candidate
locations nearby (due to spatiotemporal and regions’ location density constraints)
with photo-sharing probability. In that case, delaying E1 can protect privacy, not
posting dummies instantly. Let us consider another example from Figure 4.1(d),
where E0 is a check-in, E1 is a photo, and E0’s privacy is protected using a set of
dummies S0, generated based on check-in sharing probability. If (T1−T0) ≤ δ, then
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Table 4.1: Table of Symbols
Symbol Description Symbol Description
O User’s real location k #of locations to hide O
L Set of all locations Pi checkin-photo sensitivity of
a location
Pc check-in probability δ permanence threshold
E Degree of privacy Pr Generic term for Pc and P
S Set of k locations including
O
m Candidate location selec-
tion parameter
σ #of dummies with zero
checkin-photo sensitivity
λ Degree of privacy selection
parameter
we argue that dropping the photo is the solution to protect privacy. However, if
(T1 − T0) > δ, then the temporal relationship between E0 and E1 does not reveal
a user’s location information, even if user’s location remained the same. Thus, the
user can safely post E1. Now, let’s consider another event E2 (a check-in) such
that (T2 − T1) ≤ δ. That is, the user’s location did not change between T0 and T2.
If we use S0 for E2, then it can leak privacy for E1 as S0 was generated based on
check-in sharing probability. Thus, we propose to select the closest location with
photo-sharing probability with a spatial error as a user’s location and generate
dummies based on that location.
4.3 Background
In this section, we describe first different fundamental concepts related to our work.
We then present the system model and attack strategies of the adversary.
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4.3.1 Fundamental Concepts
1. Event: A generic name for check-in, geo-tagged photo, and photo. An event
generated at time Tt is denoted by Et.
2. Check-in Probability, Pci If the number of historical check-ins, shared from
location i, is Ci, then Pci =
Ci∑
j Cj
; ∀j ∈ L, Where L is the set of all locations.
3. Photo Sharing Probability, Pρi: If the number of historical shared photos
from location i is ρi, probability to share a photo from i is, Pρi =
ρi∑
j ρj
; ∀j ∈ L
4. Checkin-photo Sensitivity, Pi: A location, loci, is said to be checkin-photo
sensitive, if Pci > 0 and Pρi > 0. Then, checkin-photo sensitivity of location Loci is,
Pi = Pci × Pρi . Thus, a location is checkin-photo sensitive, if Pi > 0.
5. Probability, Pr: A generic term for Pc and Pρ. If check-in probability is used
to generate dummies, then Pr = Pc. In case of checkin-photo sensitivity, Pr = P .
6. Timing Error: If posting of an event is delayed for certain amount of time,
then timing error occurs. It is define as, timing error = nde
n
.
7. Dropping Error: If an event (specifically, photo) is dropped without posting,
then dropping error occurs; and it is defined as, dropping error = ndr
n
.
8. Spatial Error: If instead of user’s original location, another location is consid-
ered as user’s ‘real’ location then we call such phenomena as spatial error, which is
defined as, spatial error = nsp
n
.
Here, n, nde, ndr, and nsp refer to total number of events, delayed events, dropped
events, and spatial errors; respectively.
4.3.2 System Model
Our proposed photo-check mechanism works on user’s device without relaying on
a third party. Figure 4.3 depicts the proposed system model. Based on the spa-
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Figure 4.3: Proposed system model: (a) Photo-check’s system model on user’s device
with 4 possible actions to preserve location privacy of an event, (b) visualization of
example privacy-preserved events in LBSN.
tiotemporal correlation between new and previously generated events,photo-check
selects the appropriate action from an array of 4 possible actions to preserve location
privacy. We assume that the check-in and photo-sharing probabilities are publicly
available. If an event contains dummies, user’s location is computed from the con-
vex hull of those dummies (Figure 4.3(b)). The detail of the proposed mechanism
is discussed in section 4.4.
4.3.3 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary with access to the historical check-in and photo distri-
butions. We assume that the adversary does not use any image content analysis
method to localize a user from a given photo. Instead, it considers only the proba-
bility distribution of historical check-in and shared photos to infer the user’s location.
We also assume that it has users’ approximate permanence information at different
locations. For example, Google search shows that people typically spend 15 min at
McDonald’s of 4217 Genesee St, Cheektowaga, NY 14225. Without loss of general-
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ity, we take the time difference between two consecutive events as the threshold (δ)
to determine whether a user remains at the same location.
4.4 Proposed Privacy Preserving Geo-Tagged and Non Geo-
Tagged Data Sharing Approach
Our proposed photo-check mechanism comprises two modules: privacy preservation
on an event before sending it to a LBSN and visualization of the privacy-preserved
event in LBSN.
Privacy Preservation: The main goal of photo-check is to maximize user’s pri-
vacy against an adversary while posting an event. To achieve this goal, photo-check
uses the the following 4 actions: post, delay, drop, and dummy generation.
The flowchart of the mechanism is presented in Figure 4.4. Using information of
previously posted event Eprv, user’s current event Ecur, user’s current location O,
and user’s privacy setting (number of required dummies, k) as input, photo-check
works in the following main steps:
1) Check whether Ecur contains location information(either a check-in or a geo-
tagged photo). If so, then go to step 2; otherwise go to step 5.
2) If O is not checkin-photo sensitive, then post Ecur with k− 1 dummies using Pc;
otherwise, go to step 3.
3) Check whether enough candidates (≥ mk) within the proximity of O such that
dist(O, x) ≤ R, where x is a candidate location and R is a distance control param-
eter (e.g. 1000 meter). If yes, then generate (k − 1) dummies using PO and post
Ecur. If not, go to step 4.
4) If the following condition (Eq.4.1) satisfies, delay Ecur; otherwise, generate dum-
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Figure 4.4: Photo-check flowchart. Here loc, ph, and ∆t refer to location, photo,
and (Tprev − Tcur) respectively.
mies using Pc and post Ecur with the dummies.
(((tcur − tprv) ≤ δ) ∧ (Eprv is photo)) ∨ (photo ∈ Ecur) (4.1)
The proposed dummy generation algorithm is discussed in the later part of this
paper.
5) If Eprv was a photo or dummies were not generated for it using Pc, then directly
post Ecur. Otherwise check check whether (tcur − tprv) ≤ δ. If yes, then drop Ecur.
Else, post Eprv and update current location with the closest location i with Pi > 0
such that dist(O, i) ≤ R.
Visualization in LBSN: After receiving the privacy-preserved Ecur, to visualize
it, the LBSN works as follows. First, check whether Ecur contains a set of dummies.
If so, then compute their convex hull and it’s centroid from the location set. The
closest location in the dummy set from the centroid is treated as the approximate
location of the user (Figure 4.3(b)). Otherwise, post Ecur as it is.
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4.4.1 Dummy Generation
In dummy generation, our main objective is to select a set S of k − 1 dummies
and O, which ensures highest degree of privacy, E . This goal can be achieved if we
select locations as dummies having least difference with O in terms of Pr, which will
maximize E . E of a set S is computed as follows,
Es = −
k−1∑
i=0
P ′ri log2 P
′
ri (4.2)
where, P ′ri =
Pri∑k−1
i=0 Pri
is the normalized probability. Certainly, Es will be maximum,
if all the k locations’ probability are same, i.e. 1
k
. That is, optimum privacy,
Eopt = − log2( 1k ). Es can be maximized to Eopt if we consider the whole map as the
search space for dummy generation. In that case, the dummies distance could be
far from each other. However, to visualize the user’s approximate location in LBSN
post, it is indeed not a feasible solution. Moreover, the spatiotemporal analysis
on consecutive events will also reveal that dummies cannot be far from each other.
Thus, we constrain the maximum allowable distance between a dummy and O with
a distance control parameter R. On the flip side, this constraint imposes another
problem: we may not find enough candidate locations as dummies which are closely
related to O, in terms of Pr. That is, it might not always be possible to achieve
optimal privacy. Therefore, our goal is to select a set of dummies as the final set Sf
whose Ef is close to Eopt. Formally,
maximize{degree of privacy, Es}
s.t. Es ≥ λ× Eopt
(4.3)
Indeed, we want to have λ as close as 1 and in our experiment we found its value
can be as large as 0.9. Now, we discuss our proposed randomized greedy dummy
generation algorithm. In the first step, it selects all the locations within R
2
distance
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Algorithm 3: Dummy Generation Algorithm
Data: user’s real location O, set of all locations L, Pr of all locations in L,
k
Result: Final location set Sf and degree of privacy, Ef
1 Lselected ←− Select each location l from L such that,
(Prl > 0) ∧ (dist(O, l) ≤ R2 )
2 Lsorted ←−Compute |Prl − Pro|,∀l ∈ Lselected; and sort them in ascending
order
3 C ←− Select mk random contiguous locations including as candidates from
Lsorted
4 i←− 0
5 Es ←− 0
6 Eopt ←− − log2( 1k )
7 while ((Es < λ× Eopt) ∧ (i < |C|)) do
8 c←− Ci
9 Lselected ←− Select each location l from L such that,
(Prl > 0) ∧ (dist(c, l) ≤ R2 )
10 Lsorted ←−Compute |Prl − Prc|, ∀l ∈ Lselected; and sort them in
ascending order
11 S ←− O ∪ { First (k − 1) locations from Lsorted, excluding O}
12 Es ←− Compute degree of privacy of S using Equation 4.2
13 i←− i+ 1
14 Sf ←− S, Ef ←− Es
3
with Pr > 0, computes |Pr−Pro|, and sorts them in ascending order. Then, it selects
C = mk, (m ≥ 2), random contiguous locations from the sorted locations, which
includes O. This set, C, is used as candidate locations for dummy selection. For
each location c in C, again selects all the locations within R
2
distance with Pr > 0,
compute |Pr − Prc|, and sorts them in ascending order. From the sorted locations,
select a set S as {first k-1 locations ∪ O} and compute its degree of privacy using
eq.4.2. Once a set is found whose degree of privacy Ef satisfies (Ef ≥ λ×Eopt), then
it is selected as the final set of dummies. The overall process of dummy generation
using photo-check is presented in Algorithm 3.
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4.4.2 Privacy Analysis
Assume a user posted n events (E0, . . . En−1) in (T0 . . . Tn−1) time stamps. Out of
these, p events were dropped or delayed, q events were posted using dummies, and
w = n− (p+ q) events were posted directly. Then, the total privacy is,
total E =
p−1∑
i=0
Edrop/delayi +
q−1∑
i=0
Eposti +
w−1∑
i=0
Edummyi (4.4)
Here, E typei refers to the privacy achieved by applying the type of action on i-th
event. Now we analyze total privacy for different cases.
Case 1 (None of the events contains location information): In this case no privacy
is leaked for each event. That is, total E =∞
Case 2 (All the events contain location information): If location information of
all the events are concealed with dummies using the proposed dummy generation
algorithm, then, total E =
∑n−1
i=0 E
dummy
i
Case 3 (Some of the events contain dummy locations and others either dropped,
delayed, or directly posted): Let us consider three events E0, E1, and E2; where E0
contains dummy locations, E1 was dropped, and E2 was posted directly. E0’s degree
of privacy Edummy0 can be calculated using Eq.4.2. For E1 and E2, E
drop
1 ≥ E
dummy
0
and Epost2 ≥ E
dummy
0 , respectively. Thus, total E ≥
∑n−1
i=0 E
dummy
i . By considering all
the 3 cases the bound for total privacy,
n−1∑
i=0
Edummyi ≤ total E ≤ ∞ (4.5)
4.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present the detail of the experiment. We use a PC with Intel Core
i7 CPU(2.5 GHz), 8GB RAM, and Microsoft Windows 10-64bit operating system
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Figure 4.5: Impact of 0/1-probability based inference on DLS and baseline algo-
rithms at locations with different check-in probability (k = 20). Here, (a) and (b)
are the locations with the highest and lowest check-in probability, respectively.
to carry out the experiment. To get location information, we use Foursquare NYC
dataset [YZZY15] which contains 38, 333 unique locations. For each location, we
collect check-in and shared photo count using Foursquare developer API. In total,
these counts are 162.72 and 4.94 millions, respectively.
For comparison, we consider four different dummy generation approaches: Ran-
dom, Optimal, DLS[NLZ+14], and Baseline[NLZ+15]. We use the following param-
eters and their values in the experiment: k = [8, 12, 16, 20], δ = [5, 20] minutes,
m = 2, λ = [1, 0.9, 0.8], and R = 1000 meter. We use 100 users’ data to generate
different statistics. Using these parameters, we generate the statistics for privacy
analysis and computation cost in two ways: we run each approach on all the events
1) generated by each user and 2) generated from each location, and compute the
corresponding mean.
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4.5.1 Privacy Analysis
Impact of 0/1- probability based inference model on existing TPPMs
We apply the 0/1 probability based inference model(discussed in section 4.1) on
DLS and Baseline approach, and observe a monotonic relationship with location’s
check-in probability, Pc. For better understanding, we sort the locations based on
Pc in ascending order and for the first 5000 locations(Figure 4.5(a)), the inference
rate(σ) is least successful(Figure 4.5(c)). However, with the decrease in Pc(Figure
4.5(b)), σ increases(Figure 4.5(d)). Specifically, for DLS and baseline, Spearman’s
rank-order correlations[McD09] are −0.521 and −0.6, respectively (for last 5000
locations). These results show that existing mechanisms cannot be used for all type
of locations to protect location privacy for both check-in and photo sharing in LBSN.
Degree of Privacy
Now, we analyze the degree of privacy E which measures the uncertainty of an
attacker to infer user’s real location from a given set S. The comparison of all
the approaches in terms of degree of privacy is presented in Figure 4.6 and 4.7.
From the above discussion, it is understandable that at locations with high Pc,
DLS may sometimes achieve privacy close to our proposed approach. However, it’s
distribution(Figure 4.6) show that this number is quite small. The comparison plots
(Figure 4.7), in terms of different k and users, further justify the superiority of our
approach.
Timing, Dropping, and Spatial Errors
We found that the total timing,dropping, and spatial errors are ≈ 5% and 17% for
δ = [5, 20], respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of degree of privacy E for all the locations with k = 20.
Figure 4.7: Degree of privacy (ε) comparison: (a) for different k’s and (b) for 100
users with k = 20.
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Table 4.2: Average Computation Cost(in second) for Different k
Approaches k = 8 k = 12 k = 16 k = 20
Baseline 0.0015 0.0018 0.0017 0.0016
DLS 0.0491 0.0537 0.0535 0.0523
Proposed 0.0015 0.0020 0.0024 0.0029
4.5.2 computation cost
The comparison in terms of computation cost among different approaches in shown
in table 4.2. As all the approaches have the sorting step, we focus on the number
of steps required to generate the dummies. In this context, baseline’s computation
cost is O(1). The randomized greedy algorithm in proposed approach requires at
most mk steps, yielding O(mk) computation cost. However, the major reduction in
computation cost in the proposed approach, compared to DLS, is achieved mainly
with the introduction of the relation between gained (Es) and optimal privacy(Eopt)
in the algorithm(line 7 in algorithm 3).
4.6 Discussion and Summary
In this chapter we show that, similar to check-ins, the spatial distribution of histor-
ical shared photos can influence user’s privacy in LBSN. Based on this observation,
we design a probabilistic location inference model for both check-in and photos, and
apply it on different existing dummy-based approaches. While this model exposes
the vulnerability of existing approaches, it also shows that it is possible to infer
user’s location without analyzing the photo itself. To solve this problem, we pro-
pose a novel privacy-preserving mechanism, called photo-check, to preserve location
privacy while sharing check-in and photos in LBSN. By analyzing spatiotemporal
correlation between consecutive events(generic term for check-in and photo), photo-
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check decides whether to delay, post, drop, or insert dummies to an event. In case
of dummy generation, we propose a randomized greedy approach which is com-
putationally less expensive than state-of-the-art approach and practical for LBSN
scenarios. We believe the findings presented in this work will lead to further research
on this issue.
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CHAPTER 5
SPATIOTEMPORAL BLOCKCHAIN MANAGEMENT FOR
RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED IOT DEVICES TO ACHIEVE
DECENTRALIZED PRIVACY
Formation of a peer-to-peer (P2P) network of the IoT devices such that an IoT user
can query and get the required information from its peers, rather than a centralized
entity, is a promising approach for achieving trajectory privacy from any centralized
entity. Recently, blockchain has gained significant attention as a solution to design a
P2P network of mobile IoT devices in a way that is designed to be secure, transpar-
ent, highly resistant to outages, auditable, and efficient. However, before realizing
the promise of blockchain, there are significant challenges to address. One funda-
mental challenge is the scale issue around data collection, storage, and analytics as
IoT sensor devices possess limited computational power and storage capabilities. In
particular, since the chain is always growing, IoT devices require more and more
resources. Thus, an oversized chain poses storage and scalability problems.
With this in mind, the goal of this chapter is to present the design and imple-
mentation of a lightweight, scalable blockchain framework for mobility-centric IoT
systems. We focus on certain mobility mobility-centric applications, such as mo-
bile crowdsensing, where an IoT device is not required to have a global view of the
whole network. This framework, coined as “Sensor-Chain”, promises a new gen-
eration of lightweight blockchain management, a significant reduction in resource
consumption, and at the same time capable of retaining critical information about
the IoT systems of mobile devices. We compare the performance of proof-of-concept
implementation of sensor-chain with 3 other schemes, and the results justify its effi-
cacy. Also, the proposed framework does not involve any fixed positioned powerful
edge devices, which makes it more flexible with a variety of mobility-based IoT
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applications. We further verify Sensor-Chain by implementing it on top of Babble
hashgraph blockchain.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the problem and
section 5.2 provides the problem statement and our hypothesis. The required back-
ground information is discussed in section 5.3. The proposed Sensor-Chain is pre-
sented in section 5.4. The evaluation results on its proof-of-concept implementation
is presented in 5.5. Finally, section 5.7 concludes the chapter. Last but not least,
important symbols used in this chapter are described in table 5.1.
5.1 Introduction
Blockchain is a distributed P2P way of recording digital interactions in a way that
it provides built-in integrity of information, and security of immutability by design,
making it very useful to ensure trust, security, and transparency in P2P trustless
networks of huge number of devices[Nak08, Fra14]. Although blockchain is consid-
ered as the key to redesign IoT systems, they cannot be directly integrated into
IoT systems. Since the chain is always growing, IoT nodes require more and more
resources in order to manage it on their local spaces. Similarly, scalability with
constrained computing power and battery also poses a challenge. With an integra-
tion of blockchain, each node needs to perform large amount of tasks at different
stages of the blockchain with their constrained computing power and battery life.
The growth of the network further aggravates the problem. These two issues are
rooted to the problem of managing the number of transactions required to be stored
and processed by a single IoT node at any time instance, as transactions are the
main building blocks of a blockchain. For better understanding of the problem, let
us consider a conventional blockchain for a P2P network of n number of nodes. At
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any time instance, there could be at most n(n−1)
2
number of transactions in the the
network. If we express the size of a blockchain (BC) as the number of transactions
stored it, then it is quite understandable that, over time, the IoT devices will run
out of storage space to store all the transactions.
Understandably, in some applications, the transactions may happen at a longer
interval (e.g. 30 minutes). Also, at every timestamp the number of transactions can
be less than n(n−1)
2
. Despite that, it is not going to change the fact that, existing
blockchains are not feasible for resource-constrained IoT sensor devices in the long-
run. To manage blockchain in a mobility-centric IoT system, many research works
proposed to deploy more powerful edge devices and offload the blockchain on such
edge devices[XZN+17, MDL+18, PWH+18, KAG18]. These devices are costly and
are deployed in a predefined structured way. Such a fixed structure of the static edge
devices is hard to be acceptable for several reasons. First, the devices are costly
and their deployment over a large region will result into very high cost. Second,
in some scenarios, such as in military applications, such fixed structure cannot
be attained. Third, we also argue that the management of blockchain using fixed
positioned edge devices naturally makes the system more vulnerable, as compromise
of few edge devices will affect a large portion of the IoT nodes in the IoT network.
Hence, we need a lightweight, scalable blockchain framework without relying on a
fixed infrastructure of external edge computing devices. Another promising way
of making blockchain lightweight is to delete “historical” blocks from the chain
[DOA16]. However, such an approach still consumes large storage space and cannot
retain any information of the deleted portion of the chain.
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5.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
In this work, we focus on certain mobility-related scenarios where a mobile node
is not really required to have a “global” view of a blockchain. Let us consider
an environment monitoring mobile crowdsensing application where aggregated data
(e.g. temperature, humidity, air quality, and so on) from a small region at a certain
time is more important than individual’s data. In such a scenario, the mobile
nodes at a location may contact each other in a P2P way to collect each other’s
1 dimensional (1-d) environmental sensor’s value for some time. Then, one node
is selected to send the aggregated information in a certain form (e.g. max, mean,
average, median, etc.). As the nodes are mobile, the trust value computed for some
nodes may not be important at a different location and time for a certain node. Also,
the environmental data varies from one region to another; thus instead of having a
single network, region based multiple smaller networks, as well as blockchains, are
more feasible. Motivated by such a scenario, in this dissertation, we seek answer to
the following question: how can the spatiotemporal mobility of the IoT users allow
to make blockchain lightweight for IoT devices?
We hypothesize that breaking down a traditional blockchain into smaller “local”
blockchains based on spatial subdivision of a region, imposing a temporal constraint
on their lifecycle, and mobility-based blockchain deletion from storage will allow a
blockchain to be lightweight, and scalable for resource-constrained IoT devices.
5.3 Background
In this section, we provide a formal definition of the size of blockchain, a description
to the system model, and important assumption made in the work.
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Table 5.1: Table of Symbols
Symbol Description
TX Abbreviation of transaction
BC Abbreviation of blockchain
C Voronoi diagram or set of Voronoi cells
Ci i-th Voronoi cell or simply cell
n Total number of sensor nodes
m Number of sensors in a single cell
Gti Local network in i-th cell at time t
V ti Set of vertices of local network G
t
i
Eti Set of edges between the nodes in V
t
i
S A sensor node
Bti Local blockchain generated by G
t
i
Tchain Temporal constraint for blockchain
Tblock Block generation time constraint
5.3.1 Size of a blockchain
If we take a look at the different elements of a block, we observe that it contains
some elements which take constant storage space (the elements of block header
and transaction counter). Since each transaction size can be within a limit, its
their number which is the only dominating variable in a block. Thus, a size of a
blockchain, size(BC), can be expressed as a function of number of transactions, TX,
as follows.
size(BC) = TX1 + . . .+ TXt
= number of TX× size of a TX
= O(number of TX)
(5.1)
Here, TXt is used as an abbreviation of transaction happened at t-th timestamp.
At any time instance, there could at most n(n−1)
2
transactions in network of n nodes.
Thus, if the lifespan of a blockchain is T ,
size(BC) = O
(
T × n(n− 1)
2
)
(5.2)
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This defines the upper bound of the required storage space on a IoT device to
hold an entire blockchain in total T time.
5.3.2 System Model and Important Assumptions
The proposed system model has two major entities: 1. a region, divided into a set
of smaller cells, and 2. a set of sensor nodes. Some of the sensors are static and
others are mobile. The mobile nodes are moving over the region based on Ran-
dom Waypoint Mobility model[HV07]. Each sensor node is capable of performing
lightweight aggregate operations, such as e.g. max, mean, min, weighted average
[PPJP12] and so on. Furthermore, the proposed system does not require any addi-
tional resources. We assume that the distribution of the sensed data within a cell
is approximately same. The proposed blockchain can be either a public blockchain
or a permissioned-blockchain. If it is public blockchain, there is no authority in the
blockchain and nodes can join and leave the network with random cryptographic
key pairs. In such a blockchain, we assume that the nodes are using a lightweight
consensus algorithm, such as Proof-of-Stake (PoS). Our work is also applicable in
permissioned-blockchain where an authority assigns each IoT Node a private key
and a private key and to join a network a node needs to reveal its identity to all
the other nodes in the network. In order to achieve conditional privacy from the
peers, an IoT node can anytime request the authority for new key pairs. In such a
case, we assume that the nodes are using a Byzantine Fault tolerant algorithm for
reaching consensus in the network. Devising mechanisms for Key management and
authentication are beyond the scope of this work.
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5.4 Proposed Sensor-Chain Framework
This section presents the Sensor-Chain framework. We first discuss 3 different frame-
works: Conventional and our proposed improved temporal, and spatial blockchains.
We analyze their strength and limitations to highlight the motivation behind the
design of Sensor-Chain framework.
5.4.1 Naive Approach: Conventional Blockchain
In the conventional blockchain frameworks [XZN+17, MDB17] a blockchain is man-
aged by all the nodes in the network and continues to grow with the lifespan of the
network. Thus, with a T = ∞ lifespan, according to our discussion on the size of
blockchain, the size of a conventional blockchain becomes,
size(conventional) =
∞∑
t=1
n(n− 1)
2
(5.3)
Obviously, this blockchain will impose a high storage requirement which cannot
be met by sensor nodes. To improve this, we then design an improved version of
temporal blockchain[DOA16] in the context of mobile IoT.
5.4.2 Our First Approach: Improved Temporal Blockchain
In the original temporal blockchain[DOA16], it was proposed to keep a portion
of the blockchain after certain time period. However, we propose to replace the
blockchain with an aggregated version of it after certain a time period. In detail,
in the preprocessing step of our scheme, we consider a specific time at the “genesis
time”, and a time period is set as the temporal constraint for blockchain deletion.
For example, if 00:00 in 24-hour format is taken as the genesis time and the temporal
constraint is 2 hours, then the deletion operation will take place at 02:00, 04:00,
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06:00, . . . of each day. This genesis time information and temporal constraint are
preset onto the IoT devices. Another way to set this information is to have smart
contract on the blockchain. We leave this for our future research. Every time the
lifetime of the blockchain meets the temporal constraints, through the consensus
mechanism,a node will be selected as an aggregator node which performs aggregation
over the whole blockchain and creates an aggregated block. This block includes the
ID of the aggregator node. This block is then broadcasted over the network by the
aggregator. This aggregation could be anything lightweight for IoT sensor devices
to perform (e.g. min, max, mean, weight average [PPJP12]).
Upon receiving this block, the nodes in the network replaces the whole existing
blockchain with this block on their local storage. That is, it will considered as the
genesis block of a new blockchain. Even though as a consequence the newly restarted
blockchain’s size becomes relatively small, we still need to look into the size of the
blockchain between two consecutive restarts so as to ensure that it is withing the
storage space capacity of the IoT sensor node. If the temporal constraint is Tchain,
then in the the worst case scenario, the maximum size of the blockchain can be,
size(improved-temporal) =
t=Tchain∑
t=1
n(n− 1)
2
(5.4)
Clearly this scheme outperforms the conventional blockchain schemes. However,
with higher Tchain and a large number of nodes in a network, the nodes still need to
hold a large blockchain, making it quite impractical for IoT devices. Thus, despite
the fact that a temporal blockchain can reduce the size of a chain, the size of a
chain must be further improved when dealing with IoT nodes. This is done using
the following spatial blockchain technique.
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Figure 5.1: Proposed blockchain-based IoT architecture: A region is transformed
into a Voronoi diagram where Ci is the i-th Voronoi cell and the graph inside of it
is a local network Gi. ‘•’s and‘−’s represent nodes and edges between the nodes,
respectively. Bi refers to the local blockchain in cell Ci.
5.4.3 Our Second Approach: Spatial Blockchain
In our spatial blockchain framework, a global blockchain is broken down into smaller
disjoint local blockchains with the aim of reducing the number of transactions per-
formed by a node at any given time than in conventional blockchain frameworks.
To achieve this objective, we translate a region into a Voronoi diagram[AIRX08].
Voronoi diagram C, is a partitioning of a plane into non-overlapping smaller convex
regions, called Voronoi cells C.
Based on this partitioning of the plane, we define two different structures: local
networks and local blockchains (figure 5.1 depicts these structures). A local network
refers to the graph Gti = (V
t
i , E
t
i ) formed by the nodes in the cell Ci ∈ C at time
t. Here, V ti and E
t
i are the set of the nodes and the edges between them. Any two
local networks of two different cells at the same time are disjoint. That is,
V ti ∩ V tj = Ø, Eti ∩ Etj = Ø (5.5)
A local blockchain Bi, is the blockchain managed by the nodes in cell Ci and B
t
i is
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the snapshot of Bi at time t. Any two local blockchains from two different cells have
the following property: a block of a local blockchain in a cell is neither a parent nor
a child of a block of another local blockchain in another cell at any time instance.
That is,
(∃bxi ∈ Bi|bxi is a parent of a block in Bj)∪
(∃byj ∈ Bj|b
y
j is a parent of a block in Bi) = Ø; ∀t
(5.6)
The two properties imply that a sensor node in Gi works only on local blockchain Bi.
Hence, it needs to store only the copy of Bi at any given time as long as it remains in
Gi. While this definitely improves the storage issue than in conventional blockchain,
this scheme further enhance its efficacy by considering mobility of the nodes. In case
of mobility, if a node moves from cell Ci to Cj, at first it deletes the copy of local
blockchain Bi from its memory and then, after joining Gj, it downloads the copy of
Bj from its peers. Thus, a node is required to store only one local blockchain at any
time instance, which significantly reduces the required space to store a blockchain.
We quantify the storage requirement of this scheme as follows. Let us consider that
at any time instance, there could be at most m number of nodes in a cell, where
m < n and the time difference between the creation of genesis block and current
time is ≈ ∞. Let us also assume that a mobile node’s permanence in a cell is at
most Tper. At the first glance, it seems size(spatial) =
∑t=Tper
t=1
m(m−1)
2
. However,
consider the worst case scenario where there exists at least one node in a particular
cell Ci all the time (if some nodes are static or the cell is never empty). That is, the
local blockchain continues to expand forever. In that case,
size(spatial) =
t=∞∑
t=1
m(m− 1)
2
; m < n (5.7)
From the analysis of temporal and spatial blockchains, it is not clear which one
offers the best solution. For static nodes, the temporal blockchain with a small
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temporal constraint could be the better solution in the long run. On the other
hand, in mobile environment, the spatial blockchain will be the winner. To address
the limitations of both approaches, we propose Sensor-Chain approach.
Figure 5.2: Illustrated Sensor-Chain:-Ti+1: A mobile node moves from cell C2 to C1.
First, it deletes the copy of local blockchain B2 from its memory and then downloads
B1 from its peers in G
i+1
1 . Ti+2: local blockchain B3 does not exist anymore as C3
is empty. Ti+3: as temporal constraint is met, (a) aggregator node from each local
network is selected. The selected nodes compute aggregation over their respective
local blockchains and generate aggregated blocks. (b) using the aggregated blocks
as the genesis, the local blockchains are regenerated.
5.4.4 Our Best Approach: Sensor-Chain
Sensor-Chain is a fusion of both temporal and spatial blockchain approaches. Similar
to spatial blockchain, in this framework, a complete region is first divided into a
number of Voronoi cells. Using those cells, the nodes in a cell form a local network
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and maintain a local blockchain. All the local networks and local blockchains follow
the properties defined for spatial blockchain. Among different information, each
nodes holds the following tuple: {current cell id Ccur, copy of the local blockchain
Btcur}. In order to manage the size of a blockchain, this framework has two important
constraints: temporal constraint Tchain and block creation time constraint Tblock.
The storage management of blockchain is done in two ways: spatiotemporal and
mobility-based.
Spatiotemporal-based blockchain management is detailed in algorithm 4. In this
framework, the block creation and insertion are done at a fixed time interval (lines
1-6), a similar approach of bitcoin. At first, in each local network Gti a Miner is
selected through consensus. Then the Miner gathers all the recent transactions
and creates NewBlock. Upon verification, the new block is inserted into Bti . The
temporal constraint is used to reset the local blockchains at a fixed time interval.
Every time the temporal constraint is met (line 8), an Aggregator node is selected
from each local network. This Aggregator node computes aggregation of its local
blockchain, creates an AggregatedBlock, and broadcasts it over its local network
(lines 9-13). Upon receiving the AggregatedBlock, the nodes in the local network
first delete their copy of the existing local blockchain (line 14) and then regenerate
the local blockchain using the aggregated block as the genesis block (line 15).
Algorithm 5 presents the mobility-based blockchain management. Every time a
node moves from one cell Ccur to another Cnew cell (line 1), it deletes the copy of the
local blockchain Bcur of previous cell from its memory. Then it joins the The work
flow of Sensor-Chain is illustrated in figure 5.2.
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Algorithm 4: Spatiotemporal Blockchain Management
Input : Current time Tt, set of all local networks G at Tt, set of all local
blockchains Bt, genesis time Tgen, temporal constraint Tchain,
block creation time constraint Tblock
Output: Updated local blockchains Bt
1 if (Tgen − Tt)%Tblock == 0 then
2 for each Gti ∈ Gt do
3 Miner ← Select-Miner(V ti )
4 NewBlock ← Create-Block(Miner)
5 Insert-Block(Bti , NewBlock)
6 end
7 end
8 if (Tgen − Tt)%Tchain == 0 then
9 for each Gti ∈ Gt do
10 Aggregator ← Select-Aggregator(V ti )
11 AggregatedBlock ← Compute-Aggregation(Bti , Aggregator)
12 Broadcast(AggregatedBlock)
13 for each node v ∈ V ti do
14 Delete(Bti) from local storage
15 Bti ← Re-generate(Bti , AggregatedBlock)
16 end
17 end
18 end
Algorithm 5: Mobility-Based Blockchain Management
Input : Voronoi diagram C, sensor node S
Output: Updated node S
1 if S.Ccur 6= Cnew cell then
2 Delete(Bcur) from local storage
3 S.Ccur ← Cnew cell
4 Join(Gtcur)
5 Download(Btcur) from peers in V
t
cur
6 end
4
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t
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4
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5.4.5 Analysis
We argue that, with such spatiotemporal and mobility-based blockchain manage-
ment, Sensor-Chain provides the best solution. To prove its validity, we now analyze
the space requirement to store a blockchain in this scheme. Referring to the discus-
sion on spatial blockchain, with the space partitioning, the size of a local blockchain
in Sensor-Chain can be at most,
size(Sensor-Chain) =
t=∞∑
t=1
m(m− 1)
2
(5.8)
However, as the temporal constraint Tchain is applied to all the local blockchains,
according to the discussion on temporal blockchain, the size of a local blockchain
can be further reduced as follows,
size(Sensor-Chain) =
t=Tchain∑
t=1
m(m− 1)
2
(5.9)
This analysis gives us the required storage space in Sensor-Chain. Next, we analyze
the scheme case by case and draw comparison with our proposed improved temporal
and spatial blockchain frameworks.
Case 1: In the first case, all the nodes are assumed as static. Also, the parti-
tioning of the region is such that all the nodes reside in a single cell. In such a case,
m = n.
size(Sensor-Chain) = size(improved-temporal) =
t=Tchain∑
t=1
n(n− 1)
2
< size(spatial)
(5.10)
Where size(spatial) =
∑t=∞
t=1
n(n−1)
2
.
Case 2: All the nodes are moving in such a way that each local blockchain
becomes empty (more correctly, it doesn’t exist anymore) every time before the
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temporal constraint is satisfied. This case is depicted in figure 5.2(Ti+2) where cell
C3 is empty so that B3 does not exist anymore. In such a case,
size(Sensor-Chain) = size(spatial) =
t<Tchain∑
t=1
m(m− 1)
2
< size(improved-temporal) (5.11)
Where m < n and size(improved-temporal) =
∑t=Tchain
t=1
n(n−1)
2
.
All other cases: In all other cases,
(size(Sensor-Chain) < size(spatial))
&(size(Sensor-Chain) < size(improved-temporal)) (5.12)
5.5 Proof-of-Concept Evaluation
This section presents the experimental results. To carry out the experiment we use
synthetic data. The parameters and their different values used in the experiment
are presented in table 5.2. We implemented all the four (conventional, improved-
temporal, spatial, and Sensor-Chain) approaches. We ran the simulation for 6 hours
and generated statistics for all the approaches. Specifically, we compared the ap-
proaches in terms of number transactions needed to be stored on a single IoT sensor
device, as it defines the size of a blockchain. The evaluation is done from three differ-
ent points of view: 1. duration of the simulation, 2. number of cells, and 3. number
of sensors to analyze the benefit of Sensor-Chain in the long-run and scalability.
The detail of the evaluation results are discussed below.
Figure 5.3(a) shows the result of the simulation for Sensor-Chain. In every hour,
the curve moves upward. As Tchain = 1 hour, the size of the blockchain becomes 1
(with the aggregated block) at the end of each hour. It is also clear that in Sensor-
Chain, using the temporal constraint, it is possible to keep the size of the blockchain
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Table 5.2: Parameters used in the Experiment
Parameter Values
Area of the region 5000m× 5000m
Number of Voronoi cells 50, 100, 150, 200, 1000
Number of sensor nodes 1000, 3000, 5000, 7000
Speed of the nodes [0, 50] km/h
Temporal constraint Tchain 1 hour
Block creation time constraint Tblock 10 minute
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.3: Evaluation results: (a) Sensor-Chain, (b) conventional, (c) improved-
temporal, and (d) spatial blockchains (experiment Settings: number of cells = 50,
number of sensors = 1000).
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: Comparison between Sensor-Chain and spatial approaches in terms of
number of (a) cells and (b) sensors.
within a limit. Figure 5.3(b) shows the comparison between Sensor-Chain and
conventional approaches. From nearly the beginning of the simulation, the required
storage space in Sensor-Chain is far less than in conventional approach. Next, we
evaluate how Sensor-Chain, with the fusion of spatiotemporal and mobility-based
blockchain management, outperforms the improved temporal and spatial schemes.
For both of the improved temporal and Sensor-Chain, we used the same temporal
constraint. Although the improved temporal blockchain shows a trend similar to
Sensor-Chain, its required storage space is much higher than Sensor-Chain. Figure
5.3(d) shows more interesting results on the comparison with spatial blockchain. In
the 1st hour, both spatial and Sensor-Chain approaches go toe-to-toe. However, just
after the 1st hour (as Tchain = 1 hour), the local blockchains in Sensor-Chain restore
to genesis block, while spatial blockchain continues to grow over the time.
Then, we analyze the impact of number of cells and sensors on the size of the
blockchain. As only spatial and Sensor-Chain use cell-based partitioning, here we
analyze their comparison. Figure 5.4(a) presents the comparison result in terms
91
of number of cells. It is understandable that with the increase in the number of
cells, the size of a local blockchain decreases. Furthermore, it seems that when this
number is relatively high (e.g. 1000 in the figure), both approaches require similar
storage capacity. However, it is the number of sensors that makes the difference in
such a particular case. With the increase in the number of sensors, the required
storage space increases rapidly in spatial approach than in Sensor-Chain. Figure
5.4(b) shows the results for 1000 cells with different number of sensors.
5.6 Implementation Detail of Sensor-Chain
While the theoretical analysis and simulation results highlight the efficiency and
efficacy of Sensor-Chain, we are developing the platform for P2P networks of mo-
bile devices. In this section we present the detail of the implementation steps of
Sensor-Chain. The development is being carried out with Go programming lan-
guage, an open source programming language. For P2P communication, we use
go-libp2p-pubsub library [why19], an open source golang implementation of pub-
sub system with flooding and gossiping variants. Figure 5.5 presents the key com-
ponents of the Sensor-Chain platform. Figures 5.6 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 illustrate the
class, architecture, sequence, and use case diagrams of the platform.
Figure 5.5: Key components of Sensor-Chain platform.
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NodeManager	(package:	engine)
- clusterCount: int
- nodesPerCluster: int
- initialPort: int
+ Clusters: []Cluster (struct)
- tsxInterval: int
- txsLoad: float
- moveInterval: int
- minInt: int
- maxInt: int
- inputRangeMean: float
+ void RunNodeManager()
- void setupNetworkTopology(engineSlice,
[]*Engine)
- void setupPeerLists(engineSlice []*Engine)
- map[string]string
getCurrentPeerlist(engineSlice []*Engine)
- map[string]string
getCurrentPeerlist(engineSlice []*Engine)
- void startListening(engineSlice []*Engine)
- void setClusterSeed(newSeed int64)
- int64 getClusterSeed()
- void resetClusterConsensus()
- void printMemUsage()
- void shutdownEngines(engineSlice
[]*Engine)
- void runTerminalInterface()
- void transactionTicker(auto *bool)
- void movementTicker(auto *bool)
PubSub	(package:	engine)
- libp2pPubSub: struct
+ void Broadcast(msg string)
+ (peer.ID, string) Receive()
- *host.Host createPeer(moniker string, port
int)
- void initializePubSub(h host.Host)
- (host.Host, error) createHost(port int)
- string getLocalHostAddress(h host.Host)
- (*psub.PubSub, error) applyPubSub(h
host.Host)
- void connectHostToPeer(h host.Host,
connectToAddress string)
Engine	(package:	engine)
+ NodeStore: *store.Store
+ BasicHost: *host.Host
+ PubSub: *libp2pPubSub
+ Moniker: string 
+ MonikerNumber: int 
+ PortNumber: int
+ Address: string
+ ClusterID: int
+ PeerList: *TimedPeerList (struct)
- createEngine(...) *Engine
- void startListening(startTime time.Time, runConsensus bool)
- broadcastTransaction(to peer.ID, timestamp string, str
string)
- void broadcastBlockchain(blockchain []block.Block)
- void handleMessage(str string)
- void updatePeerList(peerList map[string]string)
- void shutdownEngine()
Block	(package:	block)
+ Generation: int
+ Index: int
+ Timestamp: string
+ Hash: string
+ Hash: string
+ PrevHash: string
+ RootHash: []byte
+ Wallet: map[string]int
+ Validator: string
+ Seed: int64
+ TransactionList:
[]TransactionContent
+ *Block CreateBlock(...)
+ *Block CreateBlockWithList(...)
+ *Block CreateGenesisBlock(...)
+ bool IsBlockValid(newBlock,
oldBlock *Block)
+ string CalculateHash(block *Block)
- string mapToString(wallet
map[string]int)
Consensus	(package:	engine)
+ Engine: *Engine
+ TBlock: int
+ TChain: int
+ Temporal: bool
+ BlockThreshold: int
+ BlockLimit: int
- random: *mrand.Rand
- random: *mrand.Rand
- tsxQueue: []message.TransactionPayload
- tsxBuffer: []block.TransactionContent
- selectedValidator: peer.ID
- queueMutex: *sync.Mutex
- blockchainMutex:  *sync.Mutex
- running: bool
- void runConsensus(startTime time.Time)
- void stopConsensus()
- void enqueueTransaction(payload
message.TransactionPayload)
- message.TransactionPayload
dequeueTransaction()
- void receiveUpdatedChain(payload
message.BlockchainPayload)
- []block.Block aggregateChain(blockChain
[]block.Block)
- []float64 decodeTxsToFloat(txsList []string)
- float64 weightedMovingAverage(txsList
[]float64)
Store	(package:	store)
+ Blockchain: *[]block.Block
+ LiveWallet: map[string]int
+ *Store CreateStore()
Contains
1
1
Has
1
Has
n
1
1
n
1
1
1
Contains
Contains
Figure 5.6: Class diagram of Sensor-Chain.
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Node Manager
Sensor-Chain 
Node
Core
Transport
Engine Consensus
Pub/Sub P2P Network
DataCommands
Interface Information
Blockchain
Transactions/Blocks
Figure 5.7: Architecture diagram of Sensor-Chain.
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Figure 5.8: Sequence diagram of Sensor-Chain.
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Manages a Node and its
communication
Stores linked list of blocks
(blockchain)
Partition the nodes into separate clusters
(spatial constraint)
Initializes Consensus
mechanism
Selects block validators,
and updates blockchain
 Consensus
Block
Store
Engine 
(Core of Node)
Sensor-Chain-
Platform-MIoT
<<includes>>
NodeManager
PubSub
Resets blockchain back to genesis block with
aggregated data (temporal constraint)
Creates and initializes node
engines in a simulated network.
<<extends>>
<<includes>>
Provides gossipsub
broadcasting protocol
<<extends>>
Stores cumulative list of
transactions and hashes 
<<extends>>
Allows node movement between clusters
(node mobility)
<<includes>>
User
Utilizes user interface provided by node
manager.
Figure 5.9: Use case diagram of Sensor-Chain.
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5.6.1 Key Components
Node
The Node struct has two fields: Blockchain and LiveWallet. The Blockchain
field is a pointer to the current blockchain that a Node is holding in its memory.
The LiveWallet is a map object containing the new transactions happened in the
Blockchain by the nodes which are not included in the Blockchain yet.
type Node struct {
Blockchain *[]block.Block
LiveWallet map[string]int
}
func CreateNode() *Node {
var newNode Node
newNode.Blockchain = &[]block.Block{}
newNode.LiveWallet = make(map[string]int)
*newNode.Blockchain = append(*newNode.Blockchain,
*block.CreateGenesisBlock(0, nil, "", nil, "", 0))↪→
return &newNode
}
Transaction Content
TransactionContent implements the Content interface provided by merkletree and
represents the content stored in the tree. There are three functions to facilitate differ-
ent operations related to transactions: CalculateHash(), Equals(), and String().
Specifically, CalculateHash() hashes the values of a TransactionContent, Equals()
tests for equality of two contents, and String() returns a string representation of
the content.
type TransactionContent struct {
From string
To string
Timestamp string
Transaction string
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}
func (t TransactionContent) CalculateHash() ([]byte, error) {
h := sha256.New()
if _, err := h.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s%s%s%s", t.From, t.To,
t.Timestamp, t.Transaction))); err != nil {↪→
return nil, err
}
return h.Sum(nil), nil
}
func (t TransactionContent) Equals(other merkletree.Content) (bool, error)
{↪→
return t.From == other.(TransactionContent).From && t.To ==
other.(TransactionContent).To &&↪→
t.Timestamp == other.(TransactionContent).Timestamp &&
t.Transaction ==
other.(TransactionContent).Transaction, nil
↪→
↪→
}
func (t TransactionContent) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("From: %s, To: %s, Timestamp: %s, Transaction:
%s", t.From, t.To, t.Timestamp, t.Transaction)↪→
}
Block
A blockchain is defined by Block struct type. The Block contains BlockHeader
and TransactionContent. BlockHeader holds the Block struct contents which
are hashed for blockchain integrity. Among different variables, the BlockHeader
contains RootHash Merkle tree root hash which is composed of the concatenated
hashes of all transactions in block.
type Block struct {
Header BlockHeader
TransactionList []TransactionContent
}
type BlockHeader struct {
Generation int
Index int
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Timestamp string
Hash string
PrevHash string
RootHash []byte
Wallet map[string]int
Validator string
}
The CreateBlock() function is used to create a new block using the previous
block hash, and appends one payload.
func CreateBlock(oldBlock *Block, from string, to string, timestamp
string, transaction string, wallet map[string]int, validator peer.ID,
seed int64) *Block {
↪→
↪→
var newBlock Block
var contentList []merkletree.Content
for _, c := range oldBlock.TransactionList {
contentList = append(contentList, c)
}
contentList = append(contentList, TransactionContent{From: from,
To: to, Timestamp: timestamp, Transaction: transaction})↪→
tree, err := merkletree.NewTree(contentList)
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
validRootHash, err := tree.VerifyTree()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
if !validRootHash {
err := tree.RebuildTree()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
validRootHash, err = tree.VerifyTree()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
if !validRootHash {
log.Fatalln(" Failed to build correct merkle
tree.")↪→
}
}
var tsxContentList []TransactionContent
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for _, c := range contentList {
tsxContentList = append(tsxContentList,
c.(TransactionContent))↪→
}
newBlock.TransactionList = tsxContentList
newBlock.Header = BlockHeader{
Generation: oldBlock.Header.Generation,
Index: oldBlock.Header.Index + 1,
Timestamp: time.Now().Format(time.RFC1123),
Hash: "",
PrevHash: oldBlock.Header.Hash,
RootHash: tree.MerkleRoot(),
Wallet: wallet,
Validator: validator.Pretty(),
Seed: seed,
}
newBlock.Header.Hash = CalculateHash(&newBlock)
return &newBlock
}
A node uses the IsBlockValid function to make sure block is valid by checking
index, and comparing the hash of the previous block. The hashing of the contect of
the Block struct is performed using SHA256.
func IsBlockValid(newBlock, oldBlock *Block) bool {
if oldBlock.Header.Index+1 != newBlock.Header.Index {
return false
}
if oldBlock.Header.Hash != newBlock.Header.PrevHash {
return false
}
if CalculateHash(newBlock) != newBlock.Header.Hash {
return false
}
var contentList []merkletree.Content
for _, c := range newBlock.TransactionList {
contentList = append(contentList, c)
}
tree, err := merkletree.NewTree(contentList)
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
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}
validRootHash, err := tree.VerifyTree()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
if !validRootHash {
err := tree.RebuildTree()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
validRootHash, err = tree.VerifyTree()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
if !validRootHash {
log.Fatalln(" Failed to build correct merkle tree
.")↪→
}
}
if fmt.Sprintf("%x", newBlock.Header.RootHash) !=
fmt.Sprintf("%x", tree.MerkleRoot()) {↪→
return false
}
return true
}
func CalculateHash(block *Block) string {
record := strconv.Itoa(block.Header.Index) +
block.Header.Timestamp + fmt.Sprintf("%x",
block.Header.RootHash) +
↪→
↪→
block.Header.PrevHash + MapToString(block.Header.Wallet)
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte(record))
hashed := h.Sum(nil)
return hex.EncodeToString(hashed)
}
Consensus
Consensus is the struct which handles the consensus mechanism of the platform. It
defines the TBlock, the time for blockchain creation in seconds, TChain, the time
for blockchain aggregation in seconds, and BlockThreshold, minimum number of
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blocks needed before aggregation. This also implements a transactionQueue, a
transaction pool to holds the new transactions in the network. In the current version,
a randomized mechanism is implemented as a consensus using RunConsensus()
function. The ReceiveUpdatedChain() accepts broadcasted blockchains, validates
them, and checks if they were sent by the validator. The NewConsensus() function
creates a new consensus which manages the consensus mechanism. The nodes run
the function RunConsensus() to run a consensus.
type Consensus struct {
Engine *Engine
TBlock int
TChain int
BlockThreshold int
random *mrand.Rand
transactionQueue []message.TransactionPayload
electedValidator peer.ID
queueMutex *sync.Mutex
blockchainMutex *sync.Mutex
running bool
}
func NewConsensus(engine *Engine, tBlock int, tChain int, blockThreshold
int) *Consensus {↪→
consensus := &Consensus{
Engine: engine,
TBlock: tBlock,
TChain: tChain,
BlockThreshold: blockThreshold,
random: mrand.New(mrand.NewSource(0)),
transactionQueue: []message.TransactionPayload{},
electedValidator: "",
queueMutex: &sync.Mutex{},
blockchainMutex: &sync.Mutex{},
running: false,
}
return consensus
}
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func (c *Consensus) RunConsensus() {
c.running = true
c.blockchainMutex.Lock()
blockchain := c.Engine.HostNode.Blockchain
lastBlock := (*blockchain)[len(*blockchain)-1]
c.blockchainMutex.Unlock()
lastBlockTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC1123,
lastBlock.Header.Timestamp)↪→
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)}
nextTBlockTime := lastBlockTime.Add(time.Second *
time.Duration(c.TBlock))↪→
nextTChainTime := lastBlockTime.Add(time.Second *
time.Duration(c.TChain))↪→
c.random.Seed(lastBlock.Header.Seed)
go func() {
for c.running {
if (time.Now().After(nextTBlockTime) ||
time.Now().Equal(nextTBlockTime)) &&
len(c.transactionQueue) > 0 {
↪→
↪→
buffer := []block.TransactionContent{}
c.electedValidator = ""
c.queueMutex.Lock()
for len(c.transactionQueue) > 0 {
t := c.dequeueTransaction()
if _, found := c.Engine.
HostNode.LiveWallet
[t.From.Pretty()];
found {
c.Engine.HostNode.
LiveWallet
[t.From.Pretty()]++
} else {
c.Engine.HostNode.LiveWallet
[t.From.Pretty()] = 1
}
buffer = append(buffer,
block.TransactionContent↪→
{From: t.From.Pretty(), To:
t.To.Pretty(), Timestamp:
t.Timestamp, Transaction:
t.Transaction})
↪→
↪→
↪→
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}
c.queueMutex.Unlock()
candidates := []string{}
for key := range c.Engine.
PeerList.Peers {
candidates = append(candidates,
key)↪→
}
sort.Strings(candidates)
validator := candidates[c.random.Intn
(len(candidates))]
pid, err := peer.IDB58Decode(validator)
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
c.electedValidator = pid
c.blockchainMutex.Lock()
lastBlock =
(*blockchain)[len(*blockchain)-1]↪→
c.blockchainMutex.Unlock()
lastBlockTime, err =
time.Parse(time.RFC1123,
lastBlock.Header.Timestamp)
↪→
↪→
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
if nextTBlockTime.Before
(lastBlockTime.Add(
time.Second * time.Duration
(c.TBlock))) {
c.random.Seed
(lastBlock.Header.Seed)
nextTBlockTime = lastBlockTime
}
if nextTChainTime.Before
(lastBlockTime.Add(time.Second *
time.Duration(c.TChain))) {
nextTChainTime = lastBlockTime
}
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go func() {
c.blockchainMutex.Lock()
if c.electedValidator ==
(*c.Engine.BasicHost).ID() {↪→
candidateBlock :=block.
CreateBlockWithList
(&lastBlock, buffer,
c.Engine.HostNode.
LiveWallet, (*c.Engine.
BasicHost).ID(),
time.Now().↪→
UTC().UnixNano())
currentChain := c.Engine.
HostNode.Blockchain
if (time.Now()
.After(nextTChainTime) ||
time.Now().↪→
Equal(nextTChainTime)) &&
len(*currentChain) >=
c.BlockThreshold↪→
&& len(lastBlock.
TransactionList) > 1 {
if c.electedValidator ==
(*c.Engine.BasicHost).ID() {↪→
aggregatedChain :=
c.aggregateChain(append(*currentChain,
*candidateBlock))
↪→
↪→
if aggregatedChain != nil {
c.Engine.broadcastBlockchain
(aggregatedChain)
}
}
nextTChainTime =
nextTChainTime.Add(time.Second *
time.Duration(c.TChain))
↪→
↪→
} else {
if block.IsBlockValid(candidateBlock,
&lastBlock) {↪→
c.Engine.broadcastBlockchain(
append(*currentChain, *candidateBlock))
} else {
if c.Engine.Verbose {
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fmt.Println("Block Creation: Block
validation failed!")↪→
}
}
}
}
c.blockchainMutex.Unlock()
}()
nextTBlockTime =
nextTBlockTime.Add(time.Second *
time.Duration(c.TBlock))
↪→
↪→
}
time.Sleep(time.Second)
}
}()
}
func (c *Consensus) ReceiveUpdatedChain(payload message.BlockchainPayload)
{↪→
c.blockchainMutex.Lock()
currentChain := c.Engine.HostNode.Blockchain
updatedChain := payload.Blockchain
if ((len(updatedChain) > len(*currentChain) &&
updatedChain[0].Header.Generation ==
(*currentChain)[0].Header.Generation) ||
↪→
↪→
updatedChain[0].Header.Generation >
(*currentChain)[0].Header.Generation) &&↪→
updatedChain[len(updatedChain)-1].Header.Validator ==
c.electedValidator.Pretty() {↪→
if len(updatedChain) == 1 ||
block.IsBlockValid(&updatedChain[len(updatedChain)-1],
&updatedChain[len(updatedChain)-2]) {
↪→
↪→
*c.Engine.HostNode.Blockchain = updatedChain
currentChain = c.Engine.HostNode.Blockchain
lastBlock := (*currentChain)[len(*currentChain)-1]
c.Engine.HostNode.LiveWallet = make(map[string]int)
for key, value := range lastBlock.Header.Wallet {
c.Engine.HostNode.LiveWallet[key] = value
}
bytes, err :=
json.MarshalIndent(*c.Engine.HostNode.Blockchain,
"", " ")
↪→
↪→
if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
}
if c.Engine.Verbose {
fmt.Printf("\x1b[32m%s\x1b[0m\n",
string(bytes))↪→
}
} else {
if c.Engine.Verbose {
fmt.Println("ReceiveUpdatedChain: Block
validation failed!")↪→
}
}
}
c.blockchainMutex.Unlock()
}
Chain Aggregation
The aggregateChain() functions takes a blockchain as input and returns an aggre-
gated block which is the genesis block of a new blockchain. The aggregation is per-
formed using weightedMovingAverage() functions which implements the weighted
moving average of the sensing data, stored in the blockchain.
func (c *Consensus) aggregateChain(blockChain []block.Block) []block.Block
{↪→
tempList := blockChain[len(blockChain)-1].TransactionList
newBlockChain := []block.Block{}
if len(tempList) > 1 {
txsList := []string{}
for _, c := range tempList {
txsList = append(txsList, c.Transaction)
}
aggregate :=
weightedMovingAverage(decodeTxsToFloat(txsList))↪→
newGenesisBlock := block.CreateGenesisBlock(
blockChain[0].Header.Generation+1,
&blockChain[len(blockChain)-1],↪→
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strconv.FormatFloat(aggregate, 'f', 6, 64),
blockChain[len(blockChain)-1].Header.Wallet,↪→
(*c.Engine.BasicHost).ID(),
time.Now().UTC().UnixNano())↪→
newBlockChain = append(newBlockChain, *newGenesisBlock)
if c.Engine.Verbose {
fmt.Println("Blockchain aggregated.")
}
} else {
newBlockChain = nil
}
return newBlockChain
}
func weightedMovingAverage(txsList []float64) float64 {
alpha := 0.1
wAvg := 0.0
if len(txsList) == 1 {
return txsList[0]
}
for i := range txsList {
wAvg = (1.0-alpha)*wAvg + alpha*float64(txsList[i])
}
return wAvg
}
Engine
Engine manages the host node and its communication over the network. It con-
tains a PeerList, which is a TimedPeerList struct type that stores a node’s peer
list alongside its update time. It assigns the current clusterID, Moniker, and ad-
dress to a node. The function CreateEngine() creates a new Engine thereby run-
ning a new node. The Engine handles the transaction listening, transaction and
blockchain broadcasting, and peer list updating through the startListening(),
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broadcastTransaction(), broadcastBlockchain(), and updatePeerList() func-
tions, respectively.
type Engine struct {
HostNode *node.Node
BasicHost *host.Host
PubSub *libp2pPubSub
Moniker string
Address string
ClusterID int
PeerList *TimedPeerList
NodeConsensus *Consensus
Verbose bool
shutdown bool
}
type TimedPeerList struct {
Timestamp time.Time
Peers map[string]string
}
func CreateEngine(moniker string, clusterID int, listenPort int) *Engine {
pubsub := new(libp2pPubSub)
host := pubsub.createPeer(moniker, listenPort)
pubsub.initializePubSub(*host)
engine := Engine{
HostNode: node.CreateNode(),
BasicHost: host,
PubSub: pubsub,
Moniker: moniker,
Address: getLocalHostAddress(*host),
ClusterID: clusterID,
PeerList: &TimedPeerList{time.Now(),
make(map[string]string)},↪→
NodeConsensus: nil,
Verbose: false,
shutdown: false,
}
engine.NodeConsensus = NewConsensus(&engine, tBlock, tChain,
blockThreshold)↪→
return &engine
}
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func (e *Engine) startListening() {
e.NodeConsensus.RunConsensus()
for !e.shutdown {
sender, message := e.PubSub.Receive()
if e.Verbose {
fmt.Println("\nIncoming broadcast...")
data := &msg.Message{}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(message), &data);
err != nil {↪→
log.Fatal(err)
}
fmt.Printf("Node %s sent Message of type: '%s'\n",
sender.Pretty(), data.Type)↪→
if data.Type == msg.TransactionType {
fmt.Println(message)
}
}
e.handleMessage(message)
}
e.NodeConsensus.StopConsensus()
err := (*e.BasicHost).Close()
if err != nil {
log.Println(err)
}
}
func (e *Engine) broadcastTransaction(to peer.ID, timestamp string, str
string) {↪→
from := (*e.BasicHost).ID()
rawData, err := json.Marshal(msg.TransactionPayload{From: from,
To: to, Timestamp: timestamp, Transaction: str})↪→
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
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message := msg.Message{Type: msg.TransactionType, RawPayload:
rawData}↪→
bytes, err := json.Marshal(message)
if err != nil {
log.Println(err)
}
e.PubSub.Broadcast(string(bytes))
}
func (e *Engine) broadcastBlockchain(blockchain []block.Block) {
rawData, err := json.Marshal(msg.BlockchainPayload{Blockchain:
blockchain})↪→
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
message := msg.Message{Type: msg.BlockchainType, RawPayload:
rawData}↪→
bytes, err := json.Marshal(message)
if err != nil {
log.Println(err)
}
e.PubSub.Broadcast(string(bytes))
}
func (e *Engine) updatePeerList(peerList map[string]string) {
e.PeerList.Timestamp = time.Now()
e.PeerList.Peers = peerList
for key := range e.PeerList.Peers {
if _, found := e.HostNode.LiveWallet[key]; !found {
e.HostNode.LiveWallet[key] = 0
}
}
}
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5.6.2 Running the Demonstration
To run the demonstration, we created a RunNodeManager() function which initial-
izes the node creation and management process. In this function, to simulate the
different regions, nodes are created as cluster and each cluster is considered as a dif-
ferent spatial region. The function defines the both number of clusters and number
of nodes per cluster. Each cluster is created from struct Cluster with an unique
ID. The function setupNetworkTopology() sets up a random and sparse network
topology. Finally, the function main() runs the platform.
var (
clusterCount = 4
nodesPerCluster = 5
initialPort = 10000
clusters = make([]Cluster, clusterCount)
txInterval = 5000
txPerMinute = (txInterval / 1000) * 60
txLoad = 0.2
maxInt = 1000
minInt = 0
inputRangeMean = (float64(maxInt-minInt) / 2.0) + float64(minInt)
)
type Cluster struct {
clusterID int
engines []*Engine
}
func RunNodeManager() {
counter := 0
for i := range clusters {
clusters[i] = Cluster{clusterID: i, engines: []*Engine{}}
clusters[i].engines = make([]*Engine, nodesPerCluster)
}
for _, cluster := range clusters {
engines := cluster.engines
defer shutdownEngines(engines)
for i := range engines {
engines[i] = CreateEngine(fmt.Sprintf("node %d",
counter), cluster.clusterID,
initialPort+counter)
↪→
↪→
counter++
}
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setupNetworkTopology(engines)
setupPeerLists(engines)
startListening(engines)
}
runTerminalInterface()
}
func setupNetworkTopology(engineSlice []*Engine) {
mrand.Seed(time.Now().UTC().UnixNano())
if len(engineSlice) > 1 {
edges := "Graph Topology: {"
for i := range engineSlice {
var n = i
for n == i || (len(engineSlice) > 2 &&
len((*engineSlice[i].BasicHost).Network().↪→
ConnsToPeer((*engineSlice[n].BasicHost).ID())) != 0) {
n = mrand.Intn(len(engineSlice))
}
connectHostToPeer(*engineSlice[i].BasicHost,
getLocalHostAddress(*engineSlice[n].BasicHost))↪→
edges += fmt.Sprintf("(%d, %d), ", i, n)
}
edges = strings.TrimSuffix(edges, ", ")
edges += "}"
fmt.Println(edges)
}
time.Sleep(time.Second * 2)
}
func main() {
engine.RunNodeManager()
}
Figures 5.10 to 5.14 present some screenshots of the demonstration. In the
demonstration, the following commands are implemented: SwitchCluster, Send,
SwitchNode, AutoSend, ManualSend, ShowActivity, PrintBlockchain, Shutdown.
Table 5.3 lists the description of the commands.
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Table 5.3: Table of Commands
Command Description
SwitchCluster Shows a different Cluster
Send Sends transaction with manual input to transaction
value and receiver
AutoSend Automatic transaction creation
ManualSend Resets transaction sending to Send from AutoSend
ShowActivity Visualizes the activities in the network
PrintBlockchain Prints the content of a blockchain
Shutdown Shutdowns the demonstration
Network Initialization
The Unix command go run src/main/sensor-chain.go creates the nodes and
clusters (in Figure 5.10, it creates 4 clusters, each with 5 nodes). In each cluster,
the connections between the nodes are set in random.
Genesis Block in a Newly Created Blockchain
Figure 5.11 depicts the content of a genesis block of a newly created blockchain for
cluster 0. The field Generation is 0, as no aggregation has been done yet in the
network. Similarly, the wallet and TransactionList are both empty.
Broadcasts and transactions in Blockchain
By using the ShowActivity command, figure 5.12 displays the detail of the new
transactions happened in a network. On the other hand, the figure 5.13 shows the
committed transactions in a block.
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Figure 5.10: Network initialization in the demonstration.
Figure 5.11: Genesis block in a newly created blockchain.
115
Figure 5.12: Transaction broadcasting in the demonstration.
Genesis Block After Aggregation
Figure 5.14 shows the content of the genesis blockchain after an aggregation. The
field Generation is set 2, meaning there two aggregation happened on a blockchain
so far. The Wallet contains the number of transactions made by the different
nodes in a cluster. In this version of genesis block, The Transaction field in
TransactionList is not empty. Rather, it contains the weighted average value
of the blockchain.
5.7 Discussion and Summary
In this chapter, we proposed “Sensor-Chain”, a lightweight scalable blockchain
framework for resource-constrained IoT sensor devices. In this framework, a con-
ventional blockchain is made lightweight in three steps. First, a global blockchain
is divided into smaller disjoint local blockchains in spatial domain such that the
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Figure 5.13: Transactions recorded in a blockchain.
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Figure 5.14: Genesis block after aggregation.
required storage space to hold a local blockchain for an IoT device is always smaller
than that in conventional blockchain. Second, a temporal constraint is imposed on
the life span of the local blockchains to limit their size in temporal domain. Finally,
a sensor node is required to keep at most one local blockchain in its memory at
any time instance. We analyzed and tested Sensor-Chain in terms of both long-run
performance and scalability; and compared with other approaches. Experimental
results show that it consumes far little storage space than other approaches.
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CHAPTER 6
QUANTIFYING TRAJECTORY PRIVACY IN
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT)
In this chapter, we study the trajectory privacy issue in a permissioned blockchain.
In such a blockchain, the authority of the system has control over the identities of
its users. Such information can allow an authority to map identities with their spa-
tiotemporal data, undermining the location privacy of a mobile user. We study the
problem under three conditions. First, the authority holds the public and private key
distribution task in the system. Second, there exists a spatiotemporal correlation
between consecutive location-based transactions. Third, users communicate with
each other through short-range communication technologies such that it constitutes
a proof of location (PoL) on their actual locations. We show that, in a permissioned
blockchain with an authority and a presence of a PoL, existing approaches cannot be
applied using a plug-and-play approach to protect location privacy. In this context,
we propose BlockPriv, an obfuscation technique that quantifies the relationship be-
tween privacy and utility in order to dynamically protect the location privacy in
the permissioned blockchain. The chapter is organized as follows. Sections 6.1 and
6.2 introduce the problem statement and hypothesis. The system model and attack
strategies are discussed in 6.3. The BlockPriv approach is detailed in section 6.4
and its several important security, privacy, and utility aspects are analyzed in sec-
tion 6.5. Experimental evaluation with real-world data of the proposed approach is
covered in section 6.6.
6.1 Introduction
To date, two main categories of blockchain have been studied in a variety of IoT
applications: public and permissioned. In the public version, the blockchain has
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no authority; a node can join and leave the network at any point with random
pseudonyms and can also change its public keys at any time instance (e.g., for every
transaction). This approach was first proposed by Nakamoto [Nak08], the creator of
blockchain and later widely adapted for almost all kinds of applications, including
smart home and vehicular network[ZN+15, DSKJ17, SK17]. It is considered that,
the certificate authority (CA) and the public blockchain are independent of each
other. Thus, the frequent pseudonym scheme makes the IoT nodes untraceable and
provides high privacy. In fact, in order to undermine trajectory privacy of a target
node, other nodes need to either collude with a large number of nodes over a large
region or track the target node physical, which is really hard to do, if not impossible,
in mobile environment.
However, in a permissioned blockchain, such a high level of privacy is not easily
attainable, as the authority of the blockchain controls the blockchain network with a
variety of access controls spanning from control over joining the network to perform
consensus mechanisms. Amazon’s Quantum Ledger Database (QLDB)[ama], J.P.
Morgan’s Quorum blockchain [Mor19], and Microsoft’s Azure blockchain [Azu] are
just a few examples of industry standard permissioned blockchains. Similar to many
other fields, permissioned blockchain is also being studied in the IoT of mobile de-
vices. The authority of the blockchain holds the public and privacy key distribution
task in the system which gives it an upper hand of tracking the the mobile devices.
The problem can be exacerbated if the communication between the nodes are based
on short-range communication. Such communication can be used to localize a target
node in spatiotemporal domain by generating proof-of-location (PoL) [ABMZ18] on
the node’s locations. In this context, We first discuss the limitations of existing
location privacy-preserving mechanisms under a PoL in the context of permissioned
blockchain. Then, we present an effective trajectory privacy-preserving approach,
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coined as BlockPriv and quantify the trade-off between privacy and utility theoret-
ically and empirically using two factual datasets.
6.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
In this work, we study the location privacy issue in the context of permissioned
blockchain, where: 1. the authority of the blockchain holds the public and privacy
key distribution task in the system, 2. a transaction can be considered as a proof of
location (PoL) for a user’s temporal whereabouts, and 3. there is a spatiotemporal
correlation between the locations. For better understanding, we draw motivation of
a permissioned blockchain from CreditCoin, a privacy-preserving blockchain frame-
work for the Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) [LLC+18]. In this framework, the
vehicles are required to be registered with the authority. This authority is respon-
sible for generating and providing the vehicles with cryptographic keys, and keep
track of the relationship between the vehicles and the provided keys. A set of trace
managers at different locations also aids the authority in tracking malicious vehi-
cles/users. In this framework, only road-side units (RSUs) and authorized vehicles
are responsible for managing the blockchain. This framework is built around the
short-range communication technology-based P2P network of the vehicles. Here,
the vehicles make transactions with their peers such that each transaction is signed
by each of the peer vehicles by their public keys. As these transactions are made
through a short-range communication technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth), they can
be treated as a proof-of-location (PoL) for the vehicles’ whereabouts in the spa-
tiotemporal domain. In some frameworks, such as the one proposed in [ABMZ18],
the proof of location is explicitly defined in the design. Based on the transaction in-
formation, the vehicles generate a rating about each other and forward them to the
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nearest RSU. The RSUs then compute the overall rating of each vehicle and append
the new rating into the blockchain. Similar motivation can also be drawn from the
work presented in [YYL+18]. Obviously, these frameworks can be integrated into
many other mobility-centric IoT scenarios, such as mobile crowdsensing. The RSUs
and smart vehicles can be replaced with Wi-Fi access points and low powered mobile
devices (e.g., smart phones and smart watches), respectively. In terms of location
privacy, these frameworks only guarantee conditional privacy to IoT users. That is,
the devices can enjoy privacy from their peers by using the public keys provided by
the authority. However, as the authority holds the mapping between real identity
and the public keys, the privacy of sensitive locations from a malicious authority
cannot be preserved using only a key changing mechanism. A malicious authority
can perform a spatiotemporal analysis of the disclosed locations of a user and can
reveal sensitive information. Against this backdrop, we seek answer to the following
problem: How can a user’s privacy preference for different locations and spatiotem-
poral mobility information over a map will help an obfuscation approach to prevent
a malicious blockchain authority from revealing trajectory of sensitive locations?
We hypothesize that a combination of spatiotemporal silence with spatial ob-
fuscation approach will allow to protect trajectory privacy of mobile users from a
malicious authority under PoL.
6.3 Background
In this section, we present the details of the system model and the behavior and
attack strategies of the malicious entities in the system. We then formulate the
problem and state the goals we set out to achieve in the design of its solution.
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Table 6.1: Table of Symbols
Symbol Description
MU Mobile user or mobile node
Nx Privacy parameter for a location lx
P(lh) Privacy level achieved for location lh
PrtMU(l) MU ’s probability of being at location l at time t
ls A sensitive location
S Set of all sensitive locations of a MU
U(l) Loss of utility for location l
Tr A trajectory
n Total number of sensitive locations in a Tr
δt Time difference
La Set of all locations reachable to/from location la
Φ(a, b) Required time to reach from location la to lb
|X| Size/number of elements in a set X
α % of location types selected as sensitive
r Privacy region radius
Figure 6.1: System model of permissioned-blockchain where BC and BA refer to
blockchain and blockchain authority, respectively. The BA also acts as certificate
authority and trace manager. The mobile IoT nodes are connected with each other
in a P2P network using a short-range communication technology. They make trans-
actions with each other and send information on the transactions (e.g., rating about
other mobile nodes at a specific location and time) to the nearest blockchain node.
Here, each grid refers to a specific location.
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6.3.1 Blockchain System Model
We consider a permissioned blockchain, where its authority also acts as the cer-
tificate authority to provide the public and private key pairs to the mobile nodes.
The mobile nodes are registered with the system and communicate with each other
using the preassigned key pairs. Communication between the nodes takes place us-
ing a short-rage communication technology. The nodes can request the authority
for new key pairs at any point of time. The blockchain is managed by preassigned
mobile edge computing devices (e.g., RSU, Wi-Fi access points, and so on), dis-
tributed over a large region. These devices constitute the blockchain nodes and are
connected with each other in a P2P network over the internet. The transactions
among the IoT nodes are broadcasted to the blockchain nodes in the blockchain
network. The blockchain nodes aggregate and insert the new transactions into the
blockchain through a consensus mechanism (e.g. practical byzantine fault tolerance,
proof-of-stake) in a timely fashion (e.g. every 30 minutes). We consider a blockchain
architecture similar to the one presented in CreditCoin [LLC+18] without consider-
ing the rewarding phase. We assume that the mobile nodes have internet capability
to compute the time to reach one location from another with the help of a traffic
information provider in real time, e.g., Google Maps. We also assume that the in-
formation between the traffic information service provider and a node is anonymous
and the provider is independent from the blockchain authority.
6.3.2 Attack Model
Malicious Entities
In the system, we consider the authority of the blockchain as the malicious entity.
It follows the honest-but-curious adversary model in the system. That is, it tries
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to predict a target node’s sensitive spatiotemporal information without violating
any protocol of the system or dismantling the way blockchain works. Furthermore,
it is not going to hack into the device of a target node. We also consider that,
in order to compute the time reachability information, the authority also uses a
traffic information service provider. From this point on, we refer the authority as
an attacker. It is important to note that some of the mobile nodes can be malicious.
However, as we mentioned earlier in the system model, the mobile nodes can change
their public keys at any point of time; the malicious mobile nodes cannot track a
target node from their transactions without colluding with the authority. This is a
fundamental privacy feature of blockchains. Thus, we focus on the attack strategies
of the blockchain authority.
Attacker’s Goal and Strategies
The goal of an attacker is to understand a mobile node’s presence at different lo-
cations in the temporal domain. In order to do so, it utilizes the time-reachability-
based spatiotemporal correlation between a node’s disclosed locations in the blockchain
as its fundamental strategy. Let the random variable OtMU represents the actual lo-
cation of a mobile node MU at time t. Given a node’s locations li, lj at time ta, tb
respectively, the node’s probability of being at a location lh at a discrete time tq
(ta < tq < tb) is
PrqMU(lh) = Pr(O
q
MU = lh|O
a
MU = li, O
b
MU = lj) (6.1)
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The attacker computes PrqMU(lh) using the time reachability correlation as follows.
PrqMU(lh) =

1 If lh is reachable to and from li
and lj in (tb − ta) time
0 Otherwise
(6.2)
Obviously, it is possible to have multiple locations with PrqMU(lh) = 1. Thus, the
ultimate goal of the attacker is to minimize the number of such locations. That is,
minimize
(∑
PrqMU(lh)
)
(6.3)
This forms the core of an attacker’s strategy. Based on this, we consider mainly
the following attacks that can be exploited by the attacker to infer a target node’s
location information.
(1) Collusion with malicious mobile nodes : Malicious nodes collude with the
authority and provide it with the location information of a target node for profit.
(2) Map matching attack : The authority employs the map information to un-
derstand spatially reachable and unreachable location information. A spatially un-
reachable location refers to a location that cannot be reached at any time using a
map service (e.g., the middle of a lake). Thus, Pr∞MU(l) = 0.
(3) Time-reachability-based path reconstruction attack : In order to reconstruct
the actual path between two revealed locations, the authority can use the time
reachability information to construct the valid paths that can be traveled between
the two locations within a time limit.
We also analyze the impact of transaction dropping attack on location privacy.
Note that, the scope of this work encompasses the analysis of location privacy invad-
ing attacks from a user’s point of view and thus different blockchain related attacks,
such as DDoS, Sybil, 51% attack, and eclipse attack are not covered here.
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6.3.3 Problem Formulation and Design Goals
It is clear that there is an important trade-off between location privacy and utiliza-
tion of the system. The problem lies with the short-range communication technology-
based transactions between the mobile nodes that form proof of locations (PoL) for
the nodes. Thus, in order to protect a sensitive location’s privacy, a mobile node
must remain silent in the network: that is, it must not make any transaction in
the network. This leads to the question of how long in both spatial and temporal
domains a node must remain silent to protect a sensitive location’s privacy. Remain-
ing silent infinitely results in a location privacy of 100%, but a system utilization of
0%. In other words, an indefinite silence will incur a 100% loss of utility. Hence,
the goal of this work is to formulate, design, implement, and evaluate a location
privacy-preserving mechanism, called BlockPriv, for mobile nodes in the context of
permissioned blockchain by solving the following problem:
minimize {P−1(ls),U(ls)} (6.4)
Here, P(ls) and U(ls) refer to the achieved privacy for sensitive location ls and the
loss of utility due to privacy preservation for ls, respectively.
To summarize, in the design of the BlockPriv mechanism, we intend to achieve
the following goals: 1. achieve privacy without collaborating with any other entity
in the system, and 2. achieve a quantifiable balance between privacy and utility.
6.4 The BlockPriv Approach
For the sake of clarity and to maintain coherence with the blockchain concept, we
first discuss the public key changing technique adapted in BlockPriv. In our scheme,
we adapt the temporal public key changing concept proposed by Michelin et al.
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[MDS+18]. Here, at a fixed time interval tkey, a mobile node will change its public
key in order to nullify the possibility of spatiotemporal linkage attack from malicious
nodes. Note that, in our problem, public key changing can only provide privacy to
a mobile node against its peers, not against the authority that distributes the keys.
Also, this scheme is vulnerable against colluding attack between the authority and
malicious mobile nodes, which is one of the focus of our work.
At this point, we present the formal definition of location privacy and utility
from the perspective of a mobile node. The definition of privacy can be derived
from the formulation of the attacker’s objective, defined by equation 6.3, as follows.
P(ls) = maximize
(∑
PrqMU(lh)
)
(6.5)
Let us consider: a node’s last revealed location in the blockchain is li at time ta, and
it was at a sensitive location lsh at time tq. It should reveal its location, also known
as making a transaction, at an insensitive location lj at time tb (ta < tq < tb) if and
only if
P(lsh) =
(∑
PrqMU(l
s
h)
)
≥ Nh (6.6)
To explain, a node should reveal its location lj at time tb in the network to the
authority when there exists at least Nq number of locations, including lsh, which are
both reachable from and to li and lj in (δt = tb− ta) time. Here, Nh is a user defined
privacy parameter for location lsh. This formulation is applicable only for a single
sensitive location. It is also possible that, after lsh, the node was also at another
sensitive location lsp at time tr (ta < tq < tr < tb) such that, after δt = tb − ta
time, P(lsh) ≥ Nh, but P(lsp)
)
< Np. In such a case, the node should not make any
transaction at location lj at time tb. Formally, if there are m number of sensitive
locations visited by a node between time ta and tb, then it will make a transaction
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with its peers at an insensitive location at time tb in the network if and only if
P(lsi ) =
(∑
PrqiMU(l
s
i )
)
≥ Ni; ∀i = 1, . . .m (6.7)
Note that, from ta to tb, the node was continuously silent in the network. We call it
single or 1 round silence to maintain privacy of the m number of sensitive locations.
If a trajectory Tr contains n number of sensitive locations, then the average privacy
of each sensitive location in that trajectory is defined as
P(Tr) =
1
n
∑
i
P(lsi ), i = 1, . . . n (6.8)
From the formulation of privacy, we can also define the loss of utility due to the
application of privacy preservation. Let us consider: at i-th round silence, the node
opted not to make any transaction at P(lsh) number of locations. In our definitions,
this number is the loss of utility of BlockPriv. If a node maintained k rounds of
silence to preserve privacy of a trajectory Tr with n number of sensitive locations,
then the average loss of utility for each sensitive location is
U(Tr) =
1
n
i=k∑
i=1
Ui (6.9)
This allows us to reconstruct the multi-objective optimization problem, presented
in equation 6.4, as a single objective optimization problem as follows:
minimize U(Tr)
s.t. P(lsi ) ≥ Ni;∀lsi ∈ Tr
(6.10)
Now we present in detail the mechanism of BlockPriv to solve this problem.
In this mechanism, the mobile nodes are responsible for labeling their sensitive
locations and assigning level of privacy to each of them. The nodes utilize radius r
to specify the level of privacy for a sensitive location as N = πr2. Let us consider:
a node MU made a transaction in the network at time ta at location li. Then, it
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Figure 6.2: Illustrated BlockPriv: The curve refers to a mobile node (MU)’s actual
path between l0, l1, and l2 locations at times t0, t1, and t2, respectively. The location
l1 is privacy sensitive for the MU . Thus, it remained silent at location l1. It will
make a blockchain transaction at l2 at time t2 only when the number of locations
reachable from both l0 and l2 in t2 − t0 time, meets the privacy requirement for l1.
moved to a privacy sensitive location lsh at time tq and did not make any transactions.
Then, after every ∆t time at location lj, different from both li and l
s
h, it checks the
number of locations that are reachable to and from li and lj. Let current time
and location be tb and lj, respectively. The node first computes the set of all the
locations Li that are reachable from li in δt = tb − ta time. Next, it computes the
set of all the locations Lj from which location lj is reachable. Then, L = Li ∩ Lj
forms the set of all locations from which both li and lj is reachable in δt time. In
other words, each of the location in L creates a valid 1-hop route from li to lj in δt
time. That is, based on the time reachability information, the node can move from
li to any location ll ∈ L and then move to lj in δt time. Thus,
L = {∀l|(Φ(li, l) + Φ(l, lj)) ≤ δt} (6.11)
Here, Φ(a, b) refers to the time to get from location a to b. The size of L defines the
privacy level achieved for sensitive location lsh in δt time. That is, P(lsh) = |L|. The
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node will make a transaction at time tj at location tb only when |L| ≥ Nh. If there
is a total m number of sensitive locations visited by the node in δt time, according
to equation 6.7, it will make a transaction at time tj and location lb if and only if
|L| ≥ Ni; ∀i = 1, . . .m (6.12)
It is understandable that, in the case when all the sensitive locations have the
same level of privacy, comparing L with the level of privacy of the latest sensitive
location is enough to check whether the condition in equation 6.7 is valid. However,
for sensitive locations with different levels of privacy, the MU is required to check
whether all the previous sensitive locations’ levels of privacy are met before making
any transaction.
For a single sensitive location ls, the maximum loss of utility Umax(ls) is bounded
by the value of its privacy parameter N . The higher the value of N , the higher the
Umax(ls). More specifically, Umax(ls) ≤ L. Certainly, from equation 6.10, we do not
want any “extra” loss in utility of the blockchain. Let ta is the last time when a
node’s location was revealed in the blockchain. After that, at every ∆t (∆t ∈ Z≥0)
time, it computes L and checks whether it meets the privacy requirement of a set
of sensitive locations. That is, after checking L at time (ta + x×∆t), it will check
L at time (ta + (x + 1) ×∆t). Here, x ∈ Z≥0. Let, t′, where (ta + x ×∆t) < t′ <
(ta+(x+1)×∆t), is the time when L ' N . Then, computing L at (ta+(x+1)×∆t)
time will certainly impose some extra loss of utilities. Thus, Umax(ls) ≤ N + U ′.
Here, U ′ refers to the set of insensitive locations at which the MU opted not to
make any transaction between time t′ and (ta + (x + 1) × ∆t). With the higher
value of ∆t, the value of U ′ will be higher. Thus, ∆t should remain as small as
possible. However, for resource-constrained mobile nodes, a very small ∆t means
very frequent computation of the time reachability, which affects the energy of the
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Algorithm 6: BlockPriv
Input: Current location lcur, current time tcur, last revealed location in the
blockchain lprev and time tprev, list of sensitive locations S, list of
level of privacy for the sensitive locations N , previous time of key
change tkeyprev, key expiration time t
key
Output: Decision on making transactions.
1 if (tcur − tkeyprev) ≥ tkey then
2 Request new key pair from the authority.
3 tkeyprev = tcur
4 if lcur is a sensitive location then
5 Append lcur to S and do not make any transaction.
6 else
7 δt← tcur − tprev
8 Lprev ← select all the locations that are reachable from lprev in δt time
9 Lcur ← select all the locations from which lcur is reachable in δt time
10 L ← Lprev ∩ Lcur
11 for (i = 1; i ≤ |S|; i+ +) do
12 if |L| ≥ N (lsi ∈ S) then
13 Delete lsi from S
14 if S 6= ∅ then
15 Do not make any transactions in the network.
16 else
17 Free to make transactions.
5
device. Thus, the compromise between the capability of the device and loss of utility
is an issue that needs to be examined: we leave it for our future work. The detail
of BlockPriv is presented in Algorithm 6.
6.5 Scheme Analysis
In this section, we present an analysis of the important privacy, utility, and security
aspects of BlockPriv.
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6.5.1 Privacy Analysis
Privacy Bound
Lemma 6.5.1 If there are multiple numbers of sensitive locations between two re-
vealed insensitive locations, then each of the sensitive locations achieves a privacy
level of (maxN ).
Proof. Let us suppose that a mobile node MU has visited m number of sensitive
locations between lprev and lcur in δt = (tcur − tprev) time. According to equation
6.12, it will make a transaction at location lcur and time tcur only when all of the
sensitive locations’ privacy requirements are met. That is, a new transaction will
take place only when the length of the set L ≥ (maxN = max{N1, . . .Nm}). Thus,
even if a sensitive location’s privacy requirement is much lower than (maxN ), the
achieved privacy for i-th sensitive location lsi in the set is P(lsi ) = |L| ≥ (maxN ).
Obfuscating Paths
Lemma 6.5.2 If there are any sensitive locations between two revealed insensitive
locations li and lj, then, at a minimum, there are (maxN ) number of 1-hop obfus-
cating paths between the two revealed locations.
Proof. Equation 6.11 implies that each location in the set L is reachable to and from
lpriv and lcur in δt time. Thus, from the point of reachability, each i-th location in
L forms a 1-hop path between lpriv and lcur in δt time.
As a result, each path formed by each sensitive location lsi ∈ L is obfuscated
with (|L| − 1) number of different other paths in δt time.
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6.5.2 Utility Analysis
Loss of Utility Bound.
Lemma 6.5.3 If there are multiple numbers of sensitive locations between two re-
vealed insensitive locations, then the maximum loss of utility Umax(ls) in BlockPriv
to preserve privacy of a sensitive location ls is proportional to (maxN ).
Proof. Lemma 6.5.1 states that whatever the expected level of privacy assigned to
a specific sensitive location, the achieved privacy is bounded by the location with
highest level of privacy maxN . Thus, the maximum loss of utility for every sensitive
location ls between the two revealed insensitive locations is Umax(ls) ≤ (maxN )+U ′.
6.5.3 Security Analysis
We analyze the efficacy of BlockPriv against different location privacy invading
strategies by a malicious authority of the blockchain system list in subsection 6.3.2.
We also briefly discuss the interesting impact of transaction dropping attack on
location privacy.
Collusion Attack.
Definition 6.5.4 A collusion with malicious mobile nodes is successful if the au-
thority of the blockchain can find a new set of locations L∗ about a MU ’s sensitive
location lsi such that
|L ∩ L ∗ | < Ni. (6.13)
Lemma 6.5.5 A combination of time reachability information and collusion with
other malicious nodes will not leak privacy of a target mobile node.
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Proof. In BlockPriv, a mobile node remains silent in the spatial and temporal do-
mains in order to preserve privacy against an untrusted authority of the blockchain.
Thus, even if the authority colludes with some mobile nodes, it will not be able
to construct a new set L∗ beyond L that would satisfy equation 6.13. In other
words, its understanding about a targeted node’s whereabouts will not be made any
finer than L by colluding with other nodes. In fact, collusion with mobile nodes
to track a target node is a costly approach. The target node changes its public
keys frequently and to keep tracking it, the authority needs to update the colluding
nodes at the same rate. The only way a colluding attack will be successful is if
a malicious node physically tracks a target node. However, our work concentrates
on providing security against software-based privacy invading techniques, not on
physical observations.
Map Matching Attack.
Definition 6.5.6 For a sensitive location ls, a map matching attack is considered to
be successful if a attacker can find a set of locations L∗ from L such that, (L∗ ⊂ L∗),
(|L ∗ | > 0), and Pr∞MU(li) = 0; ∀li ∈ L∗.
Lemma 6.5.7 BlockPriv is resilient against map matching attack.
Proof. The mobile node calculates the time reachability information using a real-
time map service provider and thus each location l, selected to form L, is spatially
reachable. That is, L = {∀l ∈ L|Pr∞MU(l) = 1}. Thus, L∗ = ∅.
Time Reachability-Based Path Reconstruction Attack.
Definition 6.5.8 A time reachability-based path reconstruction attack on BlockPriv
is said to be successful if, for a sensitive location ls, the authority can find fewer than
N number of paths between two revealed locations for a mobile node.
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Lemma 6.5.9 BlockPriv is resilient against time reachability-based path reconstruc-
tion attack.
Proof. According to equation 6.11, every location li ∈ L, including every sensitive
location, is reachable from previously revealed location lprev to lcur in δt time. Thus,
according to lemma 6.5.2, there are at least maxN number of 1-hop obfuscating
paths from lprev to lcur for li.
We can now generalize the analysis for multi-hop paths. Let the actual path be:
lprev → ls1 → ls2 → lcur and the temporal sequence of this path be: tprev → t1 → t2 →
tcur. Hence, δt = Φ(lprev, l
s
1) + Φ(l
s
1, l
s
2) + Φ(l
s
2, lcur). Assume that, using BlockPriv,
we got L, where {ls1, ls2} ∈ L. For the sake of argument, let us consider, for every
location l ∈ L′ (L′ = L \ {ls1, ls2}), there exists no multi-hop path. In such a case,
if somehow it is known that the node visited multiple locations between lprev and
lcur, then the attacker can exclude all the single hop paths and is able to reconstruct
the actual path: lprev → ls1 → ls2 → lcur. However, in BlockPriv, the node remains
silent in the network, such that every location in L exhibits similar probability of
being the node’s whereabouts under the time reachability condition. Also, such
a special case can occur only when Pr∞MU(l) = 0; ∀l ∈ L′. This case falls into
the category of a map matching attack and lemma 6.5.7 proves that BlockPriv is
resilient against such an attack. Hence, time reachability information cannot help a
malicious authority to reconstruct the actual path.
Transaction Dropping Attack.
In this attack, a mobile node MUi attempts to drop the transactions between itself
and another node MUj for a specific intention (e.g. preventing the other node from
gaining reward out of ill intention or to protect its instance location privacy). There
are two cases to consider here. First, MUj passes the transaction information to
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(a) New York City (NYC) (b) Tokyo (TKY)
Figure 6.3: Locations in (a) New York City (NYC) and (b) Tokyo (TKY) datasets.
Green markers symbolize the locations. The red colors represent the high density
regions.
the nearest blockchain node and thus MUi’s location information is revealed. In
such a case, MUi’s attempt to protect location privacy will failed. Second, if MUj
also drop the transaction, then both the nodes’ location information will remain
undisclosed in the blockchain.
6.6 Experimental Evaluation
Table 6.2: Dataset Statistics
Dataset #Transactions* #Locations #Types #Nodes*
NYC 227428 38333 400 1083
TKY 573703 61858 385 2293
*Originally called “Checkins” and “Users”. In this context, we renamed the
variables “Transactions” and “Nodes”, respectively.
In this section, we describe the details regarding the experimental evaluation of
BlockPriv. To properly understand the efficiency and efficacy of our approach, we
implemented two cases: locations with 1. similar privacy parameter and 2. different
privacy parameters. These two versions will be referred to as sim-BlockPriv and
diff-BlockPriv, respectively.
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Table 6.3: Simulation Setup Parameters
Parameter Value(s)
r {500, 1000, 1500, 2000} meters
γ {5,10,15,20}
v 30 miles per hour
α {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
n 100
6.6.1 Experimental Settings
Dataset Description
In this work, we consider the case of making frequent transactions in the network.
Hence, we selected Foursquare’s New York City (NYC) and Tokyo (TKY) datasets
[YZZY15] to test the approach with factual data. These datasets contain the check-
in information of nodes, in terms of location and time. The number of transactions,
locations, location types, and nodes of the datasets are presented in Table 6.2 and
a visualization of the locations in the datasets are depicted in Figure 6.3.
Simulation Setup
The datasets do not contain any mark on the privacy sensitive locations of the
mobile nodes. Thus, we mark α% of the location types as sensitive locations for
all the nodes. The different values of the parameters, including privacy level for
a sensitive location r, used in the experiment, are shown in Table 6.3. For each
combination of the parameters, we ran the simulation on both datasets for n number
of nodes. As there is a correlation between the number of transactions and the
impact of privacy on utility, we selected 100 nodes with the highest number of
transactions. We justify this claim through comparing the result with 100 nodes with
least number of transactions. Next, since the datasets do not contain continuous
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Table 6.4: Pearson’s Correlation Values
Dataset Statistics U-P U-S
NYC
Minimum 0.75 0.44
Average 0.94 0.92
Maximum 1.00 0.99
TKY
Minimum 0.75 0.74
Average 0.95 0.95
Maximum 1.00 0.99
U-P: Loss of Utility vs. privacy level
U-S: Loss of Utility vs. sensitive location types
location information, we set a speed (v) for each node to simulate its reachability-
based mobility. By nature of mobility, there are cases when a node cannot reach a
new location, lnew, from a previous location, lprev in a certain time, in the dataset
with speed v. In these cases, we continue adding a small value to v (e.g. v/5)
until it can reach lnew. In diff-BlockPriv, the difference in the privacy level for
different sensitive locations is set by drawing a random number from the range
{r − (r × γ%), r + (r × γ%)}.
6.6.2 Experiment Results
In the experiment, we examine the loss of utility of sim-BlockPriv and diff-BlockPriv.
In particular, we examine the following two relationships, fundamental to the design
of a privacy-preserving mechanism: 1. loss of utility versus privacy level, and 2. loss
of utility versus number of sensitive locations.
Utility versus Privacy Level
We first examine the relationship between the loss of utility and privacy (in term of
radius r in meters). For example, Figures 6.4(a-d) visually show this relationship
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(a) NYC (α = 2%) (b) NYC (α = 10%)
(c) TKY (α = 2%) (d) TKY (α = 10%)
Figure 6.4: Average loss of utilities versus privacy level in sim-BlockPriv and diff-
BlockPriv.
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Figure 6.5: Distribution of loss of utilities in sim-BlockPriv, regarding different
privacy levels.
for both sim-BlockPriv and diff-BlockPriv when there are a few number of sensitive
locations(α = 2%) and a significant number of sensitive locations(α = 10%). Each
data point in a figure refers to the average of the 100 users of a specific city. From
these figures, we can make several important occlusions. First, we can draw a
clear comparison between sim-BlockPriv and diff-BlockPriv, regarding the impact
of privacy level r on the loss of utilities. From the city level view, for the same value
of r, sim-BlockPriv imposes less utility loss than diff-BlockPriv due to the privacy
level randomness associated in diff-BlockPriv.
Second, there is an almost linear correlation between the loss of utility and
privacy level, regardless of the number of sensitive location types (α) in the dataset.
We observe a similar upward trend of loss of utility against the increase in the
privacy level for α = 2% and α = 10% in both of the datasets. The distribution of
loss of utility in Figure 6.6.2 further improves the resolution of this linearity. If we
look into the exact numeral values, presented in Table 6.4, the average Pearson’s
correlation values [BCHC09] are 0.94 and 0.95 for the NYC and TKY datasets,
respectively. Such linear correlation and lower loss of utility give sim-BlockPriv an
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(a) NYC (r = 500 meter) (b) NYC (r = 2000 meter)
(c) TKY (r = 500 meter) (d) TKY (r = 2000 meter)
Figure 6.6: Average loss of utility versus number of sensitive location types (α) in
sim-BlockPriv and diff-BlockPriv.
upper hand in designing a user-centric privacy scale, which we intend to explore in
our extension of this work.
Utility versus Number of Sensitive Location Types
We then analyze the correlation between loss of utility and number of sensitive
location types (α). While the analysis of the relationship between utility and privacy
level show that the sim-BlockPriv charges less utility loss than diff-BlockPriv, the
correlation between utility and number of sensitive location types further signifies
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.7: sim-BlockPriv: comparison between the distribution of loss of utility for
different numbers of sensitive location types (α) for r =(a) 500 meter, and (b) 2000
meter.
the superiority of sim-BlockPriv. Figures 6.6(a-d) present the average loss of utility
for different values of α. We found that, regardless of the value of privacy level r,
there is a linear correlation between utility and α. For the same value of r, the
higher the value of the α, the higher the loss of utility. However, the increase of loss
of utility is slightly sharper in diff-BlockPriv than in sim-BlockPriv. This sharpness
is due to the effect of both the increase in the number of sensitive location types
and the randomness in the privacy level. As we already know that sim-BlockPriv is
better than diff-BlockPriv, we only present the distribution of loss of utility in sim-
BlockPriv in Figure 6.7. For the same reason, we skipped the depiction of impact
of different γ in diff-BlockPriv. Similar to the average values in Figure 6.6, the
distributions of the loss of utility exhibit a linear correlation. More accurately, the
average correlation is 0.92 and 0.95 in the NYC and TKY datasets, respectively.
As we mentioned earlier, such a linear correlation can play important role to make
BlockPriv usable for privacy-preserving applications.
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User Level Correlation Analysis
Figure 6.6.2 depicts the correlation values for loss of utility versus privacy level (U-
P) and loss of utility versus number of sensitive location types (U-S) for 100 users;
Table 6.4 presents different statistics (min, average, and max) on these values. It is
observed that in the NYC dataset, 75% of the nodes have 0.9 correlation for both
U-P and U-S. In the case of the TKY dataset, these numbers are 82% and 84%,
respectively. Note that, these statistics are generated by considering the 100 nodes
with the greatest number of transactions in the datasets. We found that, when the
number of transaction is fewer, the loss of utility is significantly less. For instance, in
both datasets, the 100 nodes with fewest number of transactions achieved minimum
30% less loss of utility than the 100 nodes with highest number of transactions.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce a user-centric obfuscation technique called BlockPriv,
to preserve location privacy in permissioned blockchain-based IoT systems. We con-
sider that a user cannot falsify its location and an untrusted authority can correlate
locations by considering spatiotemporal constraints to predict unrevealed sensitive
locations of a user. We quantify the relationship between the notion of privacy and
utility of the system in BlockPriv. We analyze two variations of BlockPriv, sim-
BlockPriv and diff-BlockPriv, where the first has the same privacy level for all the
sensitive locations, and the second has a different privacy level for different sensitive
locations. We show that there is a linear correlation between loss of utility and
privacy level in sim-BlockPriv. Such linearity can be exploited to define a usable
privacy scale.
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Figure 6.8: sim-BlockPriv: correlation values (Corr. value) of loss of utility versus
privacy level (U-P) and loss of utility versus number of sensitive location types (U-S)
for 100 users in NYC and TKY datasets.
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CHAPTER 7
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE WORK, AND CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we study the trajectory privacy preservation issue in both
centralized and blockchain-based P2P decentralized network for location-based ser-
vices (LBSs). In chapter 3, we propose a delay-aware long-term privacy preserva-
tion technique for frequently visited locations in query-based LBS. We then design
a trajectory inference attack model by considering the spatiotemporal correlation of
checkins, photos, and geo-tagged photos, test it on dummy-based obfuscation mech-
anisms and present its countermeasure in chapter 4. Afterward, in chapter 5, we
introduce a framework for making blockchain lightweight for resource-constrained
IoT devices towards achieving trajectory privacy in aggregation-based IoT systems,
for instance, mobile crowdsensing applications. In chapter 6, we introduce a privacy-
preserving obfuscation mechanism to protect against location inference attacks in
permissioned-blockchain. In this chapter, we discuss the limitations of each of these
works, future directions, and concluding remarks.
7.1 Limitations
7.1.1 Delay-Aware Long-Term Privacy Preservation for Fre-
quently Visited Locations
We design a delay-aware long-term privacy-preserving obfuscation technique, coined
as “KLAP” for frequently visited locations. KLAP considers a user’s historical
information and real-time traffic information (RTTI) over the road network such
that an attacker cannot distinguish the locations in a concealing region (CR) from
the real location using a variety of inference attacks including probabilistic and
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movement boundary-based inferences. It also includes a CR pruning technique such
that with a small compromise in privacy for infrequent sensitive locations, it is
possible to ensure the privacy of frequently visited sensitive locations against long-
term observation-based attack. However, there are several limitations to this work.
First, it can incur high computation cost for computing the CR. Second, the spatial
and temporal transition probabilities between locations are not considered for which
an attacker with a model (e.g., Markov chain) based on such information can leak
location privacy in the proposed scheme. Third, KLAP would leak privacy in case
of group mobility. If an attacker gains information regarding group mobility, it can
correlate the CRs of different users and compromise their privacy. For instance, in
figure 3.1(b), if three different users generated the CRs in a short period, then an
attacker can perform region intersection attack to get all of their location information
at higher precision.
7.1.2 Location Inference Attacks on Geo-Tagged and Non
geo-Tagged data and Their Countermeasures
We propose a location inference attack model to study the impact of a combi-
nation of spatiotemporally correlated geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged contents on
existing trajectory obfuscation mechanisms. We design the model in the context of
location-based social networks (LBSN) for checkins and photo-sharing and apply it
on dummy-based obfuscation approach. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to investigate the impact of historical shared photos on location
privacy. Our experiment with factual data reveals a negative impact of the attack
model. To negate such a negative impact, we also propose an improved lightweight
probabilistic countermeasure. Our contribution also includes a visualization ap-
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proach to visualize privacy-preserving checkins and photo in LBSN. This work can
be further improved by addressing the following limitations. Similar to our work on
KLAP, the proposed approach does not consider the spatial and temporal transition
probabilities between locations for both geo-tagged and non-geo-tagged data. Also,
the proposed approach is only tested with historical data on checkins and photos.
It can be improved further by considering different other types of information in
LBSN, including, hashtags, tips, and video. Also, neither the attack model nor its
countermeasure considers the group mobility of the users, which can be exploited
by an attacker.
7.1.3 Spatiotemporal Blockchain Management for Resource-
Constrained IoT devices to Achieve Decentralized Pri-
vacy
We introduce an innovative approach, coined as “Sensor-Chain”, to make blockchain
lightweight and privacy-friendly for sensor-based mobile IoT systems. We show
that, by considering the spatial, temporal, and mobility information, it is possible
to reduce the size of a blockchain while retaining important information about the
system. The proposed approach ensures transaction privacy in a distributed and
lightweight manner for the IoT sensor devices by adapting local differential privacy-
preserving mechanism. We further demonstrate the efficiency and efficacy of Sensor-
Chain by developing its prototype. The demonstration is still in its early stage, and
it is not tested yet on IoT devices. Besides this, the proposed approach has several
other drawbacks. The spatial subdivision of the plane in the proposed approach is
static, which reduces the broad scope of the proposed approach. In addition to this,
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the local differential privacy-preserving mechanism opens the door to distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attack in the network. The malicious or compromised
devices can collude and deploy DDoS attack on targeted devices by making a large
number of transactions. Hence, the targeted devices will eventually run out of
their privacy budget and the colluding devices, with their low privacy budget, can
monopolize the network for some time. Another significant drawback is the lack of
an approach to establish communication between the independent blockchains. As
such, Sensor-Chain is not applicable in applications where different clusters of IoT
nodes required inter-cluster communication.
7.1.4 Quantifying Location Privacy in Permissioned Blockchain-
Based Internet of Things (IoT)
We propose a study of the privacy concerns with the location information in the
scope of permissioned blockchain. The uniqueness of our study lies in consider-
ation of short-term communication-based peer-to-peer location-based transactions
for which an IoT node cannot falsify about its location. In this context, we de-
sign a location inference attack model and show that existing approaches, such as
k-anonymity, dummies, or geo-indistinguishability, cannot be applied directly to
preserve location information under such an attack model. We further propose a
solution, an obfuscation mechanism based on the spatiotemporal mobility of the
nodes, to nullify the attack model. The proposed approach is resilient against dif-
ferent types of attacks, including collusion, map matching, time reachability-based
path reconstruction, and transaction attacks. However, it has several security lim-
itations. It is susceptible against off-chain information-based attack. An attacker
can combine off-chain information (e.g., information about the hours of operation of
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a business) with the map matching attack to devise a better inference model. It is
vulnerable against probabilistic inference attack from on-chain information. Here,
an attacker can personalize the mobility of the node from the information available
on the chain using machine learning algorithms and can able to improve the path
reconstruction attack.
7.2 Future Work
Besides addressing the limitations mentioned above, we propose the following signif-
icant directions that can improve the current state-of-the-art and provide a better
perspective of the future of trajectory privacy preservation techniques.
7.2.1 Secure and Privacy Preserving Inter- Blockchain Com-
munication Scheme for IoT
In this dissertation, the research focuses on intra-blockchain communication. A
significant direction to move forward with this dissertation is with the theory and
development of efficient schemes for the different aspects of communication amongst
multiple blockchains for mobility-centric IoT. The different research issues with
interoperability among multiple blockchains have attracted some attention lately
[FBS19, JDX18, ZJ18, BCD+14]. However, mobility-centric IoT is characterized
by the communication latency, mobility, low resources, and short-range connectiv-
ity of the devices for which existing interoperability approaches for inter-blockchain
communication cannot be applied directly in mobility-centric IoT applications. The
goal of this research direction is to devise and implement efficient interoperability
approaches for inter-blockchain communications. This research includes productive
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asset searching across multiple blockchains, data interpretation, ensuring atomicity,
and identifying and mitigating trajectory privacy and security issues in the process
of interoperability.
Interoperability Method for Cross-Blockchain Data Search
The first step towards cross-blockchain communication is to ensure efficient data
search under uncertainty. The efficacy and efficiency of a data search approach
depend on its adaptability to different storage capabilities of the nodes, nodes un-
availability, and link failure. In a blockchain, the IoT devices with shorter storage
capacities would run out of storage space and cannot hold new blocks. One straight-
forward solution is to delete the old blocks from the storage [DOA16]. This raises
the question of how to search an old block at a later time in the same network. One
approach to address this problem is to flood the entire network [GHG+13], which
is costly in terms of communication efficiency and latency. A better alternative is
the LeapChain[RS18], which reduces the block traversal cost without compromising
data integrity. It proposed to include one additional backlink such that it is possible
to jump over many blocks without looking to the intermediate blocks. It assumes
that there exists a prover device in the network which is capable of holding the
whole blockchain. In a mobile scenario, such an assumption is weak as the prover
devices can leave a network for many reasons, including becoming out of range, or
due to power failure. All the prover devices can be out of a network where an intra-
blockchain search would fail, and for which it is required to explore inter-blockchain
data searching mechanisms. Existing approaches for cross-chain data searching, such
as SideChain [BCD+14] or interoperable blockchain [JDX18], will also not work due
to the mobility of the devices and uncertainty in the communication for which it is
needed to address the problems with delay and drop in the communication.
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Blockchain Switchover Under Uncertainty
To deal with the delay, one possible solution could be the blockchain switchover.
Suppose, a node is trying to search specific data which can be found in multiple
blockchains. However, it does not know with which blockchain to communicate.
In such a case, querying the blockchain with higher throughput can yield better
search performance [HLP18]. A throughput-based ranking of different blockchains
[FBS19] can be helpful to design effective and efficient switchover technique. While
blockchain switchover may also help with the search request drop, it cannot deal
with the situation when there exists no blockchain to provide the desired data. Thus,
it is necessary to integrate spatiotemporal constraints in the design of the switchover
technique.
Security Issues in Inter-Blockchain Communication
The last and final step towards the design of inter-blockchain communication is to
identify, quantify, and mitigate several security issues in inter-blockchain communi-
cations of mobility-centric IoTs. One crucial issue is the DDoS attack where an entire
cluster of nodes acts maliciously and deploys DDoS attack on targeted blockchains.
The malicious group does not use the security holes of a mobility-centric IoT but
instead launches attacks on its availability. The impact of such group-based DDoS
attack is far more severe than the DDoS attack performed on individuals as the vol-
ume of traffic generated by a malicious group can instantly paralyze the blockchains
of victim mobility-centric IoTs. It is required to understand the nature of the DDoS
attacks, which can be used for proactive detection and mitigation of the attack.
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7.2.2 Developing Privacy-Preserving and Secure Scheme for
Merging Multiple mobility-centric IoT Blockchains
Another untouched but very important issue to make blockchain a reality for the IoT
is the enablement of real-time merging of multiple mobility-centric IoT blockchains
into one. Consider multiple clusters of devices, each having its own blockchain with
different consensus and lightweight mechanisms. At some point in time, for some
reasons the clusters decide to merge into one. In such a scenario, the task is to merge
the different blockchains into one in a secure and privacy-preserving way such that
integrity of the individual blockchain remains intact. The task includes, reaching
a consensus in the process of merging the blockchains, preventing data loss while
merging with limited resource (e.g. limited storage capacity of the devices), and
maintaining security and privacy in the process of merge.
Consensus on Consensus
Another untouched but crucial issue to make blockchain a reality for the IoT is the
enablement of the real-time merging of multiple mobility-centric IoT blockchains
into one. Consider multiple clusters of devices, each having its blockchain with
different consensus and lightweight mechanisms. At some point in time, for some
reasons, the clusters decide to merge into one. In such a scenario, the task is to merge
the different blockchains into one in a secure and privacy-preserving way such that
integrity of the individual blockchain remains intact. The task includes reaching
a consensus in the process of merging the blockchains, preventing data loss while
merging with a limited resource (e.g., the limited storage capacity of the devices),
and maintaining security and privacy in the process of the merge.
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Efficient Approach for Merging
Merging multiple blockchains into one is constrained by many factors. The first
factor is the ordering of the merged blockchain and how to achieve it. In a blockchain,
the blocks are linked with each other in a timely fashion using their hashes. If we
want to maintain the time sequence, then the security by hashes would be violated,
and a new hash would be required to generate. For large blockchains, such an
approach can incur high delay and communication cost. Thus, thorough research
is needed to device an efficient merging approach. Another vital factor associated
with merging is the limited resource of the devices. Merging of multiple blockchains
can yield an extensive blockchain which may not be within the storage capacity of
a device. Thus, a merging approach must be made practical to deal with such a
factor. There are much severe security and privacy factors that must be taken into
account while designing merging an approach. For instance, colluding groups can
utilize their majority benefit to take over the merged blockchain. Also, the merging
can cause inter-blockchain privacy tension as the private data from one blockchain
can be leaked due to the merging.
7.2.3 Distributed Spatiotemporal Federated Learning using
Blockchain and Smart Contract
Traditional machine learning approaches require a centralized entity to collect data
from all the users and learn a model from it. Such an approach leaks an individual’s
privacy, incurs high communication cost, and is susceptible to a variety of security
vulnerabilities, including a single point of failure. Federate learning[KMY+16] was
proposed to improve these problems by allowing to train a high-quality centralized
model while training data remains distributed over the users. In this approach,
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a preliminary model is shared by the centralized entity with each user; each user
updates the model based on his/her local data, and send it back to the centralized
entity. While federated learning promises better privacy and security than orthodox
machine learning, it is still in an inchoate state and spatiotemporal aspect of this not
fully understood. Besides, individual’s data, in terms of the model, are still at the
hand of the centralized entity for which the degree of trust and privacy can are ques-
tionable. One way to redesign the federated learning approach for spatiotemporal
applications (e.g., mobile crowdsensing) with improved trust and privacy is by us-
ing blockchain and smart contract. The blockchain and smart contract would allow
users to train machine learning models for a reward in a trustless manner without
relying on a centralized entity. The smart contract will facilitate automatic valida-
tion of a shared model on the blockchain, and reward and penalize the users based
on the output of the validation process. Such an approach has great potential in de-
signing more secure and privacy-preserving location-based recommendation systems
for IoT systems. Another potential is the creation of an AI market where parties
good at solving machine learning problems can directly monetize their skillset, and
others can solicit machine learning solutions.
7.3 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we present methods to identify and mitigate different privacy
issues associated with the location information shared in an IoT system. The scope
of this research covers both centralized and decentralized P2P architectures for IoT.
In our first study, we propose an approach to define a balance between privacy and
quality of service in real-time IoT systems such that a user’s location information
remains protected in the long-term of the use of the system. We further investi-
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gate the issue with the consideration of system usages with both geo-tagged and
non-geo-tagged data. We show that current existing approaches, designed with the
focus of geo-tagged-data, leak privacy in the presence of heterogeneous data in the
system. We propose a privacy-preserving framework for heterogeneous data sharing
in the context of location-based social network (LBSN). We study the problem in
blockchain-based decentralized IoT systems as well. Blockchain, despite its vari-
ety of benefits, is not directly applicable in resource-constrained IoT systems as it
requires a large amount of resources on the IoT devices. Thus, before analyzing
and addressing its privacy issues, we first propose an approach to reduce its storage
requirement by considering the spatiotemporal mobility of IoT devices. Afterward,
we study the trajectory privacy issue in a permissioned blockchain where the short-
range communication between the devices forms proof-of-locations. We propose an
obfuscation technique that quantifies, both theoretically and experimentally, the re-
lationship between privacy and utility to dynamically protect the privacy of sensitive
locations in the permissioned blockchain.
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